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Study 1: Kuzmanovic, B., Georgescu, A. L., Eickhoff, S. B., Shah, N. J., Bente, 
G., Fink, G. R., & Vogeley. K. (2009). Duration matters: dissociating 
neural correlates of detection and evaluation of social gaze. Neuroi-
mage, 46(4), 1154-1163. 
 
Study 2: Kuzmanovic, B., Schilbach, L., Lehnhardt, F.-G., Bente, G., & Voge-
ley, K. (2011). A matter of words: Impact of verbal and nonverbal in-
formation on impression formation in high-functioning autism. Re-
search in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 5, 604–613. 
 
Study 3: Kuzmanovic, B., Bente, G., von Cramon, D. Y., Schilbach, L., Tittge-
meyer, M., & Vogeley, K. (2012). Imaging first impressions: Distinct 
neural processing of verbal and nonverbal social information. Neuroi-
mage, 60(1), 179-188. 
 
Study 4: Santos, N. S., Kuzmanovic, B., David, N., Rotarska-Jagiela, A., Eick-
hoff, S. B., Shah, J. N., Fink, G. R., Bente, G., & Vogeley. K. (2010). 
Animated brain: a functional neuroimaging study on animacy experi-
ence. Neuroimage, 53(1), 291-302. 
 
Under review: 
 
Study 5: Kuzmanovic, B., Schilbach, L., Georgescu, A. L., Kockler, H., Santos, 
N. S., Shah, J. N., Bente, G., Fink, G. R., & Vogeley. K. (under re-
view). When seeing does not lead to feeling: Absent neural responses 
to increasing animacy judgments in high-functioning autism. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. 
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1.1 Own contributions to experimental studies 
 
Study 1: B.K. designed the experimental paradigm, collected the data, con-
ducted the statistical analyses, prepared the first version of the manu-
script and implemented the comments of co-authors and reviewers into 
the final version of the manuscript. The completion of the experimental 
paradigm and the data collection were part of diploma thesis by B.K., 
while the rest of the work was conducted within the doctoral thesis 
preparation. 
 
Studies 2-3: B.K. designed the experimental paradigm, collected the data, con-
ducted the statistical analyses, prepared the first version of the manu-
script and implemented the comments of co-authors and reviewers into 
the final version of the manuscript. 
 
Study 4: B.K. conducted the statistical analyses, wrote the statistical analysis 
and results section of the manuscript and commented the manuscript 
draft.  
 
Study 5: While using the experimental design by Natacha S. Santos, B.K. col-
lected the data, conducted the statistical analyses, prepared the first 
version of the manuscript and implemented the comments of co-
authors and reviewers into the final version of the manuscript. 
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2 List of abbreviations 
Brain regions:  
ACC anterior cingulate cortex (1)  
dmPFC dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (2)  
FFG fusiform gyrus (5)  
mPFC medial prefrontal cortex (1-4)  
mOFC medial orbitofrontal cortex (3)  
PaCC paracingulate cortex (4)  
PC precuneus (6)  
PCC posterior cingulate cortex (6)  
pSTS posterior superior temporal sulcus (7)  
STG superior temporal gyrus  
TP temporal pole (8) 
TPJ temporoparietal junction (9) 
Fig. 2.1 Anatomical locations of 
abbreviated brain region labels. 
Adapted from Lieberman, 2010. 
   
Other:   
BOLD blood oxygenation level dependent  
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging  
HFA high functioning autism  
SoE strength of evaluation  
SOF subjective-objective fit  
ToM theory of mind  
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3 General introduction 
Social brain theory proposes that humans are equipped with sophisticated skills to de-
tect, interpret and react to social stimuli in their environment in order to enhance their 
survival success (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). When living in extended and complex so-
cial groups, these skills are essential when it comes to build and maintain relation-
ships, understand and manipulate the intentions of others and convey information and 
knowledge. Thereby, the nonverbal communication and the interpretation of animated 
agents occur phylogenetically and ontogenetically earlier in the development than the 
verbal communication (Ambady & Weisbuch, 2010). Interestingly, these two do-
mains of social information appear to rely on distinct cognitive and neural mecha-
nisms differing in their quality and explicit availability but also tightly interacting 
with each other. Because of the special role of social information that is not transmit-
ted via the semantically defined and syntactically logical language related to a more 
formal way of thinking, the present work focuses on neural correlates of the percep-
tion of nonverbal and animated social stimuli and their implications for social psy-
chology. 
The exceptional importance of being able to interact in the interpersonal and animated 
world characterized by uncertainty of meanings and outcomes becomes saliently rec-
ognizable in problems of individuals with high functioning autism (HFA) due to their 
specific deficits in social cognition (see 5.1.4 and 6.1.3). While being perfectly able to 
engage within defined rules of physical and logical coherences, individuals with HFA 
fail to attend to or to understand social cues such as a gaze or a smile in their every-
day life (Klin & Jones, 2006; Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003). Investigating 
the neural processing of social and animated stimuli in HFA, thus, promotes a better 
understanding of this disorder and additionally enables a better specification of 
mechanisms underlying social cognition in healthy individuals. 
The measurement of whole brain neural correlates of cognitive processes in the pre-
sent work was carried out by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). With 
this hemodynamic-metabolic method, regionally specific information about relative 
neural activity is acquired non-invasively and indirectly, i.e. by making use of the 
blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) effect based on differential magnetic 
                                                      • • •  
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properties of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood within a strong static magnet field 
combined with radio wave pulses and gradients (Heeger & Ress, 2002). Although the 
hemodynamic-metabolic details are not yet fully understood, the validity of the 
BOLD signal has been confirmed by relating it to direct neurophysiological intracor-
tical recordings of neural activity (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 
2001; Raichle & Mintun, 2006). 
In the present essay, studies included into the doctorial theses are summarized within 
three topics: Duration matters: the neural signature of the social gaze (Study 1), Dis-
tinct paths to first impressions via verbal and nonverbal information (Studies 2 and 
3), and Different looks on animacy: mind attribution in high-functioning autism 
(Studies 4 and 5). The aim of the essay is to give an overview of research questions 
and findings for all studies in order to interrelate the theoretical backgrounds and aris-
ing conclusions to each other, while detailed information on methods and statistics is 
presented in the original articles attached in the appendix. 
                                                      • • •  
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4 Study 1: Duration matters –  
the neural signature of the social gaze 
4.1 Theoretical background 
4.1.1 The role of gaze behavior in social cognition 
Gaze behavior plays an important role "#!$%&"'(!"#)*+'&)"%# and communication. The 
gaze direction of another person indicates her focus of attention (Mason, Tatkow, & 
Macrae, 2005) and thus allows inferences about her mental states such as preferences 
and intentions (Simon Baron-Cohen, 1995), referred to as ‘mentalizing’ or ‘theory of 
mind’ (ToM, Frith & Frith, 2003). In turn, gaze shifts are also able to allocate the at-
tention of an observer towards targets in the environment resulting in a ‘joint atten-
tion’ between two persons in reference to an object (Schilbach et al., 2010). Because 
of these relations to others’ mental states, it has been suggested that gaze processing 
plays a fundamental role in the development of social cognition and that it is carried 
out by a specified operating system tuned to gaze detection and interpretation (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Senju and Johnson, 2009).  
Particularly the direct gaze, i.e. the impression of ‘being looked at’, indicates that the 
perceiver has been noticed by others and thus signals a potential social interaction 
(Senju & Johnson, 2009). This self-referential character of the direct gaze and find-
ings that infants and even newborns demonstrate a specific sensitivity to it on the neu-
ral and behavioral level (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002; Hains & Muir, 
1996) highlight its salience and its significance in social cognition. Direct gaze, as 
compared to averted gaze, has been demonstrated to modulate various aspects of cog-
nitive processing: it was detected faster in a visual-search paradigm (von Grunau & 
Anston, 1995), and led to a greater attentional capture (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005), 
elicited facilitations in ,*#-*+!-"$&+"."#')"%#!/0'&+'*1!2%%-1!0"(#*1!3%4*1!5!0'6$%#1!788791!:'&"'(!"-*#)");!+*&%,#")"%#!/2%%-1!0'&+'*1!<%(*6='>"*$1!5!="'$1!788?@!A.")B1! 2%%-1! 5! 2*&)%+1! 788C91! '#-! D*+$%#! .*.%+;! /0'$%#1! 2%%-1! 5! 0'&+'*1!788E9!/FG)!$**!HG"((*G."*+1!I*%+,*1!J"$)*+1!K+.%#;1!5!=+">*+1!788L91!'#-!B'-!'#!'->'#&"#,!*::*&)!%#! ("M'F"(");!'#-!'))+'&)">*#*$$!+')"#,$!%:!%)B*+$!/0'$%#!*)!'(N1!788L9N 
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O.D%+)'#)(;1!#%)!%#(;!)B*!-"+*&)"%#, but also the duration of the ‘social gaze’ is cru-
cially informative within the context of person evaluation (Argyle & Cook, 1976). 
Increasing duration of direct gaze can enhance the impression of affiliation or threat, 
depending on context and extent of duration, and provokes increasing likability 
(Argyle, Lefebvre, & Cook, 1974), potency (Brooks, Church, & Fraser, 1986) and 
self-esteem (Droney & Brooks, 1993) ratings of target persons. Moreover, interpreta-
tion of the varying durations of gaze behavior seem to occur later in development as 
compared to the interpretation of gaze direction indicating that this parameter requires 
a more sophisticated processing (Einav & Hood, 2006; Montgomery, Bach, & Moran, 
1998).  
Taken together, gaze behavior opens up a unique access to investigate critical mecha-
nisms in social cognition by means of manipulating its direction and duration in order 
to evoke distinct types of information processing. 
 
4.1.2 Neural correlates of social gaze processing 
The pivotal role of gaze behavior in many aspects of our everyday social life de-
scribed above has promoted the interest in investigating neural correlates of gaze 
processing by using fMRI. One of the first insights provided by these studies regarded 
the demonstration of a brain region specifically associated with the perception of gaze 
shifts and other forms of biological motion. This region is located in the posterior su-
perior temporal sulcus (pSTS) (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Pelphrey, Viola, & 
McCarthy, 2004; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998), a multimodal area 
situated between the dorsal and the ventral visual stream recruited for actions towards 
objects and for object recognition, respectively (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Ungerlei-
der & Haxby, 1994). Further research could demonstrate the involvement of the pSTS 
beyond the pure visual analysis, namely also in detecting gaze behavior that is indica-
tive of certain intentions (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004; Pelphrey, Singerman, 
Allison, & McCarthy, 2003).  
A neural region that is more tightly related to inferences about mental states of others, 
and operates independent of visual analysis of biological motion is the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC) (Amodio & Frith, 2006). However, in spite of greater self-
referential significance of the direct gaze, the empirical evidence for stronger recruit-
                                                      • • •  
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ment of the mPFC by direct as opposed to averted gaze remains controversial (Calder 
et al., 2002; Conty et al., 2007; George et al., 2001; Kampe et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 
1998). Thus, whether more complex social cognitive processes and precisely which 
regions of the social brain network are involved or not seems to depend upon task 
demands and the general social context (Senju & Johnson, 2009; Vuilleumier et al., 
2005). 
 
4.2 Experimental design and hypotheses 
Study 1 (Kuzmanovic et al., 2009) aimed to systematically provoke extended, evalua-
tive social cognitive computations by incorporating the duration of direct gaze as an 
additional experimental factor (see Fig. 4.1). Previous neuroimaging research on gaze 
behavior focused on gaze direction only, thereby comparing faces that display direct 
and averted gaze. It neglected gaze duration that has been shown to crucially influ-
ence the social meaning of gaze (see 4.1.1). Therefore, in Study 1 we implemented 
stimuli showing virtual characters with direct gaze of varying duration (ranging from 
1 to 4 seconds, see Fig. 4.1A) and measured their likability using a four point-rating 
scale (ranging from very unlikeable to very likable) as well as their neural correlates. 
Specifically, we identified neural regions where the activity parametrically increased 
with increasing direct gaze duration by using fMRI. Different gaze durations were 
realized by employing dynamic video clips of 5.65 seconds length, with target faces 
initially displaying averted gaze, than shifting the gaze to the center for a varying time 
before finally returning to the initial averted position (see Fig. 4.1C). Additionally, all 
direct gaze events were also compared with stimuli displaying only averted gaze (see 
Fig. 4.1B). In consequence, we differentiated between two gaze-related effects on lik-
ability ratings and neural responses: i) simple comparison between direct and averted 
gaze; and ii) linear parametric modulation of neural activity associated with direct 
gaze processing by its duration. 
While taking into account solely gaze direction may reveal processes related to gaze 
detection, modulation of direct gaze duration may be more prone to evoke refined 
self-referential and inferential thinking resulting in gradually varying person percep-
tion and neural responses dependent upon gaze evaluation. Thus, we hypothesized 
that gaze direction processing should be associated with social neural regions closely 
                                                      • • •  
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tied to biological motion analysis such as the pSTS, while higher-level social cogni-
tive neural regions such as the mPFC should track direct gaze duration (see 4.1.2). 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Experimental design and stimuli from Study 1 investigating the effects of gaze direction and 
gaze duration on likability ratings and neural processing. A) A schematic illustration of the experimen-
tal design focusing on the comparison between direct and averted gaze as well as on the effect of in-
creasing direct gaze duration; B) an Example of a stimulus face displaying an averted gaze with a blink 
for reasons of ecological validity; and C) an example of a stimulus face displaying a direct gaze of 
varying duration (the highlighted picture) also including a blink within the shift from averted to direct 
gaze direction. 
 
4.3 Findings and conclusions 
Participants’ ratings of stimulus faces revealed greater likeability for direct than for 
averted gaze (p < .05 for all pair-wise comparisons between averted gaze and direct 
gaze conditions, Bonferroni corrected), and a linear increase in likeability with in-
creasing direct gaze duration (see Fig. 4.2C; significant main effect of direct gaze du-
ration F(2,42) = 3.66, p = .034, and significant linear trend F(1,21) = 5.84, p = .025). 
Furthermore, fMRI analyses yielded distinct neural systems for processing the direc-
tion and the duration of interpersonal gaze: (i) the categorical comparison of direct 
and averted gaze, irrespective of varying duration of direct gaze, revealed activations 
in bilateral occipitotemporal regions including the pSTS (see Fig. 4.2A); (ii) whereas 
increasing duration of direct gaze evoked increasing activity in the mPFC including 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the paracingulate cortex (PaCC) and the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC; see Fig. 4.2B; significance threshold for fMRI group re-
sults: pc < .05 at the cluster-level, corrected for multiple comparisons and p < .001 at 
the voxel-level, uncorrected). 
direct gaze with varying gaze duration 
averted gaze B 
C 
A 
!"#
1 s 4 s 2.5 s 
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n 
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Fig. 4.2. Results from Study 1 investigating the effects of gaze direction and gaze duration on likabil-
ity ratings and neural processing. A) Main effect of the gaze direction showing stronger neural re-
sponses in bilateral occipitotemporal brain regions including posterior superior temporal sulcus for 
direct as compared to averted gaze; B) linear parametric modulation of the neural response to direct 
gaze by its duration: neural activity in the medial prefrontal cortex increased with increasing direct 
gaze duration; and C) main effect of direct gaze duration on likeability ratings of stimulus faces. L, 
left; R, right; MTG, middle temporal gyrus; V5/MT+, motion sensitive area; ACC, anterior cingulate 
cortex; mOFC, medial orbitofrontal cortex; error bars show 90% C.I.. 
 
These results indicate distinguishable cognitive mechanisms related to processing of 
gaze direction and gaze duration, respectively. The recruitment of the multimodal 
sensory area in the pSTS suggests that significant gaze direction changes are detected 
via complex visual analysis (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce et al., 1998). Beyond the 
pure decoding of gaze shifts (eye movements were present only in the direct gaze 
condition), direct gaze might have conveyed potential interpersonal intentions due to 
the self-referential social context that in turn led to more favorable likeability ratings 
and additionally triggered pSTS activity (Pelphrey, Morris et al., 2004; Pelphrey et 
al., 2003; Pelphrey, Viola et al., 2004). Supporting this interpretation, a recent neuro-
imaging study that realized the same amount of eye movement in conditions with eye 
shifts toward and away from the observer could demonstrate greater pSTS activation 
for direct gaze as well (Ethofer, Gschwind, & Vuilleumier, 2011). Importantly, how-
ever, categorically comparing direct and averted gaze resulted in neural responses that 
were restricted to occipitotemporal regions associated with sensory analysis, but did 
not include medial prefrontal areas involved in relatively more complex and sensory-
independent social cognitive computations. 
Conversely, varying direct gaze duration led to increases both in likeability ratings 
and in neural responses in the mPFC associated with diverse cognitive functions. 
These relate to monitoring the reward value and possible outcomes mediated by the 
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mOFC (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Kringelbach, 2005), to person perception, mentalizing 
and self-referential processing consistently attributed to the PaCC (Mitchell, Banaji, 
& Macrae, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005; Vogeley et al., 2001; Walter et al., 2004; 
Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2002), and to online monitoring of emotional 
valence and of performance via error detection engaging the ACC (Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000). Thus, the differential involvement of these areas indicates higher-order 
social cognitive processes related to decoding the ongoing communicational input and 
was paralleled by a positive effect of a prolonged gaze on impression formation. 
In summary, while comparing different gaze directions reveals detection of self-
referent significance conveyed by the direct gaze via visual analysis, varying direct 
gaze duration seems to require continuous evaluation in order to process possible in-
terpersonal intentions and maintain adaptive outcome monitoring. !
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5 Studies 2 and 3: Distinct paths to first impressions 
via verbal and nonverbal information 
5.1 Theoretical background 
5.1.1 The importance of impression formation in social cognition 
We are not treating all people equally and do not have the same expectations towards 
them. How much we trust others (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005), how much com-
petence we ascribe to others (Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Rule et al., 2011) and even how 
we perceive others (Todorov, Gobbini, Evans, & Haxby, 2007) depends on impres-
sions we form about them. Impression formation can be computed very explicitly and 
deliberately but also within few seconds and totally spontaneously (Uleman, Adil Sar-
ibay, & Gonzalez, 2008). In parallel to Watzlawick’s idea that “one cannot not com-
municate” (Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967), we cannot not form an impres-
sion of a social other we encounter, even if that means that we are not interested in 
him or her. Whether or not it results in specific personality traits such as being intelli-
gent or generous, it always has a global valence in the sense that a target person is 
evaluated as rather positive or negative (Schiller, Freeman, Mitchell, Uleman, & 
Phelps, 2009). Irrespective of how we come to our impressions, they help us to pre-
dict others’ behavior (Harris, Todorov, & Fiske, 2005; Rule et al., 2011), and influ-
ence our own behavior and further decisions towards others in various aspects of the 
everyday life such as personal relationships, or professional and political decisions 
(Frey, 1999). 
 
5.1.2 Differences between verbal and nonverbal social information 
Verbal and nonverbal social information differs in manifold ways leading to the as-
sumption that the cognitive processes underlying its decoding may differ as well. On 
the one hand, verbal information is described as digital, with a clearly defined seman-
tic code and a complex logical syntax enabling the transmission of elaborated and ab-
stract contents (Kraemer, 2008). On the other hand, nonverbal social information does 
not have a clear semantic code and its complexity derives from multiple simultaneous 
cues (e.g., smile and gaze), which mutually influence each other’s meaning (Bente & 
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Kraemer, 2008; Bente, Petersen, Kraemer, & de Ruiter, 2001; Bente, Senokozlieva, 
Pennig, Al-Issa, & Fischer, 2008; Kraemer, 2008). Furthermore, nonverbal cues are 
characterized by subtle dynamics extending in time rather than by static, isolated ele-
ments and are often produced and decoded outside awareness (Ambady & Weisbuch, 
2010; Choi, Gray, & Ambady, 2005; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Grammer, Honda, Juette, 
& Schmitt, 1999; Kraemer, 2008). Thus, it has been suggested that analog nonverbal 
cues have a stronger effect on affective relational level of interpersonal communica-
tion (Watzlawick et al., 1967). If these different domains of social information indeed 
trigger qualitatively different cognitive processes, than one should assume that the 
mechanisms that mediate impression formation based on verbal or nonverbal cues 
may also differ. In this case, critical implications can be deduced concerning interper-
sonal decisions in the public life requiring a certain degree of reasonability (Frey, 
1999). 
 
5.1.3 Neuroimaging background 
A recent study has compared the processing of verbal and nonverbal social informa-
tion in the context of an emotional state-judgment task (Zaki, Hennigan, Weber, & 
Ochsner, 2010). The findings support the assumption that these two domains are re-
lated to distinct neural systems. On the one hand, the processing of verbal information 
recruited the “mental state attribution system” including the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (dmPFC) in the vicinity of the PaCC, precuneus (PC), bilateral temporal poles 
(TP) and left temporoparietal junction (TPJ). On the other hand, nonverbal cues elic-
ited activation in the putative “mirror neuron system” associated with action observa-
tion as well as the bilateral amygdala, right STS and right FFG related to perception 
of salient social stimuli. However, direct comparisons between the processing of ver-
bal and nonverbal information by using fMRI are not suitable for drawing conclusions 
on areas specifically involved in social cognitive processes of interest because of dif-
ferences in basic sensory and cognitive processing between domains (e.g., language-
associate areas for verbal and motion-associated areas for dynamic nonverbal stimuli). 
Efforts to identify neural regions that track the intensity of evaluative interpersonal 
judgments revealed the specific involvement of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 
and the amygdala (Schiller et al., 2009). However, it is not clear to what extent these 
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areas tend to be more strongly involved dependent on whether the evaluation based on 
verbal or on nonverbal information because both domains were used simultaneously 
in the referred study. 
 
5.1.4  Impression formation in individuals with high-functioning autism 
The core diagnostic criteria of the pervasive developmental disorder autism include 
impaired development of and qualitative deficits in social communication and recip-
rocal social interaction (10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases, 
ICD-10, World Health Organization). These impairments have been explained by re-
duced salience of social stimuli and specific deficiency in theory of mind (Frith, 2001, 
2003; Klin et al., 2003). Particularly in normative-IQ individuals with autism, i.e., 
HFA, there is a discrepancy between their preserved or even superior logical, rule-
based reasoning skills and their social cognitive impairments. While they are able to 
solve even social cognitive problems when all elements are presented explicitly and 
verbally in an experimental setting, they do not show correspondent adaptive social 
behavior in more naturalistic, everyday life situations (Klin et al., 2003). In latter, 
they have to apply mentalizing spontaneously and to integrate multiple and incom-
plete information in order to meet the demands of moment-to-moment social encoun-
ters. 
Little is known about how individuals with HFA are performing when they have to 
form impressions about other people. However, in order to form an impression, one 
needs to be capable of decoding relevant person information provided by, for in-
stance, verbal action descriptions or expressive nonverbal cues, and to make conclu-
sions about intentions and other mental states explaining the perceived behavior. 
While individuals with HFA were shown to be able to infer personality traits from 
verbal action descriptions (Ramachandran, Mitchell, & Ropar, 2009), they seem to 
have more robust difficulties with the decoding of nonverbally transmitted social in-
formation (Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & Baron-Cohen, 2006; S. Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999; Critchley et al., 2000; Schultz et al., 2000; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 
2009). Furthermore, in more complex settings, where multiple pieces of information 
are given, these data have to be integrated in a general evaluation. It is an open ques-
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tion, which of these cognitive computational components individuals with HFA can 
realize and how they differ from the neurotypical processing. 
 
5.2 Experimental design and hypotheses 
Studies 2 and 3 (Kuzmanovic et al., 2012; Kuzmanovic, Schilbach, Lehnhardt, Bente, 
& Vogeley, 2011) focused on impression formation based on verbal and nonverbal 
person information. Study 2 implemented two types of behavioral tasks, a basic and a 
complex one, and examined the impression formation in individuals with HFA and 
matched controls (both N = 15). In the basic task (see Fig. 5.1C), participants were 
instructed to evaluate target persons on a 6-point rating scale (ranging from very 
negative to very positive) based on one single
!"#$%& '! G#-*+4*#)! )B*! !"#$%&'( )*+,1! "#!4B"&B! )B*;! :%+.*-! )B*"+! ".D+*$$"%#$!'(4';$! F'$*-! %#! '! D'"+! %:! $)".G("P! %#*! >*+F'(! '#-! %#*! #%#>*+F'(N! \B*$*! D'"+$!4*+*! *")B*+! !"-./0&-)! /F%)B! $)".G("!4*+*! D%$")">*! %+! #*,')">*9! %+! 1-!"-./0&-)!/%#*!$)".G(G$!4'$!D%$")">*!'#-!%#*!#*,')">*9N!
Study 3 used the basic task to investigate the neural correlates of first impressions by 
using fMRI, thereby comparing the evaluations based on verbal and nonverbal infor-
mation (see Fig. 5.1). Because a direct comparison between verbal and nonverbal in-
formation processing would be unspecific due to additional differences in basic sen-
sory and cognitive processing between domains (see 1.4.3), we identified neural re-
gions where the activity correlated with increasing ‘strength of evaluation’ (SoE), 
separately for verbal and nonverbal stimuli. We supposed that neural regions where 
the activity systematically increases with increasing SoE should have a central role in 
the generation of interpersonal impressions. In order to induce a sufficient variance of 
SoE, we included neutral verbal and nonverbal stimuli, so that SoE could vary from 0 
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Fig. 5.1. Examples of verbal and nonverbal stimuli and experimental procedure of the basic impression 
formation task from Study 3. A) Example frames from positive, neutral and negative nonverbal video 
stimuli; B) example sentences of positive, neutral and negative verbal stimuli; and C) an example of 
two subsequent experimental trials: verbal and nonverbal stimuli were presented in a randomized order 
and rated by participants on a 7-point global evaluation rating scale. In Study 2 only positive and nega-
tive stimuli were used and the rating scale had 6 points, without the neutral mid-point.  
 
For the Study 2 we hypothesized that individuals with HFA would have difficulties in 
decoding and consideration of nonverbal cues rather than verbal information during 
impression formation, particularly during the complex incongruent task in which con-
flicting information had to be integrated. We tested for group differences (between-
subject factor group, i.e., HFA vs. control, included in all analyses) in an mixed 
ANOVA for the basic task (within-subject factors: domain, i.e. verbal vs. nonverbal, 
and valence, i.e., positive vs. negative) and in two mixed ANOVAS for the complex 
task (congruent trials: within-subject factor valence, i.e., positive vs. negative; incon-
gruent trials: within-subject factor valence combination, i.e., V+N– vs. V–N+). Addi-
tionally, we computed relative impacts of verbal and nonverbal stimuli within the 
complex incongruent task based on subjective ratings of the single stimuli in the basic 
task, therefore controlling for inter-individual differences in the evaluation of person 
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information (see Kuzmanovic et al., 2011; within-subject factors: domain, i.e. verbal 
vs. nonverbal, and valence, i.e., positive vs. negative). 
In Study 3 we explored putative differences in neural correlates of verbal and non-
verbal social information that evoke increasing strengths of evaluative person judg-
ment. We tested whether the neural regions specifically involved in interpersonal 
evaluation, i.e. amygdala and PCC (Schiller et al., 2009), can be functionally dissoci-
ated with respect to the domain of information. 
 
5.3 Findings and conclusions 
5.3.1 Impression formation in high-functioning autism 
The basic task in Study 2 did not reveal any differences between HFA and controls 
(see Fig. 5.2A; results are reported as significant at p < .05; for exact inferential statis-
tics see Kuzmanovic et al., 2011, Table 2). There were no significant main effects of 
group or domain, indicating that in general the ratings of single stimuli did not differ 
between HFA and controls or between the verbal and nonverbal domain. However, 
there was a significant interaction between valence and domain indicating that verbal 
stimuli were evaluated more extremely than nonverbal stimuli. Thus, this highlights 
the importance of putting the relative impact of verbal and nonverbal information 
within incongruent integrative decisions into perspective with their basic ratings. Fur-
thermore, there was a significant main effect of valence confirming the different va-
lence of positive and negative stimuli. No other interactions reached significance 
(group x domain, group x valence, or group x domain x valence). 
The complex task in Study 2 revealed domain dependent group differences only for 
the incongruent but not for congruent trials (see Fig. 5.2B). In the complex congruent 
task there was a significant main effect of valence indicating that positive and nega-
tive pairs of stimuli were rated differently, but there was no significant main effect of 
group or interaction between group and valence. In the complex incongruent task, 
there 4'$!'!$",#":"&'#)!.'"#!*::*&)!%:!>'(*#&*!&%.F"#')"%#!$B%4"#,! )B')! "#!,*#6*+'(!H–QS!)+"'($!4*+*!+')*-!.%+*!#*,')">*(;!)B'#!HSQT!)+"'($! "#-"&')"#,!'!.%+*!+%FG$)!"#:(G*#&*!%:!)B*!>*+F'(!-%.'"#1!FG)!)B*+*!4'$!#%!significant main effect of 
groupN!2%4*>*+1!there was a significant interaction between group and valence com-
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Fig. 5.2. Results from Study 2 relating to impression formation ratings by HFA and control partici-
pants based on verbal and nonverbal information. A) Mean ratings for the basic task based on single 
pieces of information; B) mean ratings for the complex task based on a combination of verbal and non-
verbal information separated for congruent and incongruent trials; and C) mean relative impact of ver-
bal and nonverbal information within complex incongruent trials. Error bars show 95% C.I. 
 
By relying on individual ratings of the correspondent stimuli from each incongruent 
pair, the relative impact provided a more precise measure of the influence of the ver-
bal and nonverbal domain in Study 2. Again, there was a significant main effect of 
domain, which confirms that in general, verbal information had a greater impact on 
impression formation than nonverbal information (see Fig. 5.2C). Importantly, this 
effect again differed between the groups, as there was a significant interaction be-
tween group and domain. Pair-wise comparisons revealed that HFA participants relied 
more strongly on verbal information than control participants. Furthermore, there was 
a significant main effect of valence demonstrating a greater impact of negative as 
compared to positive information, but no significant main effect of group or interac-
tion effects between the factors valence and domain, group and valence, or group, 
domain and valence. 
Taken together, these results show that individuals with HFA are well able to evaluate 
persons based on both verbal and nonverbal information, but only in a very simplified 
setting where all stimuli are presented separately and independently from each other. 
By contrast, in a more complex setting, where multiple pieces of conflicting informa-
tion have to be integrated into a global judgment, individuals with HFA tend to ne-
glect nonverbal cues and to rely preferentially on verbal information. This points to-
ward a compensational rule-based dealing with mentalistic contents. Such cognitive 
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style may allow for the deductive extraction of constructs or abstract meanings of so-
cial stimuli, which is easier when the more explicitly coded verbal information is pre-
sented. However, when subtle nonverbal cues have to exert influence within a multi-
faceted evaluation, spontaneous affective and cognitive reactions may be more impor-
tant (Senju et al., 2009), which are shown to be reduced in face of nonverbal stimuli 
in HFA (Schwartz, Bente, Gawronski, Schilbach, & Vogeley, 2010).  
Critically, these conclusions are rather indirect because they rest upon the differential 
characteristics of verbal and nonverbal information and thus may profit from the more 
direct approach of revealing underlying neural mechanisms of impression formation 
based on different domains by using fMRI (see Study 3, 5.3.2). Nonetheless, the re-
sults clearly support “a dissociation between knowing what a cue means on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, acting upon it based on motivational predispositions to 
respond to salient social stimuli” (Kuzmanovic et al., 2011, p. 611). 
 
5.3.2 Neural correlates of impression formation 
The results from Study 3 revealed distinct neural correlates of increasing strength of 
subjective impressions based on verbal and nonverbal stimuli, respectively. While 
generally confirming that amygdala and PCC are specifically involved in interper-
sonal evaluation (Schiller et al., 2009), we demonstrated that the amygdala was re-
cruited for dynamic nonverbal, and the PC at the border to PCC (PC/PCC) for verbal 
stimuli of increasing impact (see Fig. 5.3; significance threshold for fMRI group re-
sults: pFWE-corr < .05). These effects were shown to be independent of the arousal and 
the valence of stimuli (see Kuzmanovic et al., 2012), thus emphasizing their relation 
to the increasing intensity of judgments.  
This neurofunctional dissociation indicates qualitatively different cognitive processes 
underlying impression formation dependent upon the domain of information: while 
nonverbal stimuli seem to provoke more strongly affective, salience-dependent proc-
essing consistently linked to the amygdala (Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003; Sergerie, 
Chochol, & Armony, 2008; Zald, 2003), verbal stimuli may be stronger tied to social 
inferential processing associated with the PC/PCC (Lieberman, 2010). The stronger 
link of the amygdala to nonverbal social cues is in good accordance with studies that 
consistently demonstrated its central role in judging faces with regard to valence or 
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trustworthiness (Gerber et al., 2008; Rule et al., 2011; Said, Baron, & Todorov, 2009; 
Todorov, 2008; Todorov & Engell, 2008; Winston, Strange, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 
2002). On the other hand, the systematic recruitment of the PC/PCC by increasingly 
influential verbal stimuli fits well with previous studies showing its involvement in 
processing of emotionally salient and valent words (Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 
2003; Posner et al., 2009). 
 
Fig. 5.3. Results from Study 3 showing brain regions responsive to the outcome of subjective evalua-
tive impressions based on verbal or nonverbal person information. A) When processing nonverbal 
stimuli (N), the activity in the bilateral amygdala correlated with the increasing absolute valence rat-
ings as a measure of the strength of evaluation (SoE); B) whereas for verbal stimuli (V) this effect oc-
curred in the precuneus at the border to posterior cingulate cortex, in the cuneus and the cerebellum. 
Plots are derived by a supplementary analysis modeling events with different absolute ratings (0, 1, 2 
or 3) as separate regressors. L, left; R, right; Amy, amygdala; PC, precuneus, Cn, cuneus; error bars 
show 90% C.I.. 
 
With regard to the results of Study 2, the finding that impression formation based on 
nonverbal stimuli is mediated by the bilateral amygdala associated with affective 
processing of salient social stimuli supports the conclusions made in 5.3.1 concerning 
the reduced spontaneous affective responses to nonverbal social cues in HFA. 
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6 Studies 4 and 5: Different looks on animacy – 
mind attribution in high-functioning autism 
6.1 Theoretical background 
6.1.1 The relevance of animacy perception for social cognition 
Animacy, defined as the interpretation or experience of other entities as intentional, 
mindful agents, is an important basis for all social cognitive processes that involve 
inferences about mental states of others (Santos, David, Bente, & Vogeley, 2008). 
From the philosophical viewpoint there actually should be an “other minds problem”: 
because we never have direct access to minds of others but only to our own mental 
states, we actually never can confidently conclude that others should have minds at all 
(Epley & Waytz, 2010). However, this problem does not occur in everyday life, as we 
are extraordinarily able to think about other minds and tend to attribute humanlike 
mental states not only to other persons, but also to animals, and even to computers or 
natural events. This huge time amount spent on thinking about invisible minds can be 
justified by its contribution to explaining, understanding and predicting the otherwise 
random behavior of others (Dennett, 1987). Thus, the perception of animacy as a first 
step in mind inference is an important building block of social cognition. 
A very elegant demonstration of animacy perception has been conducted by Heider 
and Simmel (1944) by using short videos with dynamically moving geometric shapes. 
Although triangles have nothing in common with mindfulness, their interactive 
movement pattern induced an impression of animacy and an interpretation of events 
in terms of mental states. This fundamental work inspired many into using such para-
digms in order to investigate mind attribution in healthy as well as in autistic samples. 
 
6.1.2 Neural correlates of animacy perception 
Using interactively moving geometric shapes to evoke animacy impressions, neuroi-
maging studies have revealed the recruitment of brain regions related to different as-
pects of social cognition, thus confirming the initiating function of animacy for social 
cognition. These brain regions include the STS, the superior temporal gyrus (STG) 
                                                      • • •  
 22 
Social cognition and nonverbal behavior Bojana Kuzmanovic
and the FFG associated with social perception, the amygdala and the insula associated 
with processing of salient and affective stimuli and the TPJ, the dmPFC, the mOFC, 
and the TP associated with mentalizing and evaluative judgments (Castelli, Happe, 
Frith, & Frith, 2000; Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Lie-
berman, 2010; Santos et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2003; Tavares, Lawrence, & Bar-
nard, 2008; Wheatley, Milleville, & Martin, 2007). Thus, animacy appears to be ef-
fective in triggering comprehensive social processing and can be used to explore the 
ability to attribute mind to animated agents. 
 
6.1.3 Animacy perception in individuals with high-functioning autism 
As described before (see 5.1.4), individuals with HFA show specific cognitive deficits 
relating to the representation of mental states of others, which has been denoted as 
“mindblindness” (Simon Baron-Cohen, 1995). Especially the spontaneous, intuitive 
attribution of and reaction upon mental states seems to be robustly impaired, while 
analytic reasoning may enable HFA individuals to perform well on explicit ToM-
tasks in simplified experimental settings (Klin, 2000; Senju et al., 2009). 
Implying mind attribution, animacy perception in dynamic geometric shapes was one 
of the paradigms, which were sensitive enough to detect these subtle characteristics of 
altered social processing in HFA. Individuals with HFA were specifically impaired in 
social but not in physical attribution (Klin & Jones, 2006), and interpreted animated 
stimuli less frequently in terms of social and mentalistic aspects (Klin, 2000). Fur-
thermore, neuroimaging studies revealed reduced activity in important nodes of the 
social neural network including STS, TPJ, dmPFC, amygdala, TP and FFG (Castelli, 
Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010). 
 
6.2 Experimental design and hypotheses 
Study 4 (Santos et al., 2010) aimed to investigate neural correlates of a parametric 
increase of experience of animacy. Thus, in order to create a more sensitive measure 
for disturbances of the mind attribution ability, animacy perception was induced in 
varying degrees along a continuum rather than as a dichotomy. This was achieved by 
a systematic modulation of movement characteristics of geometric shapes that are de-
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pendent on the degree of interaction between objects. Following motion parameters 
have been shown to provoke increased impression of animacy by ascribing the cause 
of the motion to the observed geometric shape (Santos et al., 2008): directionality (di-
rection of the motion and changes in direction), discontinuity (pauses in the trajectory, 
only in the presence of an second object) and responsiveness (reaction of some part of 
the environment to object’s movement). 
 
 
Fig. 6.1. Four frames extracted out of an example stimulus video from Studies 4 and 5 containing “ap-
proach” and “responsiveness” with arrows illustrating the pathways of movements. Across all stimuli, 
the beginning and the end were exactly the same showing a red sphere in the front and a green sphere 
entering and exiting the scene. The middle part was systematically varied across the four stimulus cate-
gories. In the least animated category, there was no additional action, i.e., the green sphere passed by 
without a stop or a change in the direction and the green sphere showed no reaction (category 1, no 
approach/ no responsiveness). In the most animated category, the green sphere stopped in front of the 
red one (frame 2) and approached it while the red sphere responded by moving towards the green 
sphere (frame 3; category 4, approach/ responsiveness). 
 
Consequently, stimulus videos were created, in which these critical motion parame-
ters were systematically modulated. All stimulus videos had the same basic scenery 
including two spheres, a green one in the background crossing the scene horizontally 
and a red one in the front. Discontinuity and directionality were used to create an im-
pression of “approach” (see Fig. 6.1). Here, the green sphere interrupted its movement 
and changed its direction towards the red sphere. Furthermore, the impression of “re-
sponsiveness” was induced by the movement of the red sphere towards the green 
sphere. The full combination of factors approach and responsiveness resulted in four 
categories of stimuli with increasingly animated movement patterns: 1) no approach/ 
no responsiveness; 2) no approach/ responsiveness; 3) approach/ no responsiveness; 
and 4) approach/ responsiveness (Santos et al., 2008). While being in the scanner, 15 
male healthy participants rated in total 104 stimuli on a four-point scale ranging from 
“physical” to “person-like”. We hypothesized that neural regions previously identified 
to be involved in animacy perception (see 6.1.2) would increase their activity para-
metrically with increasing animacy. Furthermore, we compared the neural tracking of 
increasing animacy based i) on an objective measure of varying animacy, i.e. move-
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ment features (objective animacy); and ii) on a subjective measure of varying ani-
macy, i.e. subjective ratings (subjective animacy) and expected overlapping effects of 
these two measures. 
After examining neural correlates of increasing animacy in healthy participants, 
Study 5 focused on the comparison between adults with HFA and matched controls 
(both N = 13) (Kuzmanovic et al., under review). In particular, by using a more sensi-
tive measure for deficits in mind attribution, the study aimed to provide empirical 
confirmation of the assumption that individuals with HFA apply different cognitive 
strategies when processing social information. More specifically, because HFA show 
preserved skills for physical attributions (Klin & Jones, 2006), the applied cognitive 
strategies might rely more on feature-based processing, i.e., focusing on physical 
properties of stimuli, thereby resulting in differential emotional and/or cognitive re-
sponses and hence altered subjective experience (Kuzmanovic et al., 2011; Piggot et 
al., 2004). Thus, we contrasted the two groups with regard to increasing objective and 
subjective animacy. We hypothesized that HFA and controls would differ with regard 
to the subjective animacy experience, but not with regard to the feature-based proc-
essing of the stimuli. Furthermore we computed the correlation between subjective 
and objective measures of animacy for each participant, referred to as the subjective-
objective fit (SOF). Indicating the propensity to recognize animacy-relevant move-
ment patterns, the SOF was used to compare the HFA and the control group with re-
spect to interindividual differences in animacy recognition and their neural correlates. 
 
6.3 Findings and conclusions 
6.3.1 Increasing animacy in healthy individuals 
In Study 4, on the behavioral level, the analysis of variance confirmed that the factors 
approach (F(1,14) = 82.14, p < .001, r = .92) and responsiveness (F(1,14) = 10.92, p 
< .05, r = .66), but no other movement or scenery features, had an effect on the ani-
macy ratings. On the neural level, the increasing subjective animacy was correlated 
with the activity in the bilateral insula, the STS and STG, the mOFC extending into 
the pre- and subcallosal ACC, and left FFG (see Santos et al., 2010; significance 
threshold: pc < .05 at the cluster-level, corrected for multiple comparisons and p < 
.005 at the voxel-level, uncorrected). 
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Fig. 6.'(!Results from Study 4 showing neural regions responsive to increasing and decreasing objec-
tive animacy as defined by movement patterns of the stimuli. A) Neural regions where the activity cor-
related with the increasing objective animacy including the insula, the amygdala, the superior temporal 
gyri, the FFG and the medial prefrontal cortex; and B) the opposite effect of decreasing objective ani-
macy yielding regions in bilateral inferior frontal and parietal cortices as well as in the superior precu-
neus (see Santos et al., 2010). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for movies 
with varying movement patterns (1, no approach/ no responsiveness, 4, approach/ responsiveness). L, 
left; R, right; mOFC, medial orbitofrontal cortex; Amy, amygdala; FFG, fusiform gyrus; Ins, insula; 
IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; PC, precuneus; error bars show 90% C.I.. 
 
An overlapping but more extended network was correlated with increasing objective 
animacy (see Fig. 6.2) including the bilateral insula extending into the right amygdala, 
the bilateral STG, the right TP, the ACC and the mOFC, and the bilateral FFG (sig-
nificance threshold: pc < .05 at the cluster-level, corrected for multiple comparisons 
and p < .0005 at the voxel-level, uncorrected; for the full list of results see Santos et 
al., 2010). In contrast to the effect of decreasing animacy indicating the engagement 
of frontoparietal brain regions associated with attention and action observation (see 
Fig. 6.2 and Santos et al., 2010), this aggregate of brain regions is part of the social 
neural network and reflects social perceptual and evaluative processes (Lieberman, 
2010). Thus, we confirmed that the experience of animacy depending on mind-
implying movement properties is able to gradually engage social processing, irrespec-
A 
B 
Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier et al., 1999; Golby et al., 2001). Sup-
porting the expertise hypothesis, animacy studies addressing mentaliz-
ing processes frequently reported FFG activations in the absence of
facial features in the stimuli (Castelli et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Martin and Weisberg, 2003; Schultz et al., 2005;
Tavares et al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 2007). We suggest that the FFG
activation evoked by increased animacy experience and movements of
approach might be related to the high expertise of humans for socially
appearing animated movements, since humans are highly specialized
in and attuned to social relevant signs (Tomasello et al., 2005).
Increased STS/STG bilateral activation associated with increased
animacy experience and with increase in interactive movements, is
congruent with previous reports implicating the STS/STG in the
perception of biological motion (Beauchamp et al., 2002, 2003;
Bonda et al., 1996; Grezes and Decety, 2002; Grezes et al., 2001;
Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman and Blake, 2001; Howard et al.,
1996; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Vaina et al., 2001), in processing the
kinematics of geometrical ﬁgures (Blakemore et al., 2003; Schultz
et al., 2005, 2004), and in processi g realistic scenes (Mar et al.,
2007). More speciﬁcally, it has been proposed that the STS may be
important for the processing of int ntional action (Blakemore t al.,
2003; Saxe et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2004). The lateralization of
such responses, however, is still a matter of conjecture. Ci ramidaro
et al. (2007) proposed that the left STS is mainly related to the
processing of communicative intention, while the right STS may play
a role in understanding others intentions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007).
Recently, de Lange et al. (2008) also found the right STS to
speciﬁcally activate when participants in their study selectively
attended to the intentionality of an action (de Lange et al., 2008).
Saxe et al. (2004) showed their participants videos of an actor
walking and stopping for a certain period of time behind a bookcase
(Saxe et al., 2004). They found activation in the right STS related to
longer occlusions, suggesting that this region is involved in the
representation of observed intentional actions. Contradicting previ-
ous behavioural results (Santos et al., 2008), we were surprised to
verify that in the present study using the same paradigm, time delay
did not constitute a signiﬁcant cue for animacy experience, neither at
the behavioural level (please see section Results for the behavioural
data), nor at the neural level (even when using a lower threshold).
One possible explanation for the difference between the results in
the present study and the results observed in the Saxe et al. (2004)
paradigm lies on the fundamental difference between the types of
characters involved. Wherefore, watching a human hide behind a
box may lead to stronger effects related to mental attributions (such
as intentional inferences) than watching a sphere stopping for varied
amounts of time.
Fig. 2. Brain regions of increased activation for parametric modulation of interactive movements between the spheres (approach and responsiveness). Parametric modulation
analysis of fMRI data identiﬁed regions in bilateral insula ext nding into the STG, right amygdala and temporal pole, mOFC and bilateral parahippocampal gyrus, FFG and middle
cingulate gyrus where BOLD signal changes increased linearly with increasing interactive movements (upper box). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for
movies with different movement patterns (1=no interactive movement between the spheres to 4=both movements of approach and responsiveness) for four different local
maxima (upper left plot: FFG, x=−28, y=−50, z=−11; lower left plot: right Ins, x=36, y=−12, z=5; upper right plot: mOFC, x=10, y=54, z=−5; lower right plot: right
Amyg, x=28, y=−2, z=−19). The same analysis revealed regions in bilateral inferior frontal and parietal lobules as well as in the precuneus where BOLD signal changes increased
linearly with decreasing interactive movements (lower box). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for movies with different movement patterns (see above) for
three different local maxima (left plot: IPL, x=54, y=−44, z=51; middle plot: IFG, x=58, y=10, z=23; right plot: PCun, x=6, y=−68, z=45). The SPM{t} maps of these
contrasts were overlaid on lateral and medial views of a surface based rep esentatio of the MNI cano ical brain; mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex; Amyg=Amygdala;
FFG=fusiform gyrus; Ins=Insula; IPL=inferior parietal lobule; PCun=Precuneus; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus. Statistical threshold: pb0.0005 at the voxel level, uncorrected and
pb0.05 at the cluster-level, corrected.
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Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier et al., 1999; Golby et al., 2001). Sup-
porting the expertise hypothesis, animacy studies addressing mentaliz-
ing processes frequently reported FFG activations in the absence of
facial features in the stimuli (Castelli et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Martin and Weisberg, 2003; Schultz et al., 2005;
Tavares et al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 2007). We suggest that the FFG
activation evoked by increased animacy experience and movements of
approach might be related to the high expertise of humans for socially
appearing animated movements, since humans are highly specialized
in and attuned to social relevant signs (To asello et al., 2005).
Increased STS/STG bilateral activation associated with increased
animacy experience and with increase in interactive movements, is
congruent with previous reports implicating the STS/STG in the
perception of biological motion (Beauchamp et al., 2002, 2003;
Bonda et al., 1996; Grezes and Decety, 2002; Grezes et al., 2001;
Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman and Blake, 2001; Howard et al.,
1996; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Vaina et al., 2001), in processing the
kinematics of geometric l ﬁgures (Blak more et al., 2003; Schultz
et al., 2005, 2004), and in processing realistic scenes (Mar et al.,
2007). More speciﬁcally, it has been proposed that the STS may b
important for the processing of intentional action (Blakemore et al.,
2003; Saxe et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2004). The lateralization of
such responses, however, is still a matter of conjecture. Ciaramidaro
et al. (2007) proposed that the left STS is mainly related to the
processing of communicative intention, while the right STS may play
a role in understanding others intentions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007).
Recently, de Lange et al. (2008) also found the right STS to
speciﬁcally activate when participants in their study selectively
attended to the intentionality of an action (de Lange et al., 2008).
Saxe et al. (2004) showed their participants videos of an actor
walking and stopping for a certain period of time behind a bookcase
(Saxe et al., 2004). They found activation in the right STS related to
longer occlusions, suggesting that this region is involved in the
representation of observed intentional actions. Contradicting previ-
ous behavioural results (Santos et al., 2008), we were surprised to
verify that in the present study using the same paradigm, time delay
did not constitute a signiﬁcant cue for animacy experience, neither at
the behavioural level (please see section Results for the behavioural
data), nor at the neural level (even when using a lower threshold).
One possible explanation for the difference between the results in
the present study and the results observed in the Saxe et al. (2004)
paradigm lies on the fundamental difference between the types of
characters involved. Wherefor , watching a human hide behind a
box may lead to stronger effects related to mental attributions (such
as intentional inferences) than watching a sphere stopping for varied
amounts of time.
Fig. 2. Brain regions of increased activation for parametric modulation of interactive movements between the spheres (approach and responsiveness). Parametric modulation
analysis of fMRI data identiﬁed region in bilateral insula extending into the STG, right amygdala and temporal pole, mOFC and bil teral parahippocampal gyrus, FFG and middle
cingulate gyrus where BOLD signal changes increased linearly with increasing interactive movements (upper box). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for
movies with different movement patterns (1=no interactive movement between the spheres to 4=both movements of approach and responsiveness) for four different local
maxima (upper left plot: FFG, x=−28, y=−50, z=−11; lower left plot: right Ins, x=36, y=−12, z=5; upper right plot: mOFC, x=10, y=54, z=−5; l wer right plot: right
Amyg, x=28, y=−2, z=−19). The same analysis revealed regions in bilateral inferior frontal and parietal lobules as well as in the precuneus where BOLD signal changes increased
linearly with decreasing interactive movements (lower box). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for movies with different movement patterns (see above) for
three different local maxima (left plot: IPL, x=54, y=−44, z=51; middle plot: IFG, x=58, y=10, z=23; right plot: PCun, x=6, y=−68, z=45). The SPM{t} maps of these
contrasts were overlaid on lateral and medial views of a surface based representation of the MNI canonical brain; mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex; Amyg=Amygdala;
FFG=fusiform gyrus; Ins=Insula; IPL=inferior parietal lobule; PCun=Precuneus; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus. Statistical threshold: pb0.0005 at the voxel level, uncorrected and
pb0.05 at the cluster-level, corrected.
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tive of whether the stimuli had an anthropomorphic appearance (Wheatley et al., 
2007). 
 
6.3.2 Decoding strategies for animacy in high-functioning autism 
Study 5 replicated the increasing recruitment of social neural regions for both in-
creasing subjective and objective animacy in healthy participants, including bilaterally 
the insula, the amygdala, the STG, the TP (for objective animacy only right TP), the 
FFG (for subjective animacy only left FFG) and the ventral and dorsal mPFC (for the 
full list of results see Kuzmanovic et al., under review; significance threshold for 
fMRI group results: pc < .05 at the cluster-level, corrected for multiple comparisons 
and p < .001 at the voxel-level, uncorrected). However, the focus of this study was to 
compare HFA and controls, which revealed specific differences and similarities de-
pendent on the measure of animacy. On the behavioral level, there was neither a sig-
nificant group difference in ratings of the four stimulus categories with regard to “per-
son-likeness” (see Fig. 6.3C) nor in the SOF scores, indicating comparable overt per-
formances between the groups in the experimental task. Similarly, on the neural level, 
the increasing objective animacy did not reveal any significant group differences but a 
common network shared by both groups including the vmPFC and the bilateral STG. 
While the STG has been associated with the detection of animacy-inducing movement 
characteristics (Santos et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2003; Wheatley et al., 2007), the 
vmPFC plays an important role in generating integrative, evaluative judgments (Phan 
et al., 2004; Zysset, Huber, Samson, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2003). Together, these 
comparable outcomes indicate that both groups were able to recognize the objective 
features of the stimuli, and that the common neural substrate of this performance 
seems to be related to perceptual analysis and its evaluation. 
In contrast, when regarding the subjective animacy, there was a significant group dif-
ference showing that the bilateral activity in insula, STG, TP, amygdala and dmPFC 
was correlated more strongly with increasing subjective animacy in controls than in 
HFA (see Fig. 6.3A). Furthermore, the correlation between the general activity in the 
left STS, right TPJ and the left superior frontal gyrus, and the SOF scores was signifi-
cantly stronger for the control than the HFA sample (see Fig. 6.3B). 
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Fig. 6.3. Neuroimaging and behavioral results from Study 5. A) Brain regions where the correlation 
between the increasing subjective animacy (as indexed by participants’ ratings) and activity was sig-
nificantly greater in controls than in HFA including bilaterally the dmPFC, the amygdala, the insula 
and the temporal cortices. The plots were derived from a supplementary 4 x 2 categorical model in-
cluding regressors for each response option, separately for the two groups. B) Brain regions where the 
activity correlated with the subjective-objective fit (SOF, the fit between the ratings of a participant and 
the movement patterns of stimuli) to a significantly greater extent in the control than in the HFA group 
including the STS, the TPJ and the superior frontal gyrus. For illustrative purposes, scatter charts show-
ing the relation between the SOF and the contrast estimates of the significantly correlated neural re-
gions are depicted. C) Ratings of the “person-likeness” separated for different stimulus categories (see 
6.2 and Fig. 6.1). L, left; R, right; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; Amy, Amygdala; STS, supe-
rior temporal sulcus; TPJ, angular gyrus corresponding to the temporoparietal junction; error bars show 
90% C.I.. 
 
Taken together, these results indicate dissociable cognitive strategies applied during 
the task, that for the HFA group do not incorporate neural regions implicated in men-
tal inference (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Castelli et al., 2002; Schultz et al., 2003; Tava-
res et al., 2008; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009; Wheatley et al., 2007) and salience-
dependent affective processing (Martin & Weisberg, 2003; Pessoa, 2008; Robinson, 
Laird, Glahn, Lovallo, & Fox, 2010; Santos et al., 2010) as a result of reduced modu-
lation of subjective experience by increasingly social stimuli. Thus, we provided em-
pirical evidence for the hypothesis, that feature-based processing of social stimuli is 
intact in HFA, but that there is no modulation of subjective responses to these stimuli 
that relate to mind attribution and increased salience. Paralleling the findings from 
Study 2, neurofunctionally underpinned by the Study 3, these results support the as-
sumption that in HFA the search for meaning within a social environment is guided 
more strongly by rule-based computations than by motivational predisposition to 
spontaneously respond to social stimuli (Klin et al., 2003). 
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7 General discussion 
The presented studies used nonverbal and animated behavior to induce discrete social 
cognitive processes in order to make them accessible for fundamental as well as for 
comparative-clinical investigations. In general, the construction of a subjective mean-
ing of nonverbal behavior appears to be heavily influenced by the intrinsic predisposi-
tions to ascribe salience and significance to these stimuli thereby modulating further 
experiences and judgments (Ambady & Weisbuch, 2010; Klin et al., 2003). 
More specifically, in Study 1 the increasing duration of the direct gaze of a social 
other systematically increased ratings of likeability and the activity of the mPFC as-
sociated with complex social cognitive computations such as mentalizing and conflict 
and outcome monitoring. Hence, our results support the proposed link between direct 
gaze and understanding self-relevant intentions of others. This link can be deduced 
from the enhanced but ambiguous communicational content of a prolonged stare, 
which can convey social interest but also demonstration of dominance and thus re-
quires continuous decoding for the sake of an adaptive social behavior. Overcoming 
the traditional restriction to gaze direction, our findings thus indicate that the system-
atic investigation of dynamic and subtle nonverbal parameters such as gaze duration 
may help to better characterize the link between direct gaze and complex social cogni-
tive processes. 
Furthermore, Studies 2 and 3 explored putative differences in the quality and relative 
influence of the processing of verbal and nonverbal person information in the context 
of impression formation. While increasing strength of interpersonal evaluation based 
on nonverbal stimuli was associated with the activity in the bilateral amygdala, verbal 
stimuli differentially recruited the PC/PCC, the cuneus and the cerebellum. Thus, 
Study 3 provided evidence for qualitatively different processing paths dependent on 
the domain of information. Not only does the amygdala play a central role in affective 
and salience-dependent processing (Sergerie et al., 2008), this region has also been 
implicated in automatic and implicit processing, for example when emotional facial 
expression have been presented subliminally (Liddell et al., 2005; Whalen et al., 
2004; Whalen et al., 1998) or when there was no explicit instruction to appraise facial 
stimuli (Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Phelps et al., 2000; Todorov & Engell, 
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2008; Winston et al., 2002). Thus, the amygdala may be a part of a network that me-
diates automatic responses to meaningful social cues such as gaze following, which 
cannot be suppressed (Driver et al., 1999) without reaction time costs (Schilbach, 
Eickhoff, Cieslik, Kuzmanovic, & Vogeley, 2011), or the ability of cortically blind 
persons to detect facial expressions above the chance level (de Gelder, Vroomen, 
Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999; Pegna, Khateb, Lazeyras, & Seghier, 2005). By con-
trast, the PC/PCC associated with increasing strength of evaluation based on verbal 
information has been assigned to brain regions involved in explicit and reflective so-
cial cognition (Lieberman, 2010), highlighting the relatively stronger link between 
verbal stimuli and deliberate processing (Evans, 2008; Lieberman, 2007).  
The importance of spontaneous and affective responses to nonverbal social cues be-
comes even more apparent when considering their role in psychiatric disorders. For 
example, the amygdala response to subliminally presented fearful facial expressions is 
exaggerated in patients with posttraumatic stress disorder characterized by hy-
perarousal and disinhibited trauma re-experiencing indicating an impaired gating of 
affective sensory input (Rauch et al., 2000). By contrast, in HFA, nonverbal cues in-
duce an attenuated neural response in amygdala as compared to controls (Ashwin, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O'Riordan, & Bullmore, 2007; S. Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999), have diminished influence on reports about feelings (Schwartz et al., 2010) and 
elicit reduced spontaneous responses (Senju et al., 2009), although this has not di-
rectly been demonstrated with subliminally presented stimuli. In the same line, the 
findings of Study 2 support the idea of reduced spontaneous affective responses to 
nonverbal social information in HFA by revealing its diminished impact within mul-
timodal impression formation, although isolated stimuli were recognized equally well 
by both HFA and control participants. In addition, the assumption that influences of 
nonverbal cues on social judgments are mediated by affective responses is further un-
derpinned by the specific recruitment of the amygdala for increasingly extreme person 
evaluations based on nonverbal information in Study 3. 
Finally, Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated that the activity in an extended social neural 
network was correlated with objectively and subjectively measured increase of ani-
macy in dynamic geometric figures in control participants. Moreover, Study 5 
showed that in contrast to controls, the increasing subjective experience of animacy in 
individuals with HFA was not tracked by the activity of the amygdala, the dmPFC, 
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the insula, the STG and the TP. This finding support the proposed altered cognitive 
style in HFA, which might rely more strongly on feature-based attributions, as con-
firmed by the comparable recognition of animacy and by common neural correlates of 
objective animacy based on stimulus features across HFA and control participants. 
Thus, in good accordance with Study 3, Study 5 provides empirical evidence for the 
assumption of reduced spontaneous affective and inferential responses in HFA along 
with a stronger preference for deductive feature-based reasoning during the decoding 
of social stimuli (Klin & Jones, 2006; Klin et al., 2003). 
In contrast to physical environments where consequences and causes are clearly de-
finable, social environments are characterized by a great uncertainty because actions 
are originated from people and depend on their intentions and spontaneous reactions. 
Consequently, a fast working mechanism is needed to detect and infer covert mental 
states of others indicated by a variety of cues including nonverbal behavior as well as 
verbal communication in order to enable dynamic regulation of one’s own actions and 
reactions. Thereby, nonverbal social information has a primacy status with regard to 
cognitive processing by relying on phylogenetically older mechanisms that are effec-
tive from the early childhood on and are high in automaticity (Ambady & Weisbuch, 
2010). The present work provides empirical evidence for this notion by demonstrating 
specific influences of the nonverbal information on interpersonal judgment outcomes 
via the amygdala and by showing that nonverbal cues trigger extended neural re-
sponses related to complex perceptual, affective and evaluative analyses. Further-
more, by identifying attenuation in exactly these responses to nonverbal stimuli in 
HFA, the present findings promote the importance of spontaneous cognitive and af-
fective processes in adaptive social functioning and contribute to the better characteri-
zation of this disorder. Finally, the relatively closer link between nonverbal behavior 
and automatic and affective processes has important implications for social decisions 
made in private and public domains, that are moreover often embedded in modern 
media with increasing availability of pictorial information (Frey, 1999). 
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The interpretation of interpersonal gaze behavior requires the use of complex cognitive processes and guides
social interactions. Among a variety of different gaze characteristics, gaze direction and gaze duration
modulate crucially the meaning of the “social gaze”. Nevertheless, prior neuroimaging studies disregarded
the relevance of gaze duration by focusing on gaze direction only.
The present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study focused on the differentiation of these two
gaze parameters. Therefore direct gaze displayed by virtual characters was contrasted with averted gaze and,
additionally, systematically varied with respect to gaze duration (i.e., 1, 2.5 or 4 s). Consistent with prior
ﬁndings, behavioral data showed that likeability was higher for direct than for averted gaze and increased
linearly with increasing direct gaze duration. On the neural level, distinct brain regions were associated with
the processing of gaze direction and gaze duration: (i) the comparison between direct and averted gaze
revealed activations in bilateral occipito-temporal regions including the posterior superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS); (ii) whereas increasing duration of direct gaze evoked differential neural responses in the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) including orbitofrontal and paracingulate regions.
The results suggest two complementary cognitive processes related to different gaze parameters. On the one
hand, the recruitment of multimodal sensory regions in the pSTS indicates detection of gaze direction via
complex visual analysis. On the other hand, the involvement of the MPFC associated with outcome
monitoring and mentalizing indicates higher-order social cognitive processes related to evaluation of the
ongoing communicational input conveyed by direct gaze duration.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Everyday experience as well as extensive research in psychology
and social cognitive neuroscience conﬁrm the pivotal role of human
gaze in social interactions and its impact on cognitive, affective and
motivational processes (Argyle and Cook, 1976; Gueguen and Jacob,
2002; Hood and Macrae, 2007; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007).
“Social gaze” might be metaphorically considered as glue in
interpersonal communication as it allows not only for the coordina-
tion of attention and activities (Argyle and Cook, 1976) but also
inﬂuences our social perception and the evaluation of others (Argyle
et al., 1974; Kleinke, 1986; Mason et al., 2005; Mirenda et al., 1983).
Moreover, understanding the ostensive function of eye gaze is closely
linked to the ability to infer mental states of others (Baron-Cohen,
1995; Eskritt and Lee, 2007), a cognitive process that is usually referred
to as “Theory ofMind” (Premack andWoodruff,1978) or “mentalizing”
(Frith, 2001). On the one hand, during earlier years of human
ontogeny, recognizing that people can perceive an event differently
depending on their gaze directions may aid in overcoming the initial
egocentric perspective and in understanding of mind in general
(Gopnik et al., 1994). On the other hand, more sophisticated knowl-
edge about the relations and causes of mental states could help
interpret eye gaze information at later ages (Eskritt and Lee, 2007).
Thus, both the capacity to understand the eye gaze and to infer mental
states inﬂuence each other's developments resulting in an automatic
association between a particular gaze behavior and the intention
“behind” it.
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Particularly in the context of direct gaze, i.e. when a person is
looking straight into the eyes of another person, mentalizing
processes are likely to come into play. As a nonverbal signal of notable
salience (Gibson and Pick, 1963; von Grunau and Anston, 1995), direct
gaze can be used to initiate communication by indicating “self-
reference” and by conveying interpersonal attitudes (Kampe et al.,
2003; Kleinke, 1986; Mirenda et al., 1983; Valentine and Ehrlichman,
1979; Wicker et al., 1998). Here, self-reference connotes that a person
(the sender) transfers an intention to communicate by looking
directly at someone (a receiver). The receiver, in turn, must be able
to understand this intention and to recognize that he/she is
addressed, thus experiencing that the direct gaze refers to him/her.
In this case, direct gaze would be “more than a trivial sensory
experience” thereby triggering further reasoning about the meaning
of and the motives for the other's messages as well as about the
appropriateness of one's own response (Wicker et al., 1998).
Converging neuroimaging evidence has demonstrated that pro-
cessing of gaze as a component of biological motion is consistently
associated with activation in the posterior superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS) (Akiyama et al., 2006; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Hooker
et al., 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2004b; Puce et al., 1998; Wicker et al.,
1998). Moreover, direct gaze in particular has been shown to recruit
additional neural regions associated with complex social cognitive
processing including the amygdala, the fusiform gyrus and the
prefrontal cortex (Conty et al., 2007; George et al., 2001;
Kawashima et al., 1999; Wicker et al., 2003). For instance, Kampe
et al. (2003) showed that direct gaze (compared to averted gaze)
elicited activation in the paracingulate part of the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC). Interestingly, neuroimaging studies consistently
suggest a special role of the MPFC in social cognition (Amodio and
Frith, 2006). Within this region, functional divisions were deﬁned
differentiating between the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) that is
related to monitoring the reward value of stimuli and possible
outcomes (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Kringelbach, 2005) and the
above mentioned paracingulate cortex (PCC) commonly involved in
mentalizing and self-referential processing (Gallagher et al., 2002;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005;
Vogeley et al., 2001; Walter et al., 2004). Thus, the result reported
by Kampe et al. (2003) conﬁrms the proposed link between direct
gaze and understanding self-relevant intentions of others. Further-
more, differential involvement of the MPFC during processing of
direct gaze has also been observed in combination with commu-
nicative facial expressions (Schilbach et al., 2006). However, the
majority of previous neuroimaging studies on direct gaze, indepen-
dent of facial expression, were unable to demonstrate the speciﬁc
role of the MPFC during the processing of gaze-related information
(George et al., 2001; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Wicker et al., 1998).
For instance, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
by Calder et al. (2002) even reported that the MPFC was primarily
engaged in the processing of averted, rather than direct gaze.
The lack of unequivocal evidence with respect to MPFC recruit-
ment during the processing of context-free and neutral direct gaze
could be attributed to the conﬁnement to rather simplistic,
categorical experimental designs using static stimulus material
and considering only gaze direction. However, in everyday human
interactions, the interpretation of gaze behavior appears to depend
crucially on subtle, dynamic parameters, among which gaze duration
represents a prominent example (Argyle et al., 1974; Brooks et al.,
1986; Droney and Brooks, 1993; Gueguen and Jacob, 2002;
Knackstedt and Kleinke, 1991; Montgomery et al., 1998). Previous
behavioral studies have demonstrated that the longer a person
looked straight into the observer's eyes, the more favorably this
person was judged with regard to likeability, potency and self-
esteem (Argyle et al., 1974; Brooks et al., 1986; Droney and Brooks,
1993; Knackstedt and Kleinke, 1991). Along the same line, Gueguen
and Jacob (2002) were able to show that, when direct gaze was
maintained, pedestrians were more likely to participate in an
intercept survey. Argyle and Cook (1976) explain these results by
postulating that in a social interaction prolonged gaze can convey
approach signals including the need for feedback or afﬁliative needs.
The receiver, in turn, may experience these signals as rewarding and
could reciprocate them by evaluating the gazing person more
positively and by adapting one's own behavior. Thereby, these
approach forces “behind” the direct gaze motivate and guide
interpersonal behavior and inﬂuence the perception and evaluation
of others. However, prolonged direct gaze does not solely convey
rewarding aspects like social attention and interest (Mason et al.,
2005), but may also comprise avoidance components including the
demonstration of dominance and the fear of revealing inner states
(Argyle and Dean, 1965). As a consequence of this ambiguity,
changing gaze signals require continuous decoding for the purpose
of effective outcome monitoring.
Furthermore, it could be demonstrated that gaze duration as
compared to gaze direction represents a more complex source of
social information because it requires more sophisticated mentalizing
abilities in order to perform an adequate interpretation (Eskritt and
Lee, 2007). In tasks requiring inferences about other's desires from the
simple detection of eye direction, 4-year olds were already successful
(Baron-Cohen, 1995). However, advanced levels of understanding
gaze cues based on their relative duration were not yet present at this
age (Montgomery et al., 1998). In contrast, the performance of 5- and
6-year olds was comparable to that of adults, indicating that during
later developmental stages relative gaze duration towards different
test objects can be efﬁciently used to infer others' preferences (Einav
and Hood, 2006; Montgomery et al., 1998).
In spite of the behaviorally well established relevance of gaze
duration for impression formation and motivation in social contexts,
to the best of our knowledge, no fMRI study has yet focused on the
neural correlates of this parameter. Thus, the aim of the present
study was to investigate neural correlates of both the direction and
the duration of the interpersonal gaze. We expect that the greater
amount of social information inherent in varying the duration of the
direct gaze as compared to simply contrasting the direct and the
averted gaze direction would enclose the involvement of more
complex social cognitive processes. Thus, we performed the present
fMRI study to analyze whether systematically varying the duration
of direct gaze signiﬁcantly modulates its neural correlates. In the
context of a person judgment task, virtual characters that initially
displayed averted gaze and subsequently shifted their gaze towards
the participant were presented. After a systematically varied amount
of time (i.e., 1 s, 2.5 s or 4 s), gaze was shifted back to the initial,
averted position. Additionally, a control condition without a gaze
shift towards the participant, i.e. consisting solely of averted gaze,
was presented. Given that the communicative intention conveyed by
direct gaze has been conjectured to automatically and implicitly
trigger the mentalizing mechanism (Kampe et al., 2003), no explicit
instruction to infer mental states was given but participants were
asked to rate the likeability of the stimulus faces after each trial.
Predicted on the link between duration-sensitive gaze processing
and understanding interpersonal intentions we hypothesize a direct
gaze duration (DGd) related involvement of the PCC. Furthermore,
we seek to conﬁrm the proposed reward value of increasing DGd by
replicating a more positive person evaluation on the behavioral level
and by demonstrating differential responses in the OFC as a function
of prolonged direct gaze. On the other hand, for the simple
comparison between directed and averted gaze directions we expect
the involvement of temporal regions including the STS as reported in
previous neuroimaging studies in this ﬁeld. In sum, as the
continuous monitoring of DGd provides access to an additional
source of social information, changes in the DGd should have a
discriminative value for the recruitment of the MPFC including the
OFC and the PCC.
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Methods
Subjects
22participants [12male,10 female;mean age27.2±3.9 (SD) years]
with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness gave informed
consent and participated in the fMRI study. All participants were naïve
with respect to the experimental task and the purpose of the study.
Right-handedness was conﬁrmed by the Edinburgh Inventory for
Handedness (Oldﬁeld, 1971). The study was approved by the local
ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Cologne.
Stimulus material and experimental design
Due to the advantage of systematic manipulability, which is an
important prerequisite for investigating subtle nonverbal signals such as
gaze duration, we applied computer-generated virtual characters as
stimulus material. In particular, the systematic modiﬁcation of facial
characteristics provided an effective countermeasure for confounding
inﬂuences such as face morphology and non-intended mimicry move-
ments. The advantages of using computer-animated characters for expe-
rimental communication research have been already stressed at an early
stage of research (Bente, 1989; Bente et al., 1996; Blascovich et al., 2002)
issuing tailorable research instrumentation for various applications. In
this line, a series of studies have consistently conﬁrmed the potential of
virtual characters to elicit social impressions comparable to video record-
ings of real people (Bente et al., 2001a,b) and to even mediate the
experience of social presence, i.e. of being with another person (Bailen-
son et al., 2003; Ku et al., 2005). Finally, recent research demonstrated
that facial animations of virtual characters evoke brain responses
comparable to those evoked by real human faces (Moser et al., 2007).
Using the 3D software package Poser 6 (Curious Lab®), 32male and
32 female faces displaying a neutral emotional expression have been
designed by systematically varying each of ﬁve face parameters
(mouth, nose, cheeks, cheekbones, hair color) on two levels. Subse-
quently, the likeability of these stimuli was evaluated in a pilot study
with nine healthy participants [mean age 22.8±3.8 (SD) years]. Based
on this pilot evaluation,10male and 10 female equally andmoderately
likeable faces (mean likeability rating 2.68, ranging from 2.5 to 2.78,
assessed on a four-point likeability rating scale consisting of following
response options: 1=very dislikable, 2=rather dislikable, 3=rather
likeable, 4=very likeable)were selected for the further use in the fMRI
study to prevent confounding effects of general attractiveness. In the
next step, we created animations of the selected faces performing
strictly controlled gaze behavior. Each face initially displayed an
averted gaze followed by a short eye blink (150 ms) and a direct gaze
and ﬁnally shifted the gaze back to the initial, averted position (direct
gaze condition, DG; see Fig. 1, C). Thereby, the duration of the direct
gaze was parametrically varied on three levels: 1 s, 2.5 s and 4 s. The
duration of the initial and ﬁnal averted gazewas adjusted according to
the respective duration of the direct gaze in order to establish an equal
total duration of 5650ms for all animations. For example, in trials with
direct gaze duration of 2500 ms the averted gaze sequences lasted for
1500 ms each [direct gaze (2500 ms)+2⁎averted gaze (1500 ms)+
eye blink (150 ms)=5650 ms]. The preceding eye blink was
implemented to increase ecological validity of the stimuli by a more
naturalistic gaze behavior (Omori and Miyata, 2001). Additionally,
animations with faces only displaying an averted gaze without
switching to the direct gazewere generated to be included as a control
condition (averted gaze condition, AG; see Fig. 1, B). In order to keep
these events as close as possible to those of the direct gaze condition,
the eye blink also occurred in control trials. The timing of this blinkwas
randomly chosen from the three blinks preceding direct gaze. The
control conditionAGwas necessary to allow the characterization of the
main effect of direct gaze by comparing events with direct and averted
gaze thereby considering the gaze direction only. The events with
averted gaze were not varied with respect to duration resulting in an
unbalanced experimental design with two factors, namely gaze
direction and gaze duration. The categorical factor gaze direction was
varied on two levels, namely AG and DG. The parametric factor gaze
duration was systematically varied only within the DG condition on
three levels (see Fig. 1, A).
Finally, to take the greater salience of the direct gaze in deviated
head orientation into account (Vuilleumier et al., 2005), stimulus
faces were shown with two different head orientations — slightly
turned to the left or right side. Across all trials, the averted gaze was
kept congruent to the head orientation (e.g., right gaze directionwhen
right head orientation was presented).
Fig. 1. Experimental design and stimuli. (A) We focused on (i) the main effect of gaze direction (direct gaze vs. averted gaze); and (ii) the main effect of gaze duration (parametric
modulation of the direct gaze processing by corresponding gaze durations). (B) Time course of an animation of a stimulus face displaying averted gaze. (C) Time course of an
animation of a stimulus face displaying direct gaze. The duration of the direct gaze (highlighted by a black frame) was varied systematically (1000 ms, 2500 ms or 4000 ms); the
duration of averted gaze was adapted accordingly (2⁎2250 ms, 1500 ms or 750 ms) so that each stimulus lasted for 5650 ms in total (including a short eye blink of 150 ms).
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The stimulus presentation and response recording was performed
by the software package Presentation (version 11.3; Neurobehavioral
Systems, Inc., www.neurobs.com/). Visual stimulation was provided
through magnet-compatible goggles (VisuaStim™, Resonance Tech-
nology, CA, USA) and responses were assessed using four buttons of a
MR-compatible response device (LUMItouch™, Photon Control Inc.,
BC, Canada). Due to technical difﬁculties with the recording hardware,
eye tracking could not be performed reliably and eyemovements could
hence not be considered in the present experiment. An experimental
trial consisted of a stimulus presentation followed by a likeability
rating scale lasting for 1000 ms. Further, each trial entailed two
randomly jittered inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs): one between each
stimulus presentation and the following rating scale in order to enable
for statistical isolation and an independent analysis of the person
perception and the response (applied ISI durations: 1500ms,1750ms,
2250 ms and 2500 ms; mean ISI 2000 ms) and the other between
single trials to increase condition-speciﬁc BOLD signal discriminability
(Dale,1999; Serences, 2004) (applied ISI durations: 5400ms, 6300ms,
7200 ms and 8100 ms; mean ISI 6750 ms). Taken together, an average
trial lasted for 15400 ms. Each of the twenty stimulus faces was
presented with two repetitions (head orientation towards right or left
side) for each of four gaze conditions (DG lasting for 1 s, 2.5 s or 4 s and
AG), summingup to a total of 160 trials. The experimentwas conducted
in an event-related fashion and split into two runs each lasting for
20 min. Participants were asked to perform one run with their right
and the other with their left hand in order to balance for lateralized
motor-related activations. Both runs consisted of equivalent numbers
of condition-speciﬁc events, shown in randomized order. The
sequence of the two runs was randomized as well. Prior to the fMRI
experiment participants were familiarized with the performance of
the task in a standardized instruction and practice session presented
on a computer screen outside the magnet. None of the stimulus faces
used in this introductionwas used in the subsequent fMRI experiment.
Participants were asked to pay attention to the presented animated
faces and to evaluate each of them on a four-point likeability rating
scale consisting of following response options: 1=very dislikable,
2=rather dislikable, 3=rather likeable, 4=very likeable. They were
instructed to respond as spontaneously and quickly as possible after
the display of the rating scale. Noexplicit instructionswere given about
the dimension on which to base their likeability judgments.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
Functional and structural magnetic resonance images were
acquired on a Siemens Trio 3.0 T whole-body scanner (Siemens
Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany). For the fMRI scans we used
T2⁎-weighted gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence with
following imaging parameters: TR=2200 ms, TE=30 ms, ﬁeld of
view=200×200 mm2, 36 axial slices, slice thickness=3.0 mm, in-
plane resolution=3.1×3.1 mm2. Each session consisted of 574 images
preceded by 4 additional images allowing for T1 magnetic saturation
effects. These 4 images were discarded prior to further image
processing. The slices approximately covered thewhole brain omitting
only minimal sections of the most superior part of the parietal cortex
and the most inferior part of the cerebellum. For the structural images
we used high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid
acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence with the following
parameters: TR=2250 ms, TE=3.93 ms, ﬁeld of view=256×
256 mm2, 176 sagittal slices, slice thickness=1.0 mm, in-plane
resolution=1.0×1.0 mm2.
Imaging data processing
Preprocessing
Images were analyzed using MATLAB 6.5 (The Mathworks Inc.,
Natick, USA) and the Statistical Parametric Mapping software package
(SPM5; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK)
as follows. The EPI images were corrected for head movements
between scans by an afﬁne registration (Ashburner and Friston, 2003).
For realignment we used a two-step procedure, by which images were
initially realigned to the ﬁrst image of the time series and
subsequently re-realigned to the mean of all images after the ﬁrst
step. After completing the realignment, the mean EPI image for each
participant was computed and spatially normalized to the MNI single
subject template (Collins et al., 1994; Evans et al., 1992; Holmes et al.,
1998) using the “uniﬁed segmentation” function in SPM5. The ensuing
deformation was subsequently applied to the individual EPI volumes
as well as to the T1 scan, which was coregistered to the mean of the
realigned EPI volumes beforehand. The normalized images were
spatially smoothed using an 8mm FWHMGaussian kernel tomeet the
statistical requirements of further analysis and to compensate for
macroanatomical variations across participants.
Statistical analysis
The datawere analyzed using a General Linear Model as implemen-
ted in SPM5. Two separate analyses of the imagingdatawere performed.
For both analyses presented here, events were deﬁned by onsets and
durations of corresponding stimulus face presentations, whereas
durations were always amounted to 5650 ms according to the time
the virtual character was present. All response events weremodeled on
separate regressors (rR for responses with the right hand and rL for
responses with the left hand), whereby the duration of all response
events was amounted to 1000 ms according to the time the rating scale
was present. Headmovement estimates were included as confounds to
exclude movement-related variance from the image time series. Low-
frequency signal drifts were ﬁltered using a cutoff period of 128 s.
Analysis 1 followed a combined categorical-parametric design that
allowed us to characterize different forms of responses to direct gaze:
(i) categorical response to the presence of direct gaze, irrespective of
duration, compared to averted gaze; and (ii) parametric response to
varying gaze duration within the direct gaze condition by identifying
brain regions where activations increase linearly with increasing DGd.
At the single subject level, conditions DG and AG were modeled
separately using a boxcar referencevector convolvedwith the canonical
hemodynamic response function. Within this categorical framework,
the effect of gaze duration (DGd) was modeled as a linear parametric
modulation of the hemodynamic response to DG by the corresponding
duration (1, 2.5 or 4 s). That is, for each single DG event both (i) the
onset was deﬁned within the regressor representing the categorical
presence of the direct gaze; and (ii) a value for the length of the
corresponding direct gaze (values: 1, 2.5 or 4) was speciﬁed within a
modulatory regressor. In contrast to DG, AG was not parametrically
modulated as there was no temporal variation in any respect. Taken
together, two types of events (AG, DG) and one event parameter of
interest (DGd) were included in the statistical analysis at the single
subject level. In addition, response events rR and rL were included as
well. For each participant, the following four contrasts were speciﬁed:
(i) AG; (ii) DG; (iii) DGd; and (iv) rR and rL. Thereby, all events were
computed against resting baseline by weighting only the regressor
corresponding to that particular event with 1 and all other regressors
weighted with 0. Only in the case of response events, both rR and rL
regressorswereweightedwith1. The single subject contrastswere then
fed into the second-level groupanalysis using aﬂexible factorial ANOVA
(factors: condition and subject), employing a random-effects model
(Penny and Holmes, 2003). On the group level, differences between
conditions and signiﬁcant deviations from zero, respectively, were
assessed by linear contrasts on the second-level parameter estimates
thresholded at pcb0.05 at the cluster-level, corrected for multiple
comparisons and at pb0.001 at the voxel-level, uncorrected (Friston
et al., 1996). The following t-contrasts were computed: (i) DGNAG
(applied weightings: DG=1, AG=−1); (ii) AGNDG (applied weight-
ings: DG=−1, AG=1); (iii) DGd (applied weightings: DGd=1).
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Within the analysis 1 we conducted an anatomically deﬁned
region of interest (ROI) analysis to investigate whether in addition to
the mOFC (see Results and Discussion) subcortical striatal regions
strongly implicated in reward-related processing (Kim et al., 2007; Liu
et al., 2007; O'Doherty, 2004) exhibited similar DGd-sensitive
hemodynamic responses. Using the automated atlas-based masking
technique interfaced in SPM5 (Maldjian et al., 2003) we generated a
ROI mask including the bilateral caudate nucleus, putamen and globus
pallidus in reference to atlas volumes described in Lancaster et al.
(2000). Within this ROI we computed the DGd-contrast thresholded
at pcb0.05 (family wise error [FWE]-corrected for multiple compar-
isons at the voxel-level).
Finally, in the supplementary analysis 2, we employed a categorical
design where every DGd condition was modeled as a separate
regressor. Here, four events of interest were included in the statistical
analysis at the single subject level: (i) AG; (ii) direct gaze events with
a duration of 1 s (DG1); (iii) direct gaze events with a duration of 2.5 s
(DG2.5); and (iv) direct gaze events with a duration of 4 s (DG4). In
addition, the response events rR and rL were included as well. This
procedure allowed us to conduct pair-wise comparisons between
single direct gaze conditions (e.g. DG4NDG1, DG1NDG4, etc.) in order
to corroborate the results of the parametric analysis 1. Furthermore,
this model enabled a more detailed characterization of activation
patterns based on ensuing parameter estimates for each level of the
DGd at a particular location of interest. Resulting contrast images at
the ﬁrst-level of analysis 2 were: (i) AG; (ii) DG1; (iii) DG2.5; (iv)
DG4; and (v) rR and rL. Contrast weightings for single subject level of
the analysis 2 were performed as described for the analysis 1. These
contrasts were included in the group level analysis where all possible
comparisons between DG1, DG2.5 and DG 4 resulting in t-contrasts
were computed. For instance, for the DG1NDG2.5-contrast the DG1-
regressor was weighted with 1 and the DG2.5-regressor with−1. On
the group level of the analysis, differences between conditions were
assessed by linear contrasts on the second-level parameter estimates
thresholded at pcb0.05 at the cluster-level, corrected for multiple
comparisons and at pb0.001 at the voxel-level, uncorrected (Friston
et al., 1996).
Functional activations were anatomically localised by using the
SPM anatomy toolbox, version 1.5 (Eickhoff et al., 2007; Eickhoff et al.,
2005), implementing a maximum probability map. This map denotes
the most likely anatomical area at each voxel of the MNI single subject
template based on probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps derived from
the analysis of cortical areas in a sample of 10 human post-mortem
brains, which were subsequently normalized to the MNI reference
space (Eickhoff et al., 2006). For the purpose of additional anatomical
precision, group contrasts were overlaid on a surface based repre-
sentation of the MNI canonical brain using the SPM surfrend toolbox
(written by I. Kahn; http://spmsurfrend.sourceforge.net). The sur-
faces were than rendered using NeuroLens (written by Dr. R. Hoge;
http://neurolens.org).
Results
Behavioral results
The effect of DGd on likeability ratings was tested by a one-way
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The trials with
purely averted gaze were excluded from this analysis as their
primary purpose was to provide a control condition for the fMRI
paradigm. Nevertheless, pair-wise comparisons revealed that like-
ability ratings for faces showing averted gaze were signiﬁcantly
lower than those for all direct gaze conditions (AG vs. DG1:
pc=.004; AG vs. DG2.5: pc=.003; AG vs. DG4: pc=.002, Bonferroni
corrected). Thus, the ANOVA included three within subject indepen-
dent variables, namely DG1, DG2.5 and DG4, and the dependent
variable likeability ratings.
The ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of DGd [F(2, 42)=
3.664, p=.034; see Fig. 2], implicating that gaze behavior was
evaluated differently with respect to the gaze duration. As Mauchly's
test indicated that the assumption of the sphericity was fulﬁlled, no
corrections of the degrees of freedom have been done. Trend analysis
revealed a signiﬁcant linear trend for gaze duration [F(1, 21)=5.842,
p=.025], while pair-wise comparisons showed that the subjects'
ratings were signiﬁcantly different only between DG1 and DG4 (DG1
vs. DG4: p=.025; DG1 vs. DG2.5: p=.105; DG2.5 vs. DG4: p=.287).
However, the difference between DG1 and DG4 did not survive the
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (DG1 vs. DG4:
pc=.074; DG1 vs. DG2.5: pc=.314; DG2.5 vs. DG4: pc=.861).
Neuroimaging results
Neural correlates of direct gaze
First, we directly compared DG and AG, thereby disregarding the
variations in the duration of direct gaze. Consistent with earlier
research, the contrast DGNAG yielded bilateral activations in
temporo-occipital regions including the pSTS and the motion
sensitive area (V5/MT+; see Fig. 3, left column and Table 1)
(Malikovic et al., 2007), both areas frequently associated with gaze
processing. The overlay of this contrast on a surface based
representation of the MNI canonical brain using the SPM surfrend
toolbox conﬁrms that both bilateral activations extend into the pSTS
(Fig. 3, left column). Furthermore, for the purpose of speciﬁc
veriﬁcation whether areas related to the main effect of the DG are
affected by the duration of DG as well, we conducted the effect of DGd
inclusively masked with the DGNAG contrast (mask threshold:
pb0.001, uncorrected) without getting any signiﬁcant results. Finally,
the contrast AGNDG recruited the right middle occipital gyrus
extending into the angular gyrus (see Table 1).
Neural correlates of direct gaze duration
Second, we tested for the ﬁrst-order parametric modulation of
direct gaze in order to identify regions where the activation increased
linearly with an increasing duration of direct gaze. That is, we
characterized brain areas in which higher activity was observed
during prolonged direct gaze compared to shorter gaze duration. The
Fig. 2. The plot illustrates the signiﬁcant main effect of direct gaze duration on
likeability ratings. The scales on the y-axis indicate the mean of stimuli ratings. A score
of 1 refers to rating a face as “very dislikable” and a one of 4 as “very likeable”. Error bars
show 1 standard error of the mean.
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analysis showed that brain activity was modulated by DGd only in a
single distributed area situated in the MPFC. The respective cluster of
signiﬁcant activation extended dorsally from the supragenual anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) into the pregenual ACC and the paracingulate
cortex (PCC) and ventrally into the medial orbitofrontal cortex
(mOFC; see Fig. 3, right column and Table 1). The differential
activation of this cluster was characterized by deactivations relative
to the resting baseline attenuating with increasing gaze duration,
whereas only in the supragenual ACC (local maximum: x=4, y=36,
z=17) changes in relative activations as a function of increasing gaze
duration were detected (see Fig. 3, right column).
Additionally, in order to conﬁrm the signiﬁcant linear trend
observed in the parametric modulation analysis, pair-wise compar-
isons of gaze duration conditions were performed in a supplementary
random-effects analysis. The results showed that contrasting the
longest with the shortest gaze duration (4 sN1 s) yielded activation of
the MPFC (and additional areas, see Table 1), thus overlapping with
the results from the parametric analysis. In parallel to behavior results,
no other pair-wise comparisons reached signiﬁcance.
Finally, in order to explore DGd-sensitive responses in additional,
subcortical regions, a ROI analysis for the bilateral striatum was
carried out. This analysis yielded no signiﬁcant results, even when
applying a liberal signiﬁcance threshold (pcb0.1, FWE-corrected).
Discussion
The main result of this study shows that processing gaze direction
and gaze duration recruit distinct neural systems. Whereas the
comparison of direct gaze with averted gaze, irrespective of gaze
duration, yielded prominent activations in bilateral occipito-temporal
regions including the pSTS as a correlate of socially relevant gaze
direction processing, the processing of gaze duration was associated
with differential neural activity in the MPFC.
Processing of gaze direction
The pSTS is well known to be involved in processing of various
kinds of biological motion, including gaze movements in particular
(Allison et al., 2000; Grossman and Blake, 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2003a,
b; Puce et al., 1998). That is, the activation of the pSTS may in part be
driven simply by the presence of eye gaze shifts as a form of biological
motion in the DG (but not in the AG) condition. In addition to this
concept of an “eye movement detector”, however, empirical evidence
has also reliably indicated that pSTS activity shows context-dependent
modulation of its response to gaze behavior. This suggests that the
pSTS is also involved in the analysis of social information and
intentions conveyed by gaze (Bristow et al., 2006; Hooker et al.,
2003; Pelphrey et al., 2004a,b). In support of this notion, Pelphrey
et al. (2004b) showed that the pSTS responded stronger to direct than
averted gaze within an overt social context — even when both
conditions contained the samemovement quantity. While the present
data may not differentiate between such contextual effects and
biological motion driven activity, it must be assumed that both
mechanisms coexist and constitute a dynamic hierarchical system for
processing socially relevant stimuli.
The recruitment of V5/MT+ for the processing of the direct gaze
direction might be evoked by the (physical) movement brought on by
the eye gaze shifts in the DG condition, which was absent in the AG
condition. Supporting this view, previous neuroimaging and neuro-
physiological studies have demonstrated the involvement of this
region not only in processing of visual motion in general (Born and
Bradley, 2005; Wilms et al., 2005) but also a speciﬁc effect of eye
motion on the V5/MT+ activity (Puce et al., 1998; Watanabe et al.,
2001, 2006).
Our results hence replicate previous ﬁndings on the involvement
of the pSTS and V5/MT+ in gaze processing adding to the concept
validity of our paradigm and the employed virtual characters.
Fig. 3. Brain regions involved in the processing of gaze direction and gaze duration. The categorical comparison direct gazeNaverted gaze yielded bilateral activations of the temporo-
occipital regions including the posterior superior temporal sulcus and the V5/MT+ (left box). Plots illustrate the corresponding contrast estimates obtained for trials with direct gaze
(DG) and trials with averted gaze (AG) for two different local maxima (upper plot: right MTG, x=46, y=−44, z=9; lower plot: left V5/MT+, x=−42, y=−66, z=5). On the
other hand, parametric modulation analyses of fMRI data identiﬁed a region in the MPFC where BOLD signal changes increased linearly with the increasing duration of the direct gaze
(right box). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for trials with direct gaze at three levels of gaze duration (1 s, 2.5 s and 4 s) for two different local maxima
(upper plot: supragenual ACC, x=4, y=36, z=17; lower plot: mOFC, x=−4, y=48, z=−11). The SPM{t} maps of these contrasts were overlaid on lateral and medial views of a
surface based representation of the MNI canonical brain. The temporo-occipital regions were enlarged in order to demonstrate that activations extend into the pSTS. The bar in the
middle represents the color coding of the t-values for overlaid SPM{t} maps. mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex, ACC=anterior cingulate cortex, MTG=middle temporal gyrus, V5/
MT+=motion sensitive area.
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Moreover, these ﬁndings conﬁrm the current hypothesis, that the
combination of activation in the pSTS with one in V5/MT+ is highly
important for processing the dynamic aspects of facial and in
particular gaze stimuli (Johnson and Farroni, 2007). However, neural
correlates of the simple comparison between the direct and the
averted gaze are clearly restricted to posterior occipito-temporal areas
thereby sparing any differential activation of medial frontal cortical
regions. At the same time, changes in DGd did not differentially
activate brain regions responsive to gaze direction, corroborated by
the lack of signiﬁcant results for the effect of DGd inclusively masked
by the DGNAG contrast. In other words, the elicited activations in
these areas were comparable in magnitude for all direct gaze
conditions indicating that the modulating effect of varying DGd does
not relate to sensory decoding, but relies on more complex cognitive
processes as indicated by the MPFC activation.
Processing of gaze duration
In order to expand previous work on gaze perception, we focused
our experimental design and analysis also on the question, to which
extent the neural processing of direct gaze might be modulated by its
temporal characteristics, i.e., duration of direct gaze. In accordance
with prior behavioral data (Argyle et al., 1974; Brooks et al., 1986;
Droney and Brooks, 1993; Gueguen and Jacob, 2002; Knackstedt and
Kleinke, 1991), likeability ratings of stimulus faces increased with
increasing gaze duration indicating the overall positive effect of
prolonged gaze on impression formation. The corresponding neuro-
imaging data demonstrated that a positive correlation of signal
increases with increasing gaze duration was present in the MPFC
including the supragenual and pregenual ACC, the PCC as well as the
mOFC. The modulatory effect of DGd on the activity in the MPFC was
additionally validated by overlapping results of the direct comparison
between the longest and the shortest gaze duration (4 sN1 s).
Within this DGd-responsive MPFC cluster, the PCC represents a
speciﬁc functional division. Converging evidence from neuroimaging
studies has demonstrated that the PCC is consistently recruited in the
context of tasks requiring person judgments, self-referential proces-
sing and mentalizing (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2005;
Zysset et al., 2002). For instance, similar MPFC regions have been
implicated in understanding communicative, interactively relevant
intentions of others (Walter et al., 2004). Given that the duration of
the direct gaze informs us about other persons' mental states (Eskritt
and Lee, 2007), reﬂections on possible intentions of the displayed
characters for the purpose of interpreting the “meaning” behind the
gaze behavior might have been involved in the process of person
perception in our study. Thus, the particular experience of increasing
salience and communicational content of prolonged direct gaze might
have resulted in differential amounts of spontaneous mentalizing
processes that are not identiﬁable when gaze duration is disregarded.
Furthermore, as direct gaze displayed by another person serves as an
indicator of a potential social interaction and initiates social attention
(Kampe et al., 2003; Kleinke, 1986; Mirenda et al., 1983; von Grunau
and Anston, 1995), self-referential processing might have increased as
a function of enhanced interpersonal involvement due to increasing
direct gaze duration. In conclusion, the modulations of the PCC
reported here might reﬂect a stronger engagement of meta-cognitive
processes such as mentalizing and self-referential processing due to
the manifest communicative intention of prolonged direct gaze.
In contrast to the PCC, the human mOFC plays a special role in
representing the affective value of reinforcements thus enabling
effective decision making and outcome monitoring as demonstrated
both by neuroimaging (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Kringelbach, 2005;
Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004) and lesion studies (Kringelbach and
Rolls, 2004; Mah et al., 2004). Speciﬁcally face-evoked activation in
the mOFC has been found to increase with increasing positive facial
valence (Aharon et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2007; Kranz and Ishai, 2006;
Table 1
Brain areas involved in the processing of gaze direction and gaze duration.
Region Cluster size Cluster pc Side x y z T
Gaze direction
DGNAG
Middle temporal gyrus, extending to: 414 .000 R 46 −44 9 5.11
Superior temporal gyrus R 58 −36 13 5.06
Middle temporal gyrus 251 .003 R 56 −66 −1 5.11
Middle occipital gyrus, extending to: 360 .000 L −42 −66 5 4.16
Middle temporal gyrus L −48 −44 7 3.90
AGNDG
Middle occipital gyrus, extending to: 203 .008 R 50 −76 27 4.60
Angular gyrus R 48 −74 37 4.13
Gaze duration
DGd
mOFC, extending to: 640 .000 R 6 38 −11 4.77
L −4 48 −11 3.88
Supragenual ACC R 4 36 17 4.37
Pregenual ACC R 6 38 5 4.24
PCC L −10 50 5 3.97
4 sN1 s
Pregenual ACC, extending to: 718 .000 R 8 36 5 5.20
L −2 36 5 4.71
mOFC R 6 38 −11 4.42
L −4 46 −13 4.14
Insula 386 .000 L −36 0 −1 4.81
Middle temporal gyrus 204 .008 L −62 −46 −7 5.47
Inferior frontal gyrus 199 .009 R 50 28 −9 4.40
Comments underneath the table: Included are (i) results of the random-effects analysis testing for categorical differences between direct (DG) and averted (AG) gaze direction and
computing the linear parametric modulation of neural responses to direct gaze by corresponding gaze durations (DGd); as well as (ii) results of supplementary random-effects
analysis yielding signiﬁcant results for the pair-wise comparison between the longest (4 s) and the shortest (1 s) direct gaze duration (4 sN1 s). x, y and z refer to the MNI
stereotactic coordinates. R=right hemisphere, L=left hemisphere, mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex, ACC=anterior cingulate cortex, PCC=paracingulate cortex. For each
presented cluster, coordinates at the maximumvoxel are reported in the same rowas the cluster size. Within extended clusters, coordinates for additional local maxima are indicated
in rows below the respective cluster size declaration.
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O'Doherty et al., 2003). In these studies the valence of faces was
dependent on different factors such as beauty (Aharon et al., 2001),
the match between gender of the stimulus face and the sexual
preference of the beholder (Kranz & Ishai, 2006), but also the display
of a smile (O'Doherty et al., 2003). These data give rise to the
suggestion that bothmorphological as well as dynamic self-referential
nonverbal facial features can be considered as a reward similar to
other primary and secondary reinforcements. Furthermore, evidence
for the reward potential of direct gaze is already manifest in early
ontogeny as even very young infants preferentially attend to faces
with direct as compared to averted gaze (Farroni et al., 2002; Symons
et al., 1998), show increased social smiling towards them (Hains and
Muir, 1996) and improve affect regulation and suckling behaviour
when experiencing direct gaze (Blass et al., 2007). Along the same
line, eye contact has been found to serve as a reward in operant
conditioning (Argyle and Cook, 1976). Accordingly, our results show
an increase in neural activity in the mOFC corresponding to a higher
degree of likeability with increasing duration of direct gaze. This
ﬁnding supports the interpretation of the proposed reward that is
associated with the prolonged direct gaze. As we controlled for
attractiveness and emotional expression of the virtual characters,
these factors can be excluded as potentially confounding variables.
However, the hypothesis of the increasing reward value of a
prolonged direct gaze could not be substantiated further by ROI
analyses focusing on striatal regions associated with reward proces-
sing. The lack of the involvement of striatal regionsmight be explained
by dissociable roles of OFC and ventral striatum. The engagement of
the mOFC was related to representation of the abstract and changing
reward value of stimuli (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004) and was
maintained also when facial stimuli were repeatedly presented (Kim
et al., 2007), like in the present paradigm. In contrast, the ventral
striatum exhibited novelty-dependent and short-lasting involvement
in facial preference decisions (Kim et al., 2007) probably being less
suitable for monitoring meaningful changes in subtle nonverbal social
expressions.
Nevertheless, the assumed reward effect of gaze durationdue to the
differential involvement of mOFC in response to increasing DGd needs
to be handled with caution. Alternatively, the differential involvement
of the mOFC can be related to general enhanced emotional processing
in the context of the direct gaze as suggested by Conty et al. (2007) as
well as by Wicker et al. (2003). Afﬁrmatively, the DGd-responsive
supragenual ACC has been frequently implicated in assessing emo-
tional valence of internal and external stimuli (Bush et al., 2000;
Devinsky et al., 1995). Moreover, extensive connections between the
dorsal ACC and limbic regions including the mOFC, showing a
differential response to varying DGd as well, have been described
(Devinsky et al., 1995). Conﬁrming the functional link between these
two areas (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004), dramatic behavioral changes
have been reported to occur after combined lesions of the dorsal ACC
and themOFC leading to impaired ability to interpret social cues and to
show physiological reactions to emotionally signiﬁcant stimuli
(Devinsky et al., 1995). Thus, as it could be demonstrated that being
looked at comprises an emotional valence by heightening arousal
(Argyle and Cook, 1976; Nichols and Champness, 1971; Wicker et al.,
1998), the increasing activation of the supragenual ACC and the mOFC
in response to increasing DGd might be induced by the affective
content of a maintained, interpersonally involving direct gaze.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the gaze duration processing
in the mOFC and the rostral MPFC including the pregenual ACC and
the PCC pertained to the attenuation of deactivation relative to resting
baseline whereas true activations were present only in the supra-
genual ACC. Signal decreases in medial prefrontal regions have been
commonly observed during various attention-demanding cognitive
tasks in functional imaging studies, including those focusing on
emotional and non-emotional judgment of visual stimuli, while signal
increases in these regions were present during resting states (Gusnard
et al., 2001a; Heinzel et al., 2005; Northoff et al., 2004; Raichle et al.,
2001; Schilbach et al., 2008). Taking this into account, the explicit
instruction to evaluate stimulus faces used in our study may have
induced goal-directed and externally oriented processing in the
period of stimulus presentation and in turn resulted in a deactivation
of the mOFC and the rostral MPFC when gaze duration effects are not
considered. In this context, it is interesting to note that it has been
speculated that the resting state is phenomenologically dominated by
internally directed thoughts and social cognitive processes (Gusnard
et al., 2001a,b; Iacoboni et al., 2004; Schilbach et al., 2008), as
supported by self-reports of subjects at rest (D'Argembeau et al.,
2005; Mazoyer et al., 2001) as well as by functional imaging studies
(Iacoboni et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2005). Hence, gaze duration-
dependent attenuation of signal decreases in these areas might reﬂect
an increase of internal, socio-emotional processing induced by
prolonged direct gaze.
Conclusions
In summary, cognitive processing of social gaze appears to be
dependent on speciﬁc gaze parameters that have to be considered in
detail. On the one hand, the detection of socially relevant gaze
direction conveying the impression of being looked at by a virtual
character, irrespective of gaze duration, appears to be mediated by
bilateral occipito-temporal regions including the multimodal sensory
area pSTS. Indicating social perception via complex visual analysis, the
recruitment of these posterior brain regions may be related to the
observation of incoming social stimuli. On the other hand, the
involvement of the MPFC known to be involved in a variety of meta-
cognitive processes suggests more complex processing related to the
evaluation of the ongoing communicational input conveyed by the
direct gaze duration. Within dynamic, stochastic environments like
social encounters changing nonverbal signals including gaze behavior
require sophisticated dynamic decoding of the underlying meaning
that may provide an essential basis for the regulation of one's own
actions and reactions. For online monitoring of the direct gaze
duration that encloses a signiﬁcant source of social information we
demonstrated the engagement of PCC, ACC and mOFC traditionally
associated with mentalizing on the one hand and with processing the
hedonic and affective value of stimuli and possible outcomes on the
other. Extending the perceptual detection of gaze direction, our results
thus indicate that the systematic investigation of dynamic and subtle
nonverbal signals such as direct gaze duration may help to better
characterize the proposed link between direct gaze and complex
social cognitive processes.
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A matter of words: Impact of verbal and nonverbal information on
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1. Introduction
Research on the ability to understand mental states of others, also referred to as ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), has been highly
influential in characterizing social cognition in individuals with autism (Frith, 2003). Here, impairments in ToM abilities
helped to explain core criteria of autism including qualitative impairments in social communication and reciprocal
interaction (10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases, ICD-10, World Health Organization). However, in
everyday social interactions, we do not only reason about the mental states of others in a given situation – as tested in
‘classical’ ToM tasks – but we also form global evaluative impressions of others, i.e., we feel more or less attracted by the
other person. These first impressions not only play a substantial role in interpersonal decision-making with respect to
private relationships, but also in professional contexts, mass media or politics (Frey, 1999).
Recent dual-processing accounts of judgment and social cognition assume that (i) the verbal descriptions of the behavior
of others (propositional format) and (ii) visual observation of nonverbal behavior (non-propositional format) have different
processing paths (Evans, 2008): while nonverbal behavior of others has been demonstrated to play an influential role in the
impression formation process (Burgoon, 1994; Domangue, 1978; Droney & Brooks, 1993; Kuzmanovic et al., 2009; Levine &
Feldman, 2002; Scherer, Scherer, Hall, & Rosenthal, 1977), it does not necessarily refer to an explicit semantic code like the
symbolic verbal informationmaking it on occasion difficult to extract a distinct declarative meaning from single cues (Bente
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& Kraemer, 2003; Bente & Kraemer, 2008; Bente, Kraemer, & Eschenburg, 2008; Kraemer, 2008). Further characteristics of
nonverbal behavior that add to the difficulty of its explicit interpretation are its (i) high dimensional complexity which refers
to the simultaneous co-occurrence of multiple cues (e.g., smile and direct gaze) and the interdependency of meanings of the
different cues on each other and (ii) the high processual complexity which denotes the quality of movements characterized
by subtle dynamics extending in time rather than static, isolated elements (Bente & Kraemer, 2003, 2008; Bente, Kraemer, &
Eschenburg, 2008; Grammer, Honda, Juette, & Schmitt, 1999; Kraemer, 2008). Consequently, nonverbal behavior is often
produced and decoded outside awareness (Choi, Gray, & Ambady, 2005; Frey, 1999; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Grammer et al.,
1999) and thus might influence the impression formation in a more intuitive way.
Despite the importance of impression formation for social interaction and communication and in contrast to the
numerous studies on ToM, there have been no attempts to investigate whether and how individuals with HFA form global
evaluative impressions of other people. In the present study, we, therefore, devised an impression formation task that not
only requires an understanding of currentmental states of another person, but also demands an evaluative assessment of the
target person based on verbal behavioral descriptions and nonverbal behavioral samples. In a complex impression formation
task, verbal (V) and nonverbal (N) information was presented in a congruent (i.e., V+N+ or V!N!) or in an incongruent (i.e.,
V!N+ or V+N!) combination with respect to valence (positive +, or negative !). This design allowed for investigating the
differential impacts of verbal and nonverbal components of information on the global person evaluation. Additionally, in
order to acquire the subjective evaluations of each verbal and nonverbal stimulus for each participant all stimuli were also
presented separately in a basic control task. In light of previous studies reporting processing differences for nonverbal social
stimuli in HFA (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Behrmann et al., 2006; Critchley et al., 2000; Schultz et al., 2000), we expected HFA
participants to exhibit difficulties in the decoding and consideration of dynamic, nonverbal cues rather than verbal
information during impression formation, particularly during the complex incongruent task in which conflicting
information had to be integrated to form a context-sensitive global impression of the other person.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Fifteen HFA individuals (11male, mean age 30.47, SD = 7.11 years) were studied and compared to 15 control participants
(11 male, mean age 29.87, SD = 6.40 years) who were matched with respect to gender, age, years of education and
intelligence (see Table 1). All HFA participants were diagnosed and recruited in the Autism Outpatient Clinic at the
Department of Psychiatry at the University of Cologne (Germany). As part of a systematic assessment the diagnoses were
made independently by two specialized physicians corresponding to ICD-10 criteria andwere supplemented by an extensive
neuropsychological assessment. The procedure of this assessment beganwith a first interviewwith patients by a specialized
consulting physician (LS or FGL), who were referred to our department by a practicing psychiatrist or neurologist in order to
confirm or reject the possible diagnosis of autism. In cases in which this first interview supported the diagnosis, patients
underwent a neuropsychological assessment resulting in a detailed written summary of the neuropsychological profile
including comments on the behavior of the patients during the testing. In a final interviewwith the patient, the decisionwas
made by a second, independent consulting physician (KV) under considerations of the previous indices. Included were
patients with the diagnoses childhood autism (F84.0) and Asperger’s autism (F84.5) with an at least averaged IQ. Thus, we
use the term HFA to refer to individuals with autism spectrum disorders and a high intellectual level of functioning
regardless of diagnostic criteria relating to early childhood such as the onset of the language development. None of the HFA
participants were taking any psychotropic medications except for one who was taking an antidepressant medication
(Sertraline 50mg/day). As depression is a common co-morbidity in HFA (Stewart, Barnard, Pearson, Hasan, & O’Brien, 2006)
and this individual’s neuropsychological performance was comparable to the rest of the group, he was not excluded.
Table 1
Demographic and neuropsychological variables.
HFA Control Statistics
M SD M SD
Gender (m:f) 11:4 11:4
Age (y) 30.47 7.11 29.87 6.40 t(28) = .24 p = .81
Education (y) 17.67 4.16 17.97 2.54 t(28) =!.24 p = .81
IQ 111.64 5.92 110.20 8.17 t(28) = .36 p = .73
BDIa 11.87 10.77 2.27 2.68 t(28) = 3.35 p = .00*
AQa 37.60 4.27 13.60 3.70 t(28) = 16.45 p = .00*
EQa 16.25 8.61 47.87 9.85 t(25) =!8.75 p = .00*
SQa 34.42 16.28 26.33 9.74 t(25) = 1.60 p = .12
HFA = high-functioning autism,M =mean, SD = standard deviation, m =male, f = female, y = years, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, AQ = Autism Spectrum
Quotient, EQ = Empathy Quotient, SQ = Systemizing Quotient-Revised.
Note: The EQ- and SQ-scores of three HFA participants are missing.
a Raw score (not standardized).
* p< .05.
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Additionally, three people reported episodes of depression in their past medical history. Accordingly, there was a significant
difference in the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck & Steer, 1987) score for the control and the HFA group (see Table 1).
Consistent with the clinical diagnoses, there were also significant differences in the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and the
Empathy Quotient (EQ) as well as trend level significant differences in the Systemizing Quotient-Revised (SQ) between the
HFA and the control group (see Table 1) (Wheelwright et al., 2006).
Controls were recruited online by addressing students and employees of the University of Cologne. They had no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders, and were not on any kind of psychotropic medication. Furthermore, they were only
included if providing an average AQ (critical cut-off score !22) (Baron-Cohen, 2003) and a normal BDI score (Beck & Steer,
1987) in order to avoid extensive depressive or autistic symptoms in the healthy, control sample. Intelligence in both groups
for matching purposes was assessed by a German multiple choice vocabulary test (‘‘Wortschatztest’’, WST) (Schmidt &
Metzler, 1992), which allows a quick and valid estimation of general intelligence (Lehrl, Triebig, & Fischer, 1995; Suslow,
2009). Participants gave their informed consent before taking part. The study was conducted with the approval of the local
ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Cologne.
2.2. Stimuli
Verbal stimuli consisted of 12 positive (V+) and 12 negative (V") German sentences describing a social action of the target
person (e.g., ‘‘She told the secrets of a colleague to the others.’’ vs. ‘‘She did not tell the secrets of a colleague to the others.’’).
There were no differences between the positive and the negative sentences concerning the syntactic complexity as all
sentences had a simple structure without any subordinate clauses and the samemean number of words in a sentence (mean
number of words for both valence categories = 8.0; T(22)< 1, p = 1.0). Furthermore, semantic complexity was also
comparable across the conditions as both valence categories did not differ in the mean word frequency per sentence
according to the German vocabulary project of the University of Leipzig (http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de/; M for
V+ = 651628.97, SD = 307675.20; M for V" = 713860.11, SD = 265210.25; T(22)< 1, p = .60).
Nonverbal stimuli consisted of 12 positive (N+) and 12 negative (N") animated video files presenting a virtual character
sitting in a chair and displaying different kinds of social signals. To optimize the control of the displayed nonverbal behavior
and to minimize the impact of the physical appearance, we used anthropomorphic virtual characters as social stimuli (see
Fig. 1). This approach was proved to be an internally as well as externally valid method to test the impact of nonverbal cues
on person perception in behavioral (Bente, Feist, & Elder, 1996; Bente, Kraemer, Petersen, & de Ruiter, 2001; Bente, Petersen,
Kraemer, & de Ruiter, 2001; Bente, Senokozlieva, Pennig, Al-Issa, & Fischer, 2008) and functional neuroimaging studies
(Kuzmanovic et al., 2009; Moser et al., 2007; Schilbach et al., 2009; Schilbach et al., 2006). The design and animation of
nonverbal behavior of the virtual character and the creation of the videoswere realized by using the software package ‘Poser
6’ (Curious Labs, Inc. and e frontier, Inc.). In the initial, default sitting position, the virtual character exhibited a straight body
Fig. 1. Experimental procedure and examples of nonverbal stimuli. (a) An experimental trial from the complex impression formation task basing on a
combination of verbal and nonverbal information. (b) An experimental trial from the basic impression formation task basing on single peaces of information
providing a subjective evaluation of all stimuli. (c) An example of a positive nonverbal stimulus showing the target person displaying a direct gaze, smile and
forward-lean. (d) An example of a negative nonverbal stimulus showing the target person rolling her eyes upwards, making an angry face and leaning
backwards.
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and head position with a neutral facial expression and a trunk rotated 108 to the right in order to increase the salience of
observer-directed signals like direct gaze. This default position was systematically combined with four effective social
signals, namely: (i) gaze direction (gaze directed to the observer vs. gaze directed upwards); (ii) facial expression (smile vs.
angry face); (iii) body movement (forward-lean vs. backward-lean); and (iv) head movement (lateral flexion towards vs.
away from the observer) (see Fig. 1c and d). These basic signals were then implemented as short movies under systematic
variation of one (e.g., only the smile was displayed by the virtual character, i.e., single combination), two (e.g., the smile and
the gaze directed to the observer were displayed by the virtual character, i.e., double combination), or three signals (e.g.,
smile, direct gaze, forward-lean, i.e., triple combination) resulting in 14 positive and 14 negative movies. Of these 28movies
and 28 sentences, the 12 most effective negative and 12 most effective positive sentences and movies (including 4 single, 4
double and 4 triple combination movies of positive and negative valence) were selected based on the results of a behavioral
pilot study prior to the begin of the study. Consequently, the two positive and the two negative verbal and nonverbal stimuli,
that evoked the weakest positive or negative impression formation, were excluded.
2.3. Procedure
The experiment consisted of two parts: (i) during the first part complex impression formation was to be performed
based on a combination of verbal and nonverbal information and (ii) during the second part basic impression formation
based on a single piece of information, either verbal or nonverbal, was required, providing a subjective evaluation
of all stimuli for each participant (see Fig. 1a and b). Before each part, subjects were familiarized with the task by
means of a standardized, computerized instruction that included practice trials with stimuli not used in the
experimental tasks.
In the complex task, participants were instructed to judge female job applicants as positive or negative on a 6-point
rating scale (1 = very negative; 2 = negative; 3 = rather negative; 4 = rather positive; 5 = positive; 6 = very positive) after a
verbal and a nonverbal piece of information about this applicant had been shown. Verbal information was introduced as a
statement by a friend of the target person in reference to her prior work place. Nonverbal information was said to be a
representative scene of the face-to-face job interview overlayed onto a virtual character. In the basic task, the subjects were
instructed to judge female job applicants on the same 6-point scale again, but this time based on either verbal or nonverbal
information alone.
All stimuli were presented for 3 s with a 3 s break in between and a rating scale lasting for 2 s. Subsequent trials were
separated by a 6 s break in the complex task and by a 3 s break in the basic task. Resulting trial length for the complex task,
therefore, was 20 s and for the basic task 11 s. The complex task comprised 48 trials (12 V!N!, 12 V!N+, 12 V+N!, 12 V+N+)
in a pseudorandomized order and lasted 16min in total. Consequently, verbal and nonverbal information was either
presented congruently (V!N! or V+N+) or incongruently (V!N+ or V+N!). Each stimulus was presented twice: once in the
congruent and once in the incongruent condition. The sequence order of information (V/N vs.N/V)was fully counterbalanced
across conditions. Verbal and nonverbal stimuli were presented in a fixed pattern, i.e., sentence–movie pairs were consistent
across all subjects. The basic task also comprised 48 pseudorandomly ordered trials (12 V!, 12 V+, 12 N!, 12 N+) and lasted
8.8min in total. Stimulus presentation and response recording were performed by using the software package Presentation
11.3 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., www.neurobs.com/).
2.4. Analyses
The data were analyzed using the statistical software SPSS (SPSS Statistics 17.0). In all analyses amixed design analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with one between-subject independent variable group (HFA vs. control) and varying within-subject
independent variables as described in the following was used.
For the complex task the analysis was separated into two ANOVAs distinguishing between congruent and incongruent
combinations of verbal and nonverbal information. Congruent trials required no integration of conflicting information as
necessary in incongruent trials allowing for the estimation of the relative impacts of verbal and nonverbal sources of
information on impression formation. In both analyses, the within-subject factor was the valence of the combined
information (congruent: positive (V+N+) vs. negative (V!N!); incongruent: positive verbal and negative nonverbal (V+N!)
vs. negative verbal and positive nonverbal (V!N+). The dependent variables were the mean ratings for the relevant
conditions (V+N+, V!N! and V!N+, V+N!) for each subject.
The same information can have varying meanings for different subjects. In order to investigate the relative influence of
the different information domains based on the subjective evaluation of applied verbal and nonverbal stimuli, the ratings
given in incongruent trials (V!N+ and V+N!) were related to the ratings of the respective single stimuli as acquired in the
basic task where all stimuli were judged separately. The relative impact of the two domains on the complex impression
formationwas estimated by the absolute amount of the difference between the complex judgment (e.g., based on V!N+) and
basic judgments based on the corresponding single stimuli (e.g., V! and N+). For instance, when the complex rating for a
stimulus combination V!N+was 2 and the basic ratings for the corresponding V! stimulus was 1 and for the corresponding
N+ stimulus 5, the verbal stimulus exhibits a smaller distance to the complex rating (j1! 2j = 1), and was therefore assumed
to have a stronger impact in the decision-making process than the nonverbal stimulus whose basic rating exhibits a greater
distance to the complex rating (j5! 2j = 3). The raw data of these difference values from each participantwere then averaged
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within the four possible conditions (mean relative impact of V!, V+, N! and N+). In order to obtain amore intuitive scaling of
the dependent variable where higher scores correspond to greater relative impact, the mean relative impact scores were
reversed by subtracting each score from the highest score obtained in the entire measured sample of HFA and control
participants (Xhighest! Xi). The ANOVA included the within-subject factors domain of the information (V vs.N) and valence of
the information (+ vs. !) resulting in a two by two matrix.
Finally, in order to calculate the evaluation of single stimuli, impression ratings from the basic task were analyzed by
defining the within-subject factors domain of the information (V vs. N) and valence of the information (+ vs. !) resulting in a
two by two matrix (V!, V+, N! and N+). As in the complex task, the dependent variable was the mean rating for each of the
four conditions for each individual participant.
In all analyses, the assumption of the normal distribution of the data was fulfilled for both groups and for all levels of the
respective repeated-measures variables as indicated by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov-Test. Furthermore, the assumption of the
homogeneity of variance for all levels of the repeated-measures variables was fulfilled as shown by the Levene’s test. All
effects are reported as significant at p< .05 (all t-tests were computed as two-tailed tests). Significant interactions were
further analyzed using paired or independent sample t-tests.
3. Results
3.1. Basic impression formation
As shown in Table 2a and as plotted in Fig. 2a, there was no significant main effect of the factor group within the basic
impression formation task indicating that there were no general differences with respect to the capacity to evaluate
isolated verbal and nonverbal stimuli between the HFA and the control participants. Furthermore, there was no
significant main effect of the factor domain showing that in general verbal and nonverbal information did not elicit
Table 2
Inferential statistics for the effects of interest.
Effects of interest and pair-wise comparisons F/t p r Mean difference 95% CI of mean difference
Lower bound Upper bound
(a) Basic impression formation
Group .36 .552 .11 !.047 !.21 .11
Domain .96 .335 .18 .08 !.08 .25
Valence 534.33 .000* .97 !2.52 !2.74 !2.30
Valence"Domain 29.20 .000* .71
!: V vs. N !3.47 .002* .54 !.55 !.87 !.23
+: V vs. N 5.53 .000* .72 .71 .45 .98
V: ! vs. + !18.20 .000* .96 !3.15 !3.51 !2.80
N: ! vs. + !12.79 .000* .92 !1.89 !2.19 !1.59
(b) Complex impression formation
Congruent information
Group .06 .802 .05 .02 !.15 .19
Valence 617.40 .000* .98 !3.14 !3.40 !2.88
Valence" group .65 .428 .15
Incongruent information
Group .00 .983 .00 .00 !.22 .22
Valence 40.01 .000* .77 !1.52 !2.02 !1.03
Valence" group 6.54 .016* .43
V!N+: HFA vs. control !2.97 .006* .50 !.61 !1.04 !.19
V+N!: HFA vs. control 2.00 .056 .35 .62 !.02 1.25
HFA: V!N+ vs. V+N! !6.25 .000* .86 !2.14 !2.87 !1.40
Control: V!N+ vs. V+N! !2.68 .018* .58 !.91 !1.63 !.18
(c) Relative impact
Group .15 .701 .07 .034 !.15 .21
Domain 23.33 .000* .67 .75 .43 1.06
Valence 14.29 .001* .58 .33 .15 .51
Domain" group 5.05 .033* .39
V: HFA vs. control 2.47 .020* .42 .38 .07 .70
N: HFA vs. control !1.58 .126 .29 !.31 !.71 .09
HFA: V vs. N 5.02 .000* .80 1.11 .63 1.58
Control: V vs. N 1.92 .076 .46 .41 !.05 .88
HFA = high-functioning autism,M =mean, SD = standard deviation, CI = confidence interval, V = verbal information, N = nonverbal information,! = negative
valence, + = positive valence. For the analyses (a) and (c) only the significant interactions are listed. In order to specify significant interaction effects, pair-
wise comparisons by paired or independent sample t-tests were computed (italic font).
* Significant effects at a probability threshold p< 0.05.
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differential impression ratings. There was a significant main effect of the factor valence demonstrating the general
validity of the applied stimuli as positive stimuli were in fact rated as positive and negative stimuli as negative. However,
there was also a significant interaction effect between the factors domain and valence revealing that verbal and
nonverbal information was rated differentially when considering its valence. Pair-wise comparisons of negative
information yielded stronger negative ratings of verbal as compared to nonverbal information (see Table 2a, !: V vs. N).
Similarly, positive verbal information was perceived as more positive than positive nonverbal information (see Table 2a,
+: V vs. N). Thus, although the difference between positive and negative stimuli within both the verbal and the nonverbal
domain was highly significant and demonstrated a large effect size (see Table 2a, V:/N:! vs. +), this difference was greater
within the verbal domain than within the nonverbal domain as evident from the mean difference and confidence
intervals. Taken together, the statistical interaction between the factors domain and valence indicates that verbal and
nonverbal stimuli are not strictly comparable concerning their potential to induce positive and negative impressions. At
the same time, the validity of both verbal and nonverbal stimuli is still maintained as positive information always ranges
within the positive levels of the rating scale (4–6) and negative information within the negative levels (1–3) even for the
nonverbal information (see Fig. 2a). Still, it is possible and plausible that the difference in the potential to induce positive
and negative impressions between the verbal and nonverbal information could interfere with the relative impact of these
two modalities within combined incongruent information trials, which needs to be considered in the discussion of these
effects. However, as there were no significant interaction effects between the factors group and valence (F(1, 28)< 1,
p = .42), nor group and domain (F(1, 28)< 1, p = .91), nor group, valence and domain (F(1, 28) = 2.00, p = .17), no
constraints need to be made for the discussion of the group related differences in the integrative rating of combined
information.
3.2. Complex impression formation
As shown in Table 2b and plotted in Fig. 2b, for both congruent and incongruent combinations of verbal and nonverbal
information there was no significant main effect of the factor group indicating that ratings of HFA and control participants
were in general the same, i.e., when disregarding the effects of the valence of stimuli.
For congruent trials there was, similar to basic impression formation, a significant main effect of the factor valence of the
combined information showing that positive information combinations were rated more positively than negative
information combination. There was no significant interaction effect between the factors group and valence indicating that
both groups made a similar distinction between positive and negative congruent information.
For incongruent trials there was also a significant main effect of the factor valence of the combined information showing
that V!N+ trials were rated more negative than V+N! trials indicating a more robust influence of the verbal domain on the
complex impression formationwithin incongruent trials. Furthermore, therewas a significant interaction effect between the
factors group and valence. Pair-wise comparisons revealed that HFA participants rated the V!N+ trials significantly more
negative and the V+N! trials as more positive on a trend level, both in comparison to control subjects (see Table 2b,
incongruent information, V!N+:/V+N!: HFA vs. control). This indicates that although both groups relied more on the verbal
information, this effect is pronounced stronger in the HFA group because the mean ratings are influenced stronger by the
valence of the verbal information. Consistent with this finding, the difference in the HFA group between V!N+ and V+N! is
significantly greater than in the control group as demonstrated by the differences in effect sizes as well as by the mean
differences and the confidence intervals (see Table 2, incongruent information, HFA:/control: V!N+ vs. V+N!). For the HFA
group the latter include only mean strong differences while in the control group small mean differences are comprised as
well.
3.3. Relative impact
In a supplementary analysis we calculated the relative impacts of positive and negative verbal and nonverbal
information within complex incongruent trials in reference to the basic evaluation of the corresponding single stimuli for
each participant (see Section 2.4). Again, as shown in Table 2c and plotted in Fig. 2c there was no main effect of the factor
group confirming that in general the stimuli had a comparable influence on impression formation in HFA and control
participants, i.e., when disregarding the effects of domain and valence. There was a significant main effect of the factor
valence demonstrating a greater impact of negative as compared to positive information, irrespective of group or domain.
As there was no significant interaction effect between the factors group and valence (F(1,28)< 1, p = .60) both groups
appeared to show the same tendency in that they take negative information more into consideration than positive
information. Also, there was a significant main effect of the factor domain, which indicates that verbal information had a
greater impact on the impression formation than nonverbal information. Importantly, this effect differed between the
groups, as there was a significant interaction between the factors group and domain. Pair-wise comparisons revealed that
HFA participants relied more on the verbal information than control participants (see Table 2c, V: HFA vs. Control).
Crucially, the difference between the relative impact of verbal and nonverbal information was significant and large in
the HFA (see Table 2c, HFA: V vs. N), but not in the control group (see Table 2c, control: V vs. N). Finally, there was no
significant interaction effect between the factors valence and domain (F(1,28)< 1, p = .58) nor group, domain and valence
(F(1,28)< 1, p = .77).
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Fig. 2. Bar graphs showing results of the impression formation tasks for the HFA and control group. (a) Mean ratings for the basic impression formation
based on a single peace of information; (b)mean ratings for the complex impression formation based on a combination of verbal and nonverbal information
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4. Discussion
The present study sought to investigate the differential impact of verbal and nonverbal information on impression
formation in HFA. When presenting the socially relevant information independently or in congruent combinations, no
significant differences between the HFA and the matched control group were observed. Furthermore, when presenting
contradicting verbal and nonverbal information, both groups exhibited a tendency to more strongly rely on verbal
information. Importantly, however, impression formation of the HFA participants wasmore strongly influenced by verbal
information than that of the control group. In addition, by proceeding from the subjective evaluations of the underlying
stimuli to assess the relative influence of the information domains, we were able to demonstrate a relative dominance of
the verbal over the nonverbal domain only within the HFA but not within the control group. While both verbal and
nonverbal stimuli had a considerable influence on control participants indicating an integration of the relevant
social information, the HFA participants showed a bias towards relying on the verbal domain thereby neglecting the
nonverbal cues.
The first finding that there were no group differences in evaluating isolated verbal or nonverbal information contradicts
our a priori hypothesis. It demonstrates that HFA individuals are well able to detect and interpret socially relevant cues from
both domains to form an impression, when explicitly instructed to do so and when engaged in a simplified and structured
task. However, the degree to which nonverbal information contributes to complex subjective social decisions is significantly
lower in HFA than in control participants. This finding points towards differences in the impact of the two information
domains detectable only when contextualizing nonverbal cues within other relevant and competing sources of information.
Based on the finding that individuals with HFA are able to infer personality traits from textual action descriptions
(Ramachandran, Mitchell, & Ropar, 2009), we suppose that such deductive social constructs might guide individuals with
HFA when evaluating the target person based on verbal stimuli. In contrast, dynamic nonverbal behavior might be less
clearly related to certain social constructs and might influence the global impression formation by means of an immediate
‘value’ of the observed social cues (Bente & Kraemer, 2003, 2008; Kraemer, 2008). We suggest that during the complex
impression formation, nonverbal information needs not only to be identified, but must also lead to the formation of an
affectively meaningful impression that is able to bias the representations of additional verbal information. As previous
results from our group could demonstrate that nonverbal information has less influence on feelings in HFA (Schwartz, Bente,
Gawronski, Schilbach, & Vogeley, 2010), we suggest an impoverished affective response to nonverbal stimuli in people with
HFA. Thus, for HFA individuals, nonverbal information does not seem to leave a profound impression and, therefore, can
hardly become effective in the context of explicit verbal information. Consequently, there seems to be a dissociation between
knowingwhat a cue means on the one hand, and, on the other hand, acting upon it based on motivational predispositions to
respond to salient social stimuli (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003).
An alternative explanation for the less effective performance of the HFA group in the complex task could be provided by
its increased difficulty relative to the basic task. When defining the difficulty by the quantity of information, then this
explanation can be disproved because HFA participants did not differ from the controls in the complex congruent task, which
also required the consideration of two pieces of information. However, the difficulty can also be defined by the quality of
information, i.e., by the fact that the informationwas contradictory in the complex incongruent task. Even so, if the increased
difficulty would have been the only reason for the differences in the performance of the task, then the reduced ability to
integrate multiple contradictory information should have affected both domains equally, but not specifically the nonverbal
domain. In conclusion, we argue that the increased difficulty of the complex incongruent task alone cannot sufficiently
explain the reduced influence of the nonverbal information.
On a more speculative note, the good performance in the basic task along with the stronger reliance on the verbal
information in the complex incongruent task might indicate an essential difference in the underlying cognitive processes
between the HFA and the control group. It could be possible that HFA participants apply a more analytic processing style
when dealing with social information. Thus, they could more easily deal with the verbal information and would be able to
apply rule-based processing for the simple decoding of the nonverbal information only in the absence of competing verbal
information. Providing only a weak basis for stringent logical reasoning, social decisions and impressions that incorporate
multimodal and also incomplete, ambiguous or even contradictory information could profit from more intuitive,
spontaneous processing (DeMartino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, & Dolan, 2008). Supporting this suggestion, individuals with HFA
showed prolonged reaction times in face discrimination tasks along with preserved accuracy (Behrmann et al., 2006)
suggesting the employment of cognitive processes that require a higher effort. Furthermore, functional neuroimaging
studies have revealed atypical strategies for face perception in HFA adults indicated by the recruitment of neural regions
associatedwith object but not with face recognition – despite of high accuracy on the behavioral level (Critchley et al., 2000;
Schultz et al., 2000). Consequently, although being perfectly able to process nonverbal signals under simplified laboratory
conditions, HFA individuals are likely to be less effective in their everyday social interactions or in more complex
experimental settings failing to respond in a fast and spontaneousway (Frith, 2003; Klin et al., 2003; Senju, Southgate,White,
& Frith, 2009).
separated for congruent and incongruent trials; and (c) mean relative impact of verbal and nonverbal information within complex trials with incongruent
peaces of information. The scaling on the y-axis refers in (a) and (b) to the rating scale ranging from 1 (very negative impression) to 6 (very positive
impression) and in (c) to the relative effects computed in reference to basic evaluation of the corresponding stimuli.
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Finally, our results revealed interesting overall effects for both groups within the incongruent complex impression
formation task. Firstly, both groups equally attached greater importance to information with a negative valence. This
tendency is also known as the ‘negativity effect’, which has frequently been demonstrated in the impression formation
research (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). According to this notion, negative information is perceived as more ‘diagnostic’ for
trait inferences because it contradicts the social norms and is thus perceived as more closely related to intrinsic motivation
and personality characteristics of the target person (Jones & Davis, 1965). Secondly, when building an impression based on
conflicting verbal and nonverbal information, both the HFA and the control group tended to rely more on the verbal
information even though this bias was significantly stronger in the HFA group. Importantly, this dominance of verbal
information needs to be considered in the context of the greater distinctiveness of negative and positive verbal stimuli in
comparison to nonverbal stimuli as assessed in the basic impression formation task across both groups. We suggest that the
higher potential to induce positive and negative impressions of verbal stimuli may underlie the greater general impact of
verbal information within the incongruent complex impression formation. Accordingly, it is crucial to take into account the
subjective evaluation of the corresponding single pieces of information when assessing the relative influence of the verbal
and nonverbal domain. With this procedure it was, indeed, possible to account for the variance of the stimulus material
underlying the complex impression formation with respect to the potential to evoke subjective positive or negative
impressions and to reveal more robust differences between the groups concerning the relative impact of verbal and
nonverbal stimuli.
5. Conclusions
Taken together, HFA individuals show a tendency to rely more strongly on the explicit, verbal domain when forced to
integrate conflicting social stimuli. Although they are able to decode the meaning of isolated nonverbal information, HFA
participants were significantly less influenced by the same nonverbal cues when making complex social decisions. The
nature of cognitive processes that underlie the evaluation of socially relevant verbal and nonverbal information, however,
remain an open question and could be addressed by making use of experimental set-ups enriched by psycho-physiological
and functional neuroimaging methods in future research.
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First impressions profoundly inﬂuence our attitudes and behavior toward others. However, little is known
about whether and to what degree the cognitive processes that underlie impression formation depend on
the domain of the available information about the target person. To investigate the neural bases of the inﬂu-
ence of verbal as compared to nonverbal information on interpersonal judgments, we identiﬁed brain regions
where the BOLD signal parametrically increased with increasing strength of evaluation based on either short
text vignettes or mimic and gestural behavior. While for verbal stimuli the increasing strength of subjective
evaluationwas correlatedwith increased neural activation of precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex (PC/PCC),
a similar effect was observed for nonverbal stimuli in the amygdala. These ﬁndings support the assumption that
qualitatively different cognitive operations underlie person evaluation depending upon the stimulus domain:
while the processing of nonverbal person informationmay bemore strongly associatedwith affective processing
as indexed by recruitment of the amygdala, verbal person information engaged the PC/PCC that has been related
to social inferential processing.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
In our everyday life we are ready to make fast and spontaneous
judgments about other persons (Uleman et al., 2008), which are de-
termined by our very subjective evaluation of the available informa-
tion about the target person (Schiller et al., 2009). Furthermore, ﬁrst
impressions are mostly not restricted to inferences about enduring
dispositions, e.g., that someone is intelligent because he passed a
math test, but also encompass an evaluative component due to the
assignment of a rather positive or negative value to someone's indi-
vidual characteristics. Importantly, the outcome of such an evaluation
crucially determines our expectations and behavior toward social
others (Delgado et al., 2005; Uleman et al., 2008).
However, little is known about whether the cognitive processes
mediating the evaluation of another person differ depending upon
the domain of available information. While the traditional person
judgment research has relied on verbal stimuli such as action descrip-
tion or trait adjectives, short excerpts of nonverbal behavior have
been demonstrated to be equally effective in evoking differentiated
assessments (Ambady et al., 2000; Kuzmanovic et al., 2011). But
although ratings of other persons may lead to similar outputs across
different domains of information, this does not allow for inferences
regarding the degree of similarity of underlying cognitive processes.
However, comparing the neural correlates of impression formation
that relies on verbal and nonverbal person information, respectively,
could be used as an index for such conclusions. Thus, the present
study explores putative differences in the neural signature of the
evaluative component of impression formation dependent upon
whether the underlying relevant social information was presented
verbally or nonverbally. Given the far-reaching consequences of im-
pression formation within social interactions, elucidating possible
domain-speciﬁc differences in the related neural processing would
extend the understanding of interpersonal behavior and might have
signiﬁcant implications for social decisions.
Theoretical considerations suggest divergent processing streams
across domains by stating that language is digitally deﬁned by an ex-
plicit semantic code with a complex logical syntax, while the inter-
pretation of analog nonverbal signals appears to be more uncertain
as multiple cues may occur simultaneously and extend over time,
and are known to have greater impact on the affective, relational
level of communication (Kraemer, 2008; Watzlawick et al., 1967).
Supporting these assumptions, a recent neuroimaging study indeed
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has demonstrated domain-speciﬁc neural systems involved when
drawing inferences about social targets' affective states: while verbal
information processing was associated with the mental state attribu-
tion system including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC),
precuneus (PC), temporopolar and temporoparietal regions, the non-
verbal information processing related to the right inferior frontoparietal
network corresponding to the putative human mirror neuron system,
bilateral amygdala, right superior temporal sulcus (STS) and fusiform
gyrus (FFG) (Zaki et al., 2010). Direct comparisons between verbal
and nonverbal stimuli though cannot identify speciﬁc differences in
social cognition because of additionally present basic differences in
sensory and cognitive processing across domains.
In the speciﬁc context of interpersonal judgments, little is known
about the neural processing of dynamic nonverbal behavior. However,
studies using still neutral faces have provided consistent evidence for
the amygdala being crucially involved in their evaluation with respect
to judgments of trustworthiness and valence (Todorov, 2008; Todorov
and Engell, 2008;Winston et al., 2002). Although being generally asso-
ciated with salience detection, and with assigning an emotional value
to external cues, the response of the amygdala appears to be particu-
larly sensitive for faces that convey signiﬁcant social cues (Hariri et
al., 2002; Sergerie et al., 2008). In contrast, the processing of verbal
person information in the context of interpersonal judgments has
been consistently associated with the dmPFC (Harris et al., 2005;
Mitchell et al., 2002, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005; Sugiura et al., 2004;
Zysset et al., 2002). While this is in concordance with its central role
in mental state attribution and person perception (Amodio and Frith,
2006), it has recently been demonstrated that the dmPFC is not specif-
ically involved in evaluative processes of impression formation
(Schiller et al., 2009). Instead, evaluation of others has been shown
to differentially engage the amygdala and the posterior cingulate cor-
tex (PCC), whichwere activated stronger by stimuli that guided subse-
quent judgments (Schiller et al., 2009). Additionally, these regions also
exhibited increases in the BOLD signal with increasing strength of the
evaluative judgment (Schiller et al., 2009). The study by Schiller and
colleagues, however, failed to investigate putative stimulus domain-
speciﬁc differences as they used simultaneously both verbal and non-
verbal stimuli. Our study was conducted to directly address this as-
pect: Speciﬁcally, we were interested in exploring differences in
neural processing of verbal and nonverbal social information, which
evokes increasing strengths of evaluative person judgment.
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we employed
an experimental paradigm containing verbal (V) and nonverbal (NV)
stimuli of different valences (positive, negative, and neutral). Partici-
pants were instructed to rate target persons along a global positive–
negative scale based on either a) a short video clip showing an animated
virtual character displaying dynamic expressive nonverbal behavior;
or b) short verbal action description. Additionally, the arousal of all
stimuli was assessed after scanning in order to control for this dimen-
sion of person perception. We aimed to identify brain regions whose
activity correlated with the ‘strength’ of subsequent evaluations of so-
cial others based either on verbal or nonverbal information (operatio-
nalized as a difference from 0 on the rating scale, i.e., including both
positive and negative judgments). Notably, we based this analysis on
individual responses in order to take into account that the same piece
of information can have different meanings or values for different per-
sons. We expected that brain regions, which are involved in the evalu-
ation of others, would increase their activation with increasingly
pronounced impressions. By focusing on the parametric modulation of
the neural activity by the ‘strength of evaluation’ (SoE), this paradigm
allows to compare different domains, in spite of basic sensory and cog-
nitive stimulus-speciﬁc processing differences. The SoE-effectwas com-
puted separately for each domain, so that across all events the basic
stimulus characteristics were identical and differences related only to
the degree to which they, in fact, inﬂuenced the subsequent evaluation
of the target person.
Methods
Subjects
18 right-handed participants with no reported history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric illness were included in the study (9 males,
mean age=24.7, age range 21–29 years). All participants gave in-
formed consent and were naïve with respect to the experimental
task and the purpose of the study. The study was approved by the
local ethics committee of the University Hospital Cologne.
Stimuli
Positive and negative verbal and nonverbal stimuli were created
as reported in detail in Kuzmanovic et al. (2011). Verbal stimuli (V)
consisted of sentences describing a social action suitable to induce
an impression of a female target person (e.g., “She told the secrets
of a colleague to the others.” vs. “She did not tell the secrets of a col-
league to the others.”; see Fig. 1B). Nonverbal stimuli (NV) consisted
of dynamic video clips of 3 s duration with an animated female virtual
character displaying impression-evoking nonverbal signals. While
using the same virtual character for all nonverbal stimuli, the follow-
ing expressive features were systematically varied: Gaze direction
(direct vs. averted gaze), facial expression (smile vs. angry face),
body movements (forward vs. backward lean), and head movements
(lateral vs. backward ﬂexion) (see Fig. 1A). The purpose of the strict
control of the target person's physical appearance was to ensure
that both verbal and nonverbal stimuli conveyed individuated social
information related to idiosyncratic behavior, which is not reducible
to more superﬁcial cues like face morphology or hair color. In addi-
tion, neutral verbal (non-social action descriptions: e.g., “She opened
the drawer of her desktop.”) and nonverbal stimuli (non-expressive
facial and body movements) were created in order to enable the com-
parison between impression-valent and impression-neutral stimuli.
In each domain (V, NV), the three valence categories, i.e., negative
(−), neutral (0) and positive (+), were matched for complexity. Ver-
bal stimuli did not differ with regard to syntactic complexity as all
sentences had a simple structure without any subordinate clauses
and the same mean number of words (ANOVA of mean number of
words per sentence for −, 0, +, F(2,33)=.04, p=.96). Furthermore,
semantic complexity was also comparable across the valence condi-
tions as there were no differences in the word frequency according
to the German vocabulary project of the University of Leipzig
(http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de/; ANOVA of mean word frequency
per sentence for−, 0, +, F(2,33)=.27, p=.76). Finally, neutral, pos-
itive and negative nonverbal stimuli had the same quantity of move-
ment as measured by the mean of frame-to-frame pixel change per
stimulus (ANOVA, F(2,33)=.40, p=.67).
The stimuli were pretested in an independent sample (n=14)
with regard to ratings of valence (−3 = very negative to 3 = very
positive) and arousal (−3 = not arousing to 3 = very arousing)
resulting in mean ratings shown in Table 1. Paired t-tests revealed
that positive verbal and nonverbal and negative verbal and nonverbal
stimuli did not signiﬁcantly differ regarding valence or arousal ratings
(p>.05 for all comparisons). However, although neutral verbal and
nonverbal stimuli were comparable concerning the valence ratings
(p>.05), they differed with regard to arousal ratings (t(13)=−2.85,
p=.01) with neutral verbal stimuli being rated as less arousing than
neutral nonverbal stimuli.
Procedure
Stimulus presentation and response recording were performed by
the software package Presentation (version 13.1; Neurobehavioral
Systems, Inc). Stimuli were projected onto a screen (Optostim, 32-
inch, resolution 1280×800) at the end of the magnet bore that
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participants viewed via a mirror mounted to the head coil. Responses
were assessed using a MR-compatible response device (Current
Design).
Participants were instructed to judge female job applicants as posi-
tive or negative on a 7-point rating scale (−3 = very negative; −2 =
negative;−1 = rather negative; 0 = neutral; 1 = rather positive; 2 =
positive; 3 = very positive) based on either verbal or nonverbal infor-
mation. A 7-point scale was used in order to enable participants to
give neutral ratings as well. Verbal information was said to provide de-
scriptions of the applicant's behavior toward colleagues at the prior
workplace. Nonverbal information was said to be a “thin slice” of the
applicant's behavior toward colleagues at the prior workplace. Partici-
pants were further instructed to treat the social referent across trials
as different target persons. In other words, they were instructed to
form a new impression on every trial independently of previously ob-
served person information. It was explained that the nonverbal cues
were overlayed on the same virtual character in order to control for
effects of physical appearance on impression formation. An experimen-
tal trial consisted of a 3000 ms stimulus presentation (either V or NV)
followed by a rating scale lasting for 3000 ms. Participants received a
visual feedback about their button presses and could correct given re-
sponses if necessary until the end of the rating scale slide. Furthermore,
each trial entailed two randomly jittered intervals with a ﬁxation cross:
one between each stimulus presentation and the following rating scale
in order to enable a separate analysis of the person evaluation and the
response (average duration 3000 ms, jittering between 1875 ms and
4125 ms) and the other between single trials to increase condition-
speciﬁc BOLD signal discriminability (Serences, 2004) (average dura-
tion 9000 ms, jittering between 7875 ms and 10,125 ms). Taken to-
gether, an average trial lasted for 15,000 ms (see Fig. 1C). In total, the
task consisted of 72 trials (36 stimuli for each of the two domains)
that were presented in a randomized order within two sessions of
9 min duration each. In one session button presses were performed
with the right and in the other sessionwith the left hand, this sequence
being randomized across participants. After scanning, participants
underwent an additional task, in which they rated all stimuli on a 7-
point rating scale measuring arousal.
fMRI acquisition
Functional and structural MRI images were acquired on a Siemens
Magnetom Trio 3T whole-body scanner with a Tx/Rx birdcage coil.
For the fMRI scans we used a T2*-weighted gradient echo planar
imaging (EPI) sequence with the following imaging parameters:
TR=2200 ms, TE=30 ms, FoV=210, 33 oblique (maximal 30°)
axial slices, and slice thickness=3.0 mm. Two sessions of 301 images
were acquired, preceded by 3 additional images allowing for T1 mag-
netic saturation effects that were discarded prior to further image
processing. For the structural images we used high-resolution T1-
weighted modiﬁed driven equilibrium Fourier transform sequence
with the following parameters: TR=1930ms, TE=5.8 ms, FoV=256,
128 sagittal slices, and slice thickness=1.25 mm.
fMRI preprocessing and analysis
Images were preprocessed and analyzed using MATLAB 7.1 (The
MathWorks Inc) and SPM8 (The Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroim-
aging) as follows. After the EPI images were corrected for head move-
ments using realignment and unwarping, the mean EPI image of each
participant was computed and coregistered to the corresponding T1
image. The T1 image was then used to obtain normalization parame-
ters for each participant to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
reference space using the uniﬁed segmentation function in SPM8. The
ensuing deformation was subsequently applied to the individual EPI
volumes, the T1 image and the segmented T1 images with a writing
resolution of 8 mm3. The normalized EPI images were spatially
smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel to meet the statis-
tical requirements of further analysis and to compensate for macroa-
natomical variations across participants.
The data were analyzed using a General Linear Model as imple-
mented in SPM8. The following speciﬁcations apply to all conducted
analyses. Conditions were modeled using a boxcar reference vector
A  
C 
3s jitter 3s 
3s 
ITI jitter 9s 
She told the secrets 
of a colleague 
to the others. 
3s jitter 3s 
3s 
She told the secrets 
of a colleague  
to the others. 
She opened  
the drawer  
of her desktop. 
She did not tell the 
secrets of a 
colleague to the 
others. 
B 
Fig. 1. Examples of verbal and nonverbal stimuli and the experimental procedure of the evaluative impression formation task. A) Example frames from positive, neutral and neg-
ative nonverbal video stimuli. B) Example sentences of positive, neutral and negative verbal stimuli. Originally, the sentences were on German, but are translated into English for
illustration purposes. C) An example of two subsequent experimental trials: verbal and nonverbal stimuli with differing valences were presented in a randomized order and rated
by participants on a 7-point global evaluation rating scale.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the stimuli: Means and standard deviations of valence and
arousal ratings from the pretest.
− 0 +
Valence V −1.88 (.34) .08 (.16) 2.03 (.27)
NV −2.08 (.63) −.09 (.54) 1.76 (.32)
Arousal V 1.45 (.98) −1.66 (1.01) .04 (1.23)
NV .96 (.86) −.61 (.92) .32 (.60)
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convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and
its time derivative. The analyses were explicitly masked with a nor-
malized within-brain mask of each subject derived by the segmenta-
tion of individual T1-images. Stimulus events were deﬁned by the
onsets and durations of corresponding stimulus presentations. Re-
sponse events were modeled as a separate regressor, with onsets
and durations according to the time the rating scale was present. If
present, events with missing responses were modeled separately.
Low-frequency signal drifts were ﬁltered using a cutoff of 128 s. Fol-
lowing the ﬁrst-level analyses, single subject contrasts were fed into
the group analysis using a ﬂexible factorial ANOVA (factors: condition
and subject), employing a random-effects model. On the group level,
differences between conditions and signiﬁcant deviations from zero
were assessed by linear contrasts on the second-level parameter esti-
mates thresholded at pb .05 at the voxel level, FWE-corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons (pFWE-corrb .05) and with a minimal cluster size of
30 voxels. Exceptionally, when reporting results from the analysis
including both evaluation strength and arousal as parametric modula-
tors a more liberal threshold of pb .001 at the voxel level, uncorrected
for multiple comparisons (puncorrb .001) was applied as this analysis
speciﬁcally served to conﬁrm the signiﬁcant effect of evaluation strength.
Results were superimposed on the mean normalized T1-group image.
Three different statistical analyseswere conducted. The ﬁrst analysis
focused on the SoE-effect by including both categorical and paramet-
ric neural responses to the stimuli into the model: (i) the categorical,
general processing of verbal and nonverbal person information, re-
spectively, disregarding its impact on subsequent evaluation (V and
NV); and (ii) the parametric modulation of general processing by
SoE (SoE-V and SoE-NV, deﬁned as a difference from 0 on a 7-point
rating scale: 0, 1, 2 or 3). For illustration purposes only, i.e., in order
to provide plots for the better characterization of activation patterns
across different SoE levels for signiﬁcant brain regions, we also
employed a categorical analysis, in which V and NV events with differ-
ent absolute rating values were modeled as separate regressors. Here,
eight events of interest were included in the analysis: V0, V1, V2, V3
and NV0, NV1, NV2, NV3 (see plots in Fig. 2A).
The second analysis aimed to demonstrate that differences in
arousal ratings cannot explain the results of the parametric modulation.
Here, the ﬁrst analysis was repeated but with two linear parametric
modulation factors: (i) ﬁrst the arousal rating for each stimulus; and
(ii) second the absolute valence rating for each stimulus. At the group
level we again computed the SoE-V and SoE-NV contrasts, masked
with the results from the main analysis. Because the second parametric
modulation can only account for unique variance, which is not already
accounted for by the ﬁrst parametric modulation, this allows for ruling
out the inﬂuence of the arousal of the stimuli on the impression
strength effect.
The third analysis ﬁnally aimed to demonstrate that the SoE-effect
was similar for positive and negative person information and included
six events of interest: V−, V0, V+ and NV−, NV0, NV+. At the group
level, valent, i.e. positively and negatively judged events (Val) were
compared against neutrally rated events, separately for the verbal
(Val-V) and nonverbal (Val-NV) domains (applied contrasts: 1−2 1).
Results
The ﬁrst analysis revealed distinctmodulations of the general neural
response by SoE for verbal and nonverbal stimuli, respectively. When
judgments were based on nonverbal information, there was a linear
signal increase in the bilateral amygdala with increasing SoE (see
Fig. 2A and Table 2, SoE-NV). In contrast, when relying on verbal social
information, increasing SoE correlated positively with the signal change
in the left PC at the border to PCC (PC/PCC), the bilateral cuneus and
cerebellum (see Fig. 2A and Table 2, SoE-V). These effects could mainly
be replicated also in a direct comparison of SoE-V and SoE-NV, thereby
resembling the plots in Fig. 2A. The contrast SoE-NV>SoE-V revealed a
greater increase in the right hippocampus (x=32, y=−10, z=−16,
T=5.84, pFWE-corr=.002, cluster size=48 voxels) and the right amyg-
dala (x=24, y=0, z=−20, T=5.39, pFWE-corr=.009, cluster size=
48 voxels, same cluster as the hippocampus). Conversely, the contrast
SoE-V>SoE-NV revealed a greater increase in the right PC/PCC
(x=14, y=−60, z=34, T=4.97, pFWE-corr=.039, cluster size=4
voxels) and the right cerebellum (x=10, y=−50, z=−20, T=5.31,
pFWE-corr=.012, cluster size=12 voxels). However, the left amygdala
and the bilateral cuneus did not exhibit a signiﬁcantly different increase
with increasing SoE across the two domains. Furthermore, contrasts
targeting general responses to verbal and nonverbal stimuli irrespective
of SoE revealed more widely distributed patterns of activation (V>NV,
NV>V and conjunction between V and NV, V∩NV, see Fig. 3A and
Table 3). Categorical comparison of verbal versus nonverbal stimuli
revealed a network including the left STS, bilateral inferior parietal
lobule (IPL), bilateral temporal pole, left PC/PCC, left dmPFC, left inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG), left inferior temporal gyrus and left middle occipital
gyrus. The opposite comparison of nonverbal versus verbal stimuli
demonstrated involvement of the bilateral middle temporal gyrus,
bilateral FFG, the right posterior STS extending into the IPL, the right
middle frontal gyrus extending into the IFG, bilateral superior occipital
gyrus and cuneus and the right thalamus. Finally, regions commonly
activated by both verbal and nonverbal stimuli included the left FFG, bi-
lateral calcarine sulci and inferior occipital gyri, the SMA, the left IPL, the
bilateral anterior insula, the superior PC, the bilateral thalamus and the
left IFG.
The second analysis included both arousal ratings and absolute
valence ratings as parametric modulators in order to control for the
effect of stimulus arousal. This analysis replicated the former SoE-
effects by showing increasing BOLD signal in the bilateral amygdala
with increasing SoE for the nonverbal domain (x=−22, y=−10,
z=−8, T=4.95, puncorrb .001, cluster size=284 voxels and x=32,
y=−12, z=−16, T=4.50, puncorrb .001, cluster size=125 voxels).
Similarly, the equivalent contrast for verbal stimuli revealed the pre-
cuneus (x=−10, y=−64, z=36, T=3.76, puncorrb .001, cluster
size=15 voxels), the cerebellum (x=6, y=−44, z=−24, T=4.99,
puncorrb .001, cluster size=549 voxels) and the cuneus (x=12, y=
−78, z=12, T=4.50, puncorrb .001, cluster size=445 voxels). Thus,
as the effects of the second parametric modulation in a model reveal
only variance that had not been explained by the ﬁrst parametric
modulation, we can rule out that the effect of the increasing SoE
could be explained by differences in stimulus-related arousal ratings.
Finally, the third analysis conﬁrmed that the effect of increasing SoE
does not reﬂect the inﬂuence of valence per se because the effect of
valent versus neutral ratings was similar for both positive and negative
social judgments. By comparing positive and negative against neutral
judgments, we fully replicated the results from the ﬁrst analysis (see
Fig. 2B and Table 2, Val-V and Val-NV). In addition, direct comparisons
between negative and positive verbal judgments (V− vs. V+ and V+
vs. V−) revealed no signiﬁcant results within the whole brain, or
when inclusively masked with SoE-V, even at a more liberal threshold
(puncorrb .001). Similarly, comparing negative and positive nonverbal
judgments (NV− vs. NV+ and NV+ vs. NV−) revealed no differences
when inclusively maskedwith SoE-NV, even at amore liberal threshold
(puncorrb .001). The comparison between negative and positive non-
verbal stimuli within the whole brain, i.e. without masking, however,
revealed a signiﬁcantly stronger activation of the right superior tem-
poral gyrus (x=42, y=−30, z=12, T=5.77, pFWE-corr=.001, cluster
size=143 voxels) while no signiﬁcant whole brain effect was found
for the opposite contrast (NV+ vs. NV−), even at a more liberal
threshold (puncorrb .001).
Discussion
The results of the present study show that neural regions speciﬁ-
cally associated with increasing SoE during impression formation
182 B. Kuzmanovic et al. / NeuroImage 60 (2012) 179–188
differ depending upon the stimulus domain, i.e. between verbal and
nonverbal stimuli. These effects were detectible for both positive
and negative evaluations and even after controlling for subjectively
rated arousal of the stimuli. Although pretests showed that verbal
and nonverbal stimuli evoked comparable person evaluations at the
behavioral level, increasing evaluation strength was associated with the
bilateral amygdala for nonverbal stimuli and with the PC/PCC, bilateral
cuneus and cerebellum for verbal stimuli. Hence, this ﬁnding indicates
an involvement of qualitatively different cognitive processes during the
evaluation of other persons dependent upon the stimulus domain.
Known to be a centerpiece of the affective system of the brain, the
amygdala has been associated with diverse aspects of affective
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Fig. 2. Brain regions responsive to the outcome of subjective evaluative impressions based on a verbal or a nonverbal person information: A) Areas correlating with the increasing
absolute valence ratings as a measure of the strength of evaluation (SoE), based on nonverbal (SoE-NV) and verbal (SoE-V) stimuli. Plots are derived by a supplementary analysis
modeling events with different absolute ratings (0, 1, 2 or 3) as separate regressors; and B) Areas activating stronger during valent than neutral evaluations (Val), separately for
nonverbal (Val-NV) and verbal (Val-V) stimuli, demonstrating a similar involvement for both positive and negative ratings.
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processing and learning (Zald, 2003). Providing further empirical
support for its recruitment during the evaluation of other persons,
our results also imply two more speciﬁc aspects: i) the amygdala was
sensitive to changes in evaluation intensities, irrespective of valence;
and ii) this response patternwas speciﬁc for nonverbal social information.
In concordance with the ﬁrst point, the idea that the amygdala
correlates with affective response intensities in a broad sense has
recently received considerable empirical support. Overcoming the
traditional conception that the amygdala is associated with negative
valence only, neuroimaging studies (Anders et al., 2008; Sander and
Scheich, 2001), as well as a quantitative meta-analysis (Sergerie et
al., 2008) have demonstrated its recruitment for the processing of
positive stimuli as well. Speciﬁcally regarding face evaluation, recent
studies have shown that both highly trustworthy as well as highly
untrustworthy faces activated the amygdala yielding a nonlinear, U-
shaped response pattern (Said et al., 2009; Todorov et al., 2008). Simi-
larly, the amygdala was engaged during judgments of absolute valences
of emotional faces (Gerber et al., 2008). Furthermore, neuroimaging
studies focusing speciﬁcally on interpersonal judgments have demon-
strated that both positive and negative judgments recruit the amygdala
when evaluating famous people (Cunningham et al., 2004, 2008) or
when forming evaluative impressions of social others (Schiller et al.,
2009). In the same line, the present study revealed that the more the
nonverbal behavior displayed by the target person induced a pro-
nounced impression, indexed by a greater SoE, the higher was the
BOLD signal in the amygdala. Thus, ourﬁndings provide further support
for the concept that the amygdala is especially sensitive to varying in-
tensities of salient social information, irrespective of valence (Sander
et al., 2003).
The second aspect with regard to the involvement of the amygdala
in our study is that its increasing response with increasing SoE was
speciﬁc for nonverbal stimuli. This result extends the ﬁndings by
Schiller et al. (2009) by highlighting a closer association of the differ-
ential response in the amygdala with nonverbal social information in
the context of increasingly extreme interpersonal evaluation. Taking
into account its extensive projections to the occipital cortex, the
amygdala is well positioned to modulate visual processing based on
affective signiﬁcance of the perceived input (Phelps and LeDoux,
2005; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007). Consistently, converging evi-
dence indicates its modulatory role in visual information processing,
but not in recall and auditory induction methods of emotional re-
sponses (Phan et al., 2002). Furthermore, support for the speciﬁc sen-
sitivity of the amygdala to nonverbal social cues has been provided by
impairments in evaluating trustworthiness based on nonverbal, but not
on verbal information in patients with amygdala lesions (Adolphs et al.,
1998). Moreover, the recruitment of the amygdala for processing non-
verbal stimuli has been shown to occur relatively independent of atten-
tional resources or awareness, i.e., implicitly and automatically (Engell
et al., 2007; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Phelps et al., 2000; Todorov
and Engell, 2008; Winston et al., 2002). Although the essential role of
the amygdala in the production of the social behavior has been ques-
tioned in prior studies on non-human primates, its role in detection of
and reaction to especially threatening and hence signiﬁcant stimuli
Table 2
MNI coordinates of brain regions revealed by the parametric effect of increasing abso-
lute evaluation ratings as a measure of the strength of evaluation (SoE) based on verbal
(SoE-V) and nonverbal (SoE-NV) stimuli, and by the comparison between valent and
neutral evaluation ratings based on verbal (Val-V) and nonverbal (Val-NV) stimuli.
Region Cluster size
(vox)
BA Side x y z t
SoE-V
Cerebellum 1018 – R 10 −54 −20 9.54
L −6 −54 −22 7.22
PC/PCC 59 31 L −12 −56 32 6.10
Cuneus 57 17/18 R 12 −76 14 5.67
53 17 L −8 −88 10 5.74
SoE-NV
Amygdala 126 – R 30 −8 −16 7.36
110 – L −24 −8 −14 6.58
Val-V
PCC 468 23 L −10 −52 30 6.40
PC 31 L −4 −66 34 6.13
Cerebellum 246 – R 4 −46 −20 5.57
– L −6 −40 −22 5.45
Middle cingulate gyrus 74 23 L −4 −20 34 6.99
Lingual gyrus 55 17 R 12 −70 0 5.37
Cuneus 46 18 R 12 −82 20 5.35
Val-NV
Amygdala 132 – L −30 −6 −18 6.12
40 – R 26 −6 −18 5.52
Reported are results that were signiﬁcant at the voxel-level threshold pb .05, FWE-
corrected for multiple comparisons, with a cluster size greater than 30 voxels; x, y, z,
MNI coordinates of local maxima; BA, Brodmann area; PC, precuneus; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex; one voxel=8 mm3.
x = -54 
x = -6 
x = 50 
z = -18 
x = -38 
x = -6 
A V > NV B NV > V C V  NV
pFWE-corr<.05 
Fig. 3. Neuroimaging results relating to the general processing of verbal (V) and nonverbal (NV) person information, irrespective of subsequent ratings. A) Brain regions involved
stronger in processing of verbal than nonverbal person information; B) Brain regions involved stronger in processing of nonverbal than verbal person information; C) Brain regions
involved in processing of both verbal and nonverbal person information revealed by a conjunction.
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within a social context has not beendisproven (Amaral, 2003; Amaral et
al., 2003). Given that understanding information conveyed by conspe-
ciﬁcs' nonverbal signals occurs early in phylogenetic and ontogenetic
development and plays a special role in adaptive social behavior, our
ﬁndings may reﬂect an evolutionary shaped recruitment of the amyg-
dala in the rapid detection and decoding of biologically and socially rel-
evant information (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Sergerie et al., 2008).
Interestingly, the presentation of verbal and of neutral nonverbal
stimuli was accompanied by deactivations in the amygdala, especially
in the right hemisphere (see Fig. 2). Such right amygdala deactiva-
tions have been demonstrated already early on, by comparing active
and passive conditions of different experiments, i.e. conditions
where stimulus presentationswere pairedwith demanding tasks versus
with no task (Schulman et al., 1997). Moreover, those experiments that
involved verbal processing tended to reveal larger deactivations in the
right amygdala (Schulman et al., 1997). General task-induced deactiva-
tions are in accord with research demonstrating cognitive regulation
of affective processing (Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004). Here, it has been
shown that active cognitive computations were able to down-regulate
affective processing and thereby decrease amygdala activity. Referring
to neutral nonverbal stimuli in our study, the activity in the amygdala
associated with detection of salient stimuli was possibly decreased sim-
ply because of the non-affective quality. Verbal stimuli, in contrast, may
have induced a greater amount of high-level cognitive processing lead-
ing to a decreased activity of the amygdala as previously supposed by
Freeman et al. (2010) for interpersonal judgments based on informative
verbal stimuli. Additionally, paralleling patterns of activations have been
demonstrated with other-race facial stimuli that increased the activa-
tion of the amygdala, while the perception of more neutral own-race
facial stimuli resulted in slight deactivations (Lieberman et al., 2005).
Furthermore, matching the race of the target face verbally and not via
facial, i.e. nonverbal stimuli resulted in amygdala deactivations for
both races (Lieberman et al., 2005).
On the other hand, our study highlights that when basing social
judgments on verbal information, the BOLD signal increased in the
PC/PCC, bilateral cuneus and cerebellum with increasing SoE. Thus,
we replicated the ﬁndings by Schiller et al. (2009), who showed a
speciﬁc involvement of the PCC in the evaluative component of im-
pression formation and its parametric scaling with the SoE. Beyond
this general functional characterization, we were able to demonstrate
that the PC/PCC and its parametric activity changes are speciﬁcally
associatedwith the processing of verbal stimuli. Consequently, our ﬁnd-
ings provide evidence for functional dissociations of ‘social brain’
regions based on the stimulus domain.
A similar dissociation has been demonstrated by a stronger in-
volvement of the PCC in the processing of interpersonal judgments
based on informative verbal material, while the amygdala was
recruited when verbal stimuli were not informative and the judgment
was reduced to an additionally presented face of the target person
(Freeman et al., 2010). Our study extends these ﬁndings because it
focuses speciﬁcally on the evaluative component of impression for-
mation by making use of event-related subjective ratings instead of
comparing two categories of person judgment irrespective of the sub-
sequent outcome. Furthermore, due to themanipulation of both verbal
and nonverbal stimuli in one experimental design, more valid conclu-
sions about the inﬂuence and processing of the two domains can be
derived from our study. Finally, in the present study both verbal and
nonverbal information was individuated, i.e. related to idiosyncratic
attributes and qualities of the target person indicated by social action
descriptions and dynamic nonverbal communicative signals, respec-
tively. Because nonverbal cueswere displayed by the same virtual char-
acter, the content of social category knowledge extractable from the
physical appearance such as gender, age, and race was identical across
all nonverbal stimuli and could not serve as a basis for “superﬁcial”
decisions. This procedure implicates that not simply the degree of indi-
viduation but also the domain of social information determines the
involvement of differential brain regions in evaluation of social others.
In general, the neurofunctional characterization of PCC has been
more diverse than that of the amygdala. Social cognitive neuroscience
research has assigned an important role to the PC/PCC in social infer-
ence including mentalizing, intention inference and impression for-
mation (Lieberman, 2010) and in the interaction between episodic
memory and the processing of emotionally salient words (Maddock,
1999; Maddock et al., 2003). Also, associations with the strength of
evaluative judgments have been demonstrated by using verbal but
not nonverbal stimuli (Maddock et al., 2003; Posner et al., 2009). At
the same time, this region is characterized by its involvement in con-
trolled, i.e., resource-limited processing in social cognitive tasks
(Lieberman, 2010) and thus may also be associated with relatively
deliberate processing. Thus, on a more speculative level, by revealing
Table 3
MNI coordinates of brain regions associated with the general processing of verbal (V)
and nonverbal (NV) person information.
Region Cluster size
(vox)
BA Side x y z T
V>NV
Anterior STS 2001 21 L −58 −6 −20 12.41
Posterior STS 22 L −54 −36 0 11.66
Temporal pole 38 L −48 16 −28 9.96
Angular gyrus 815 39 L −44 −56 24 11.54
Middle occipital gyrus 377 18 L −18 −90 −6 11.42
PC/PCC 298 31 L −6 −52 36 7.00
dmPFC 235 9 L −10 48 40 9.39
Middle frontal gyrus 190 6 L −42 6 52 6.60
Middle temporal gyrus 148 21 R 58 4 −28 7.43
Temporal pole 21 R 56 10 −30 7.01
Inferior frontal gyrus 121 47 L −50 30 −8 6.66
Inferior frontal gyrus 78 45 L −52 24 18 6.26
44 L −52 16 28 4.93
Inferior temporal gyrus 67 37 L −42 −62 −8 7.39
Angular gyrus 37 39 R 60 −58 26 7.10
NV>V
Middle temporal gyrus,
V5/MT+
3897 37 R 50 −62 6 17.06
Fusiform gyrus 37 R 42 −48 −18 12.26
Posterior STS 42 R 50 −40 12 11.87
Supramarginal gyrus 48 R 58 −38 26 10.63
Middle frontal gyrus 1770 10 R 46 42 4 11.04
Inferior frontal gyrus 44 R 48 14 20 9.78
Inferior frontal gyrus 45 R 44 32 16 7.94
Superior occipital gyrus 1404 17 L −8 −98 12 17.61
Cuneus 18 R 10 −92 22 15.09
Middle temporal gyrus,
V5/MT+
575 37 L −48 −70 8 10.94
Fusiform gyrus 148 37 L −40 −48 −18 7.42
Thalamus 76 – R 18 −30 2 6.75
NV∩V
Fusiform gyrus 3387 19 L −40 −70 −16 12.80
Calcarine sulcus 17 R 16 −96 −6 12.33
17 L −6 −98 −6 8.50
Inferior occipital gyrus 19 R 34 −90 −12 12.11
19 L −38 −86 −10 10.55
SMA 666 6 L −6 16 44 9.72
Inferior parietal lobule 382 7 L −38 −48 44 7.36
Superior parietal lobule 7 L −30 −60 46 5.45
Anterior insula 371 48 L −30 20 −4 7.98
Precuneus 191 31 L −6 −68 50 6.39
Inferior frontal gyrus 174 45 L −50 30 28 7.63
Anterior insula 111 48 R 42 26 −8 6.05
Thalamus 68 – L −10 −12 6 5.54
Middle frontal gyrus 51 9 R 46 36 32 6.77
Thalamus 50 – R 12 −8 4 6.11
Reported are results that were signiﬁcant at the voxel-level threshold pb .05, FWE-
corrected for multiple comparisons, with a cluster size greater than 30 voxels; x, y, z,
MNI coordinates of local maxima; BA, Brodmann area; STS, superior temporal sulcus;
PC, precuneus; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex;
SMA, supplementary motor area; one voxel=8 mm3.
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the association of PC/PCC with the verbal and of the amygdala with
the nonverbal domain, we provide indirect evidence for hypotheses
made by dual-process theories of social judgments (Evans, 2008;
Lieberman et al., 2002). Here, it has been suggested that the two do-
mains evoke automatic and controlled cognitive operations to different
degrees that are associated with closely interacting but distinguishable
neural substrates.
The cuneus comprising primary and secondary visual areas and
the cerebellum were also differentially recruited by increasing evalu-
ation strength based on verbal stimuli. The involvement of the visual
cortex may be explained by the increased mental imagery of behaviors
described in the more inﬂuential verbal stimuli (Lambert et al., 2002),
possibly due to a higher selective attention toward a more diagnostic
information (Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000). Similarly, the activation
of the cerebellum was frequently reported for language- and emotion-
related tasks (Stoodley and Schmahmann, 2009) and thus may repre-
sent a general increase of semantic and emotional processing of verbal
stimuli with their increasing impact.
With regard to categorical comparisons of verbal and nonverbal
stimuli, irrespective of the subsequent judgment, we could precisely
replicate recent ﬁndings by Zaki et al. (2010) demonstrating domain-
speciﬁc neural systems recruited when drawing inferences about emo-
tional states of others based on either verbal or nonverbal social cues.
A network related to mind state attribution including the dmPFC, the
left PC/PCC and the bilateral temporal pole, as well as a left-lateralized
network including inferior frontal, temporal and angular cortices asso-
ciated with semantic processing (Price, 2000), weremore strongly acti-
vated by verbal than by nonverbal stimuli. In contrast, nonverbal as
compared to verbal stimuli more strongly engaged the right fronto-
parietal cortex corresponding to the putative human mirror neuron
system (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), as well as the right posterior
STS, the bilateral FFG and the bilateral middle temporal gyrus includ-
ing the area V5/MT+ involved in face and movement perception
(Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006; Pelphrey et al., 2005; Wilms et al.,
2005). Thus, our data support the notion that both the mentalizing
and the mirror neuron system are involved in the general processing
of social information about others, but obviously with different prior-
ities for different domains (Zaki et al., 2010).
Critically, Zaki et al. (2010) also showed that when drawing infer-
ences based on conﬂicting pairs of verbal and nonverbal information,
activity in the right frontoparietal cortex and pSTS correlated with the
relative reliance on nonverbal cues, whereas the activity in the left
angular gyrus and mPFC correlated with the relative reliance on ver-
bal cues. These results, however, must not be regarded as inconsistent
with the domain-speciﬁc parametric modulation ﬁndings reported
here because the two studies explored two different types of cogni-
tive processes, namely person evaluation as opposed to inferences
about emotional states of others. Moreover, the correlation of the
activity in the amygdala with nonverbal and in the PC/PCC with ver-
bal stimuli reported here was based on the strength of impression
resulting from differentially salient unimodally presented informa-
tion and not on the relative reliance on cues presented in a multimodal
fashion.
Noteworthy, the activity in the dmPFC was not modulated by the
increasing intensity of judgments for any domain, but was categori-
cally stronger for processing verbal as compared to nonverbal person
information. Thus, this ﬁnding provides additional evidence for the
proposal that the dmPFC is not essential for the evaluative component
of impression formation (Schiller et al., 2009). Rather, the dmPFC
appears to be related to the general inferential processing of social in-
formation. Within the verbal domain, this inferential processing seems
to occur regardless of information's diagnostic value as long as the
instruction to form an impression is explicitly given evoking the con-
tinuous need to monitor social meanings (Mitchell et al., 2006). Simi-
larly, in situations that speciﬁcally require an identiﬁcation of non-
observable mental states such as assessing deceptive intentions
(Grezes et al., 2004a), false beliefs (Grezes et al., 2004b), reasons for ac-
tions (Spunt et al., 2011), moment-to-moment emotional states (Zaki
et al., 2009) or social relations (Iacoboni et al., 2004) the dmPFC has
been recruited by nonverbal social cues as well. However, without
such an explicit need for sophisticated inferential computation, non-
verbal stimuli may convey observable and expressive cues therefore
engaging the dmPFC to a lesser extent (Spunt et al., 2011; Zaki et al.,
2010).
With respect to limitations of the study, it is important to note that
both the source of information and the semantic content differed
between the two domains: While nonverbal stimuli implied a “self-
report” with the target person presenting herself actively by the dis-
play of communicative expression and gesture, verbal stimuli were
reputation-based and referred to descriptions of social actions. This
approach was chosen because of its ecological validity as in everyday
life we are frequently confronted with reputation-based verbal infor-
mation about other persons' actions and nonverbal cues that are di-
rectly observed. Furthermore, verbal self-reports could induce the
impression of target's self-projection that could inﬂuence the credit-
ability of the given information. Although it is not indisputable that
the differential SoE-effects for the two domains of information were
neither inﬂuenced by the source of information nor by the semantic
content, the comparison of the SoE-effect between the two domains
as such is still valid because the SoE was computed separately within
each domain. Furthermore, the differential recruitment of distant
brain regions for the two domains is consistent with previous re-
search in the related ﬁeld as described above. However, in future
studies the source of social information should be taken into account,
for example, by using statements about controversial topics instead of
action descriptions as verbal stimuli. Such statements would indicate
a self-report comparable to the nonverbal domain thereby avoiding
problems with creditability. The difference between the semantic
contents referring to actions or opinions on the one hand and to ex-
pressive nonverbal signals on the other is more difﬁcult to overcome,
as these differences are inextricably constitutive of the verbal and
nonverbal domain.
Another limitation is given by the use of female virtual characters
only. This procedure was chosen in order to constrain the experimen-
tal design to the focus on the SoE effect by disregarding possible
effects of the gender of the target person. However, it seems unlikely
that similar effects would not occur also for male targets, because
exactly such evaluation-related effects, but without a strict differenti-
ation of the information domain, have been demonstrated in a study
by Schiller et al. (2009), which used male target persons only and a
gender-mixed sample of participants.
Furthermore, we only report the peaks of activation of isolated
neural regions that do not provide any insights into the underlying
neural networks. Further neuroimaging research should focus on
methods targeting functional and anatomical connectivity in order
to enrich our understanding of the neural mechanisms also on a net-
work level of description. These methods could for example help to
identify possible inﬂuences of increased attention to more informa-
tive and diagnostic social information resulting in more extreme
judgments, which are not directly evident from the reported SoE
effects.
Conclusions
The present study provides evidence for neurofunctional dissocia-
tion between the processing of verbal and nonverbal social informa-
tion during interpersonal impression formation. Our results show
that behaviorally similar social cognitive operations were driven by
distinct neural networks when taking into account the kind of avail-
able information.While the inﬂuence of verbal stimuli on interpersonal
judgments appears to rely on the PC/PCC, previously associated with
mental state inferences, nonverbal social information shapes
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subsequent impression formation by the speciﬁc involvement of the
amygdala, known to play a central role in automatic, affective proces-
sing. Instead of delineating these neurofunctional dissociations, how-
ever, in terms of independent dichotomies, it rather seems useful to
characterize them as complementary parts of a complex interaction re-
lated to additional cognitive functions such as attention and memory.
To explore these aspects further will be an important objective of fu-
ture research. The question to what extent rapid, affective processes
determine our social judgments and how this may relate to the pres-
ence of visual images has far reaching implications given the inﬂuence
of impression formation on future expectations, decisions and behavior
toward other persons. Due to the wide presence and increasing avail-
ability of visually transmitted information in today's media, this ques-
tion is likely to take on even greater signiﬁcance in the future.
Acknowledgments
We thank H. Kockler for helpful discussions and comments,
E. Bannemer, R. Rosniak-Florath, A. Rühling and K. Wittenberg for as-
sistance with data collection and T. Wetzel for technical support. This
study was funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(Germany) [Project “Other Minds”; grant number 01GP0802; KV].
References
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, A.R., 1998. The human amygdala in social judgment.
Nature 393, 470–474.
Amaral, D.G., 2003. The amygdala, social behavior, and danger detection. Ann. N. Y.
Acad. Sci. 1000, 337–347.
Amaral, D.G., Bauman, M.D., Schumann, C.M., 2003. The amygdala and autism: implica-
tions from non-human primate studies. Genes Brain Behav. 2, 295–302.
Ambady, N., Bernieri, F., Richeson, J., 2000. Towards a histology of social behavior:
judgmental accuracy from thin slices of behavior. In: Zanna, M.P. (Ed.), Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology, pp. 201–272.
Amodio, D.M., Frith, C.D., 2006. Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social
cognition. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 268–277.
Anders, S., Eippert, F., Weiskopf, N., Veit, R., 2008. The human amygdala is sensitive to
the valence of pictures and sounds irrespective of arousal: an fMRI study. Soc.
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 3, 233–243.
Cunningham, W.A., Raye, C.L., Johnson, M.K., 2004. Implicit and explicit evaluation:
FMRI correlates of valence, emotional intensity, and control in the processing of
attitudes. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 1717–1729.
Cunningham, W.A., Van Bavel, J.J., Johnsen, I.R., 2008. Affective ﬂexibility: evaluative
processing goals shape amygdala activity. Psychol. Sci. 19, 152–160.
Delgado, M.R., Frank, R.H., Phelps, E.A., 2005. Perceptions of moral character modulate
the neural systems of reward during the trust game. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1611–1618.
Engell, A.D., Haxby, J.V., Todorov, A., 2007. Implicit trustworthiness decisions: automat-
ic coding of face properties in the human amygdala. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19,
1508–1519.
Evans, J.S., 2008. Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cogni-
tion. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 255–278.
Freeman, J.B., Schiller, D., Rule, N.O., Ambady, N., 2010. The neural origins of superﬁcial
and individuated judgments about ingroup and outgroup members. Hum. Brain
Mapp. 31, 150–159.
Gerber, A.J., Posner, J., Gorman, D., Colibazzi, T., Yu, S., Wang, Z., Kangarlu, A., Zhu, H.,
Russell, J., Peterson, B.S., 2008. An affective circumplex model of neural systems
subserving valence, arousal, and cognitive overlay during the appraisal of emotional
faces. Neuropsychologia 46, 2129–2139.
Grezes, J., Frith, C., Passingham, R.E., 2004a. Brain mechanisms for inferring deceit in
the actions of others. J. Neurosci. 24, 5500–5505.
Grezes, J., Frith, C.D., Passingham, R.E., 2004b. Inferring false beliefs from the actions of
oneself and others: an fMRI study. Neuroimage 21, 744–750.
Hariri, A.R., Tessitore, A., Mattay, V.S., Fera, F., Weinberger, D.R., 2002. The amygdala
response to emotional stimuli: a comparison of faces and scenes. Neuroimage 17,
317–323.
Harris, L.T., Todorov, A., Fiske, S.T., 2005. Attributions on the brain: neuro-imaging dis-
positional inferences, beyond theory of mind. Neuroimage 28, 763–769.
Iacoboni, M., Lieberman, M.D., Knowlton, B.J., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Moritz, M., Throop,
C.J., Fiske, A.P., 2004. Watching social interactions produces dorsomedial prefrontal
and medial parietal BOLD fMRI signal increases compared to a resting baseline.
Neuroimage 21, 1167–1173.
Kanwisher, N., Yovel, G., 2006. The fusiform face area: a cortical region specialized for
the perception of faces. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 361, 2109–2128.
Kastner, S., Ungerleider, L.G., 2000. Mechanisms of visual attention in the human cortex.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 23, 315–341.
Kraemer, N.C., 2008. Nonverbal communication. In: Blascovich, J.J., Hartel, C.R. (Eds.),
Human Behavior in Military Contexts. National Academic Press, Washington, pp.
150–188.
Kuzmanovic, B., Schilbach, L., Lehnhardt, F.-G., Bente, G., Vogeley, K., 2011. A matter of
words: impact of verbal and nonverbal information on impression formation in
high-functioning autism. Res. Autism Spectr. Disord. 5, 604–613.
Lambert, S., Sampaio, E., Scheiber, C., Mauss, Y., 2002. Neural substrates of animal mental
imagery: calcarine sulcus and dorsal pathway involvement—an fMRI study. Brain Res.
924, 176–183.
Lieberman, M.D., 2010. Social cognitive neuroscience. In: Fiske, S.T., Gilbert, D.T., Lindzey,
G. (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology. McGraw Hill, New York, pp. 143–193.
Lieberman, M.D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D.T., Trope, Y., 2002. Reﬂection and reﬂexion: a
social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. Adv. Exp. Soc.
Psychol. 34, 199–249.
Lieberman, M.D., Hariri, A., Jarcho, J.M., Eisenberger, N.I., Bookheimer, S.Y., 2005. An
fMRI investigation of race-related amygdala activity in African-American and
Caucasian-American individuals. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 720–722.
Maddock, R.J., 1999. The retrosplenial cortex and emotion: new insights from functional
neuroimaging of the human brain. Trends Neurosci. 22, 310–316.
Maddock, R.J., Garrett, A.S., Buonocore, M.H., 2003. Posterior cingulate cortex activation
by emotional words: fMRI evidence from a valence decision task. Hum. Brain
Mapp. 18, 30–41.
Mitchell, J.P., Heatherton, T.F., Macrae, C.N., 2002. Distinct neural systems subserve per-
son and object knowledge. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 99, 15238–15243.
Mitchell, J.P., Neil Macrae, C., Banaji, M.R., 2005. Forming impressions of people versus
inanimate objects: social-cognitive processing in the medial prefrontal cortex.
Neuroimage 26, 251–257.
Mitchell, J.P., Cloutier, J., Banaji, M.R., Macrae, C.N., 2006. Medial prefrontal dissocia-
tions during processing of trait diagnostic and nondiagnostic person information.
Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 1, 49–55.
Ochsner, K.N., Bunge, S.A., Gross, J.J., Gabrieli, J.D., 2002. Rethinking feelings: an FMRI
study of the cognitive regulation of emotion. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 1215–1229.
Ochsner, K.N., Ray, R.D., Cooper, J.C., Robertson, E.R., Chopra, S., Gabrieli, J.D., Gross, J.J.,
2004. For better or for worse: neural systems supporting the cognitive down- and
up-regulation of negative emotion. Neuroimage 23, 483–499.
Ochsner, K.N., Beer, J.S., Robertson, E.R., Cooper, J.C., Gabrieli, J.D., Kihsltrom, J.F.,
D'Esposito, M., 2005. The neural correlates of direct and reﬂected self-
knowledge. Neuroimage 28, 797–814.
Pelphrey, K.A., Morris, J.P., Michelich, C.R., Allison, T., McCarthy, G., 2005. Functional
anatomy of biological motion perception in posterior temporal cortex: an FMRI
study of eye, mouth and hand movements. Cereb. Cortex 15, 1866–1876.
Phan, K.L., Wager, T., Taylor, S.F., Liberzon, I., 2002. Functional neuroanatomy of emo-
tion: a meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI. Neuroimage
16, 331–348.
Phelps, E.A., LeDoux, J.E., 2005. Contributions of the amygdala to emotion processing:
from animal models to human behavior. Neuron 48, 175–187.
Phelps, E.A., O'Connor, K.J., Cunningham, W.A., Funayama, E.S., Gatenby, J.C., Gore, J.C.,
Banaji, M.R., 2000. Performance on indirect measures of race evaluation predicts
amygdala activation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12, 729–738.
Posner, J., Russell, J.A., Gerber, A., Gorman, D., Colibazzi, T., Yu, S., Wang, Z., Kangarlu, A.,
Zhu, H., Peterson, B.S., 2009. The neurophysiological bases of emotion: an fMRI
study of the affective circumplex using emotion-denoting words. Hum. Brain
Mapp. 30, 883–895.
Price, C.J., 2000. The anatomy of language: contributions from functional neuroimag-
ing. J. Anat. 197 (Pt. 3), 335–359.
Rizzolatti, G., Craighero, L., 2004. The mirror-neuron system. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 27,
169–192.
Said, C.P., Baron, S.G., Todorov, A., 2009. Nonlinear amygdala response to face trustwor-
thiness: contributions of high and low spatial frequency information. J. Cogn. Neu-
rosci. 21, 519–528.
Sander, K., Scheich, H., 2001. Auditory perception of laughing and crying activates human
amygdala regardless of attentional state. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 12, 181–198.
Sander, D., Grafman, J., Zalla, T., 2003. The human amygdala: an evolved system for
relevance detection. Rev. Neurosci. 14, 303–316.
Schiller, D., Freeman, J.B., Mitchell, J.P., Uleman, J.S., Phelps, E.A., 2009. A neuralmechanism
of ﬁrst impressions. Nat. Neurosci. 12, 508–514.
Schulman, G.L., Fiez, J.A., Corbetta, M., Buckner, R.L., Miezin, F.M., Raichle, M.E., Petersen,
S.E., 1997. Common blood ﬂow changes across visual tasks: II. Decreases in cerebral
cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 648–663.
Serences, J.T., 2004. A comparison of methods for characterizing the event-related
BOLD timeseries in rapid fMRI. Neuroimage 21, 1690–1700.
Sergerie, K., Chochol, C., Armony, J.L., 2008. The role of the amygdala in emotional pro-
cessing: a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 32, 811–830.
Spunt, R.P., Satpute, A.B., Lieberman, M.D., 2011. Identifying the what, why, and how of
an observed action: an fMRI study of mentalizing and mechanizing during action
observation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 63–74.
Stoodley, C.J., Schmahmann, J.D., 2009. Functional topography in the human cerebellum:
a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neuroimage 44, 489–501.
Sugiura, M., Gotoh, R., Okada, K., Yamaguchi, K., Itoh, M., Fukuda, H., Kawashima, R.,
2004. Target dependency of brain mechanism involved in dispositional inference:
a PET study. Neuroimage 21, 1377–1386.
Todorov, A., 2008. Evaluating faces on trustworthiness: an extension of systems for
recognition of emotions signaling approach/avoidance behaviors. Ann. N. Y. Acad.
Sci. 1124, 208–224.
Todorov, A., Engell, A.D., 2008. The role of the amygdala in implicit evaluation of emo-
tionally neutral faces. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 3, 303–312.
Todorov, A., Baron, S.G., Oosterhof, N.N., 2008. Evaluating face trustworthiness: a
model based approach. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 3, 119–127.
187B. Kuzmanovic et al. / NeuroImage 60 (2012) 179–188
Uleman, J.S., Adil Saribay, S., Gonzalez, C.M., 2008. Spontaneous inferences, implicit
impressions, and implicit theories. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 329–360.
Vuilleumier, P., Pourtois, G., 2007. Distributed and interactive brain mechanisms during
emotion face perception: evidence from functional neuroimaging. Neuropsychologia
45, 174–194.
Watzlawick, P., Bavelas, J.H., Jackson, D.D., 1967. Pragmatics of Human Communica-
tion: a Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes. Norton, New
York.
Wilms, M., Eickhoff, S.B., Specht, K., Amunts, K., Shah, N.J., Malikovic, A., Fink, G.R.,
2005. Human V5/MT+: comparison of functional and cytoarchitectonic data.
Anat. Embryol. (Berl.) 210, 485–495.
Winston, J.S., Strange, B.A., O'Doherty, J., Dolan, R.J., 2002. Automatic and intentional brain
responses during evaluation of trustworthiness of faces. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 277–283.
Zaki, J., Weber, J., Bolger, N., Ochsner, K., 2009. The neural bases of empathic accuracy.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 106, 11382–11387.
Zaki, J., Hennigan, K., Weber, J., Ochsner, K.N., 2010. Social cognitive conﬂict resolution:
contributions of domain-general and domain-speciﬁc neural systems. J. Neurosci.
30, 8481–8488.
Zald, D.H., 2003. The human amygdala and the emotional evaluation of sensory stimuli.
Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. 41, 88–123.
Zysset, S., Huber, O., Ferstl, E., von Cramon, D.Y., 2002. The anterior frontomedian cortex
and evaluative judgment: an fMRI study. Neuroimage 15, 983–991.
188 B. Kuzmanovic et al. / NeuroImage 60 (2012) 179–188
Animated brain: A functional neuroimaging study on animacy experience
Natacha S. Santos a,⁎, B. Kuzmanovic a, N. David b, A. Rotarska-Jagiela a, S.B. Eickhoff c, J.N. Shah d, G.R. Fink d,e,
G. Bente f, K. Vogeley a
a Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne, Germany
b Institute of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, Center of Experimental Medicine, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany
c Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University of Aachen, Germany
d Institute of Neurosciences and Medicine (INM), Research Center Juelich, Germany
e Department of Neurology, University of Cologne, Germany
f Department of Social and Media Psychology, University of Cologne, Germany
a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 26 November 2009
Revised 21 May 2010
Accepted 27 May 2010
Available online 4 June 2010
Keywords:
Animacy
Insula
Mentalizing
Mirror neuron system (MNS)
Social neural network (SNN)
Superior temporal sulcus
Orbitofrontal cortex
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Previous research used animated geometric ﬁgures to investigate social cognitive processes involved in
ascribing mental states to others (e.g. mentalizing). The relationship between animacy perception and brain
areas commonly involved in social cognition, as well as the inﬂuence of particular motion patterns on
animacy experience, however, remains to be further elucidated. We used a recently introduced paradigm for
the systematic variation of motion properties, and employed functional magnetic resonance imaging to
identify the neural mechanisms underlying animacy experience. Based on individual ratings of increased
animacy experience the following brain regions of the “social neural network” (SNN), known to be involved
in social cognitive processes, were recruited: insula, superior temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, parahippo-
campal gyrus and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex bilaterally. Decreased animacy experience was
associated with increased neural activity in the inferior parietal and inferior frontal gyrus, key constituents of
the human “mirror neuron system” (hMNS). These ﬁndings were corroborated when analyses were based on
movement patterns alone, irrespective of subjective experience. Additionally to the areas found for increased
animacy experience, an increase in interactive movements elicited activity in the amygdala and the temporal
pole. In conclusion, the results suggest that the hMNS is recruited during a low-level stage of animacy
judgment representing a basic disposition to detect the salience of movements, whereas the SNN appears to
be a high-level processing component serving evaluation in social and mental inference.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Humans like most other animals equipped with visual senses are
very sensitive to detect biological motion in their environment. The
attribution of liveliness in humans leads to inferences about the
perceived intentions, emotions and social relations of others often
subsumed under the headings of “mentalizing” and “Theory of Mind”
(ToM). These social cognitive capacities are assumed to be a uniquely
human capacity (Tomasello et al., 2005). Phenomenologically,
biological motion constitutes a complex perceptual input conveying
information about physical properties of the moving object (e.g.
anatomy, size, and weight), its interrelation to the physical and social
environment (e.g. gravity, responses to barriers, approach and
avoidance), its behavioural capacities (e.g. sophistication and efﬁ-
ciency in performing motor tasks) and potentially also about
psychological processes or mental states (e.g. thoughts, intentions,
emotions, etc.). Previous research could amply demonstrate that
movement properties as attached to graphically reduced object
representations, such as point-light-walkers, are sufﬁcient to perceive
an object as alive, to extract various types of information (e.g. the
action and identity of the agent) and to make meaningful inferences
(Blake and Shiffrar, 2007; Johansson, 1973).
Research on the experience of animacy has put forward the notion
that different variations of movement inﬂuence our ability to attribute
mental states to moving objects independently of their structure or
form (Abell et al., 2000; Barrett et al., 2005; Heider and Simmel, 1944;
Rochat et al., 1997; Santos et al., 2008; Tremoulet and Feldman, 2006).
This ability to perceive and understand others' socially meaningful
movements relies on the integration of information into relevant
motion cues, leading to ascriptions of mental states to others. Thereby,
the perception of animacy requires a type of motion able to trigger the
impression that an entity is alive, and that it also possesses some
degree of “mind”, whether very simple goal-directed (e.g. moving to
reach an apple) or complex mental states like mentalizing. Thus, it is
our interpretation of other entities as having a mind that ultimately
leads to a perception of animacy (Santos et al., 2008; Tremoulet and
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Feldman, 2006). Movement features contributing to animacy percep-
tion include self-propelled motion, such as initiation of movement
without an external cause (Leslie, 1984; Stewart, 1984), motion
contingency (spatial and temporal synchrony) between objects
(Bassili, 1976; Blakemore et al., 2003; Johnson, 2003; Johnson et al.,
2001), and responsiveness to the motion by the environment (Abell
et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 2003, 2001; Castelli et al., 2000; Leslie,
1984; Michotte, 1946; Rochat et al., 1997; Santos et al., 2008;
Schlottmann and Surian, 1999; Schultz et al., 2005; Springer et al.,
1996; Tremoulet and Feldman, 2006). In our own study, participants
experienced an increase in animacy perception whenever the
animations displayed a combination of movement cues (e.g. break
of a smoothmovement trajectory, approach of one object to the other,
and responsiveness from the addressed object to the actively moving
object) (Santos et al., 2008).
Social cognition involves the cognitive perceptual and conceptual
processes, which helps us make sense of our social world. The
amygdala, the orbital frontal cortex and the temporal cortex are
considered part of the social brain since its original description by
Brothers in 1990 (Brothers, 1990). Subsequently, a vast number of
neuroimaging studies have contributed to our present knowledge of
how social information is processed at the neural level. Although
some debate exist to which brain areas constitute the what is now
called “social neural network” (SNN), across different social research-
ers these include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
(Adolphs, 2009; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Beer and Ochsner, 2006;
Bifulco et al., 2006; Blakemore, 2008; Brothers, 1990; Frith, 2007;
Skuse and Gallagher, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009), the superior
temporal sulcus (STS) and gyrus (STG) (Adolphs, 2003; Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Beer and Ochsner, 2006; Blakemore, 2008; Frith, 2007;
Gallese et al., 2004; Van Overwalle, 2009), the insula (Adolphs, 1999;
Blakemore, 2008; Frith and Frith, 2006), the amygdala (Adolphs,
1999, 2001, 2003; Blakemore, 2008; Brothers, 1990; Frith, 2007;
Pinkham et al., 2008; Skuse and Gallagher, 2009), the fusiform gyrus
(FG) (Adolphs, 2003; Beer and Ochsner, 2006; Blakemore, 2008), and
the anterior temporal poles (TP) (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Blakemore,
2008; Frith, 2007; Pinkham et al., 2003). Some of these brain areas are
typically implicated in mentalizing processes, essential for social
cognition, constituting the ToM neural network: themedial prefrontal
cortex, the STS/STG, and the precuneus (Frith and Frith, 2003;
Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Gobbini et al., 2007; Van Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009). Observing animated movement patterns, indepen-
dently of the characters shape and form, can elicit increased neural
activation in brain areas that are part of the SNN (Blakemore et al.,
2003; Castelli et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000; Chaminade et al., 2007;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Martin and Weisberg, 2003; Schultz et al., 2005,
2004, 2003; Tavares et al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 2007), and in areas
that are speciﬁcally related to the ToM network. Using animations
similar to those developed by Heider and Simmel (1944), Castelli et al.
(2000) in a PET study found increased activations in vmPFC and basal
temporal regions (fusiform gyrus and TP), when comparing anima-
tions eliciting ToM with random motion animations (Castelli et al.,
2000). More recently, it was demonstrated an increased activity in the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), as part of the medial prefrontal
cortex, both under the presentation of ToM stories and ToM
animations, but not during the observation of simple point-light
displays of human motion (Gobbini et al., 2007). In accordance with
others (Walter et al., 2004) the authors proposed a crucial role of the
ACC in the representation of the social intentions of actions. The STS
has also been implicated in processing the kinematics of geometrical
ﬁgures, in particular related to those properties that are strongly tied
to animacy perception such as goal-directed motion (Schultz et al.,
2004), contingency between objects (Blakemore et al., 2003) and
interactivity (Schultz et al., 2005).
While most neuroimaging studies that have used animated stimuli
aimed at evoking ToM in human subjects (Campbell et al., 2006;
Castelli et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Horan et
al., 2009; Kana et al., 2009; Russell et al., 2006; Salter et al., 2008), only
few studies focused on the neural correlates of animacy experience
(Wheatley et al., 2007) and the relation between animacy and social
cognition (Martin andWeisberg, 2003; Tavares et al., 2008). Focusing
on neural correlates of animacy perception, Wheatley et al. (2007)
compared animations of the same object moving with different
backgrounds in the absence of any social content, which either lead to
interpretations of animacy (e.g. “ice-skating”) or of inanimacy (e.g.
“spinning-top”) (Wheatley et al., 2007). The interpretation of the
same motion as animated (depending on background) was sufﬁcient
to elicit activations throughout the SNN. Similarly, Tavares et al.
(2008) manipulated the attended aspect of two animated circles by
instructing the subjects to focus on either the social interaction
between them or motion properties such as speed (Tavares et al.,
2008). Viewing animations while attending to social cues in contrast
to motion properties activated areas previously linked to the SNN,
namely the fusiform gyrus, the STS, and the amygdala.
The present study investigates the neural correlates of animacy
experience and the parallels between animacy experience and the
SNN. In addition, we were interested in identifying movement
patterns that strongly inﬂuence increases in animacy experience at
the neural level. We employed a previously developed paradigm
aiming at inducing an increase in animacy experience, which was
conﬁrmed behaviourally in our ﬁrst previous study (Santos et al.,
2008). The movies we used range from movies that could clearly be
judged as animated to movies that could clearly be judged as least
animated, while the majority was more ambiguous. This ambiguity,
we believe, was fundamental to induce subjective ratings, so that
judgments depended entirely on the individual subjective experience
of animacy. The design involves systematic variations of motion
parameters shown to successfully induce and parametrically vary the
experience of animacy including the degree of interaction between
two objects (e.g. approach and responsiveness) (Dittrich and Lea,
1994; Santos et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2005) and the time delay one
object spent in the vicinity of another object (Santos et al., 2008).
Subjects saw three-dimensional (3D) animations of two spheres
displaying different types of movement sequences, and were
instructed to judge each animation as (i) physical, (ii) rather physical,
(iii) rather personal or (iv) personal. This allowed a parametric
analysis of fMRI data according to increased vs. decreased animacy,
based on subjective experience and physical properties of the stimuli.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Fifteen male subjects (mean age=26.59±3.94) without any past
medical history with respect to psychiatric or neurological diseases
participated in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Written informed consent was obtained and all participants
were informed of the necessary safety precautions involving fMRI
experiments prior to the scanning session. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of
Cologne, Germany.
Stimuli and design
The stimuli consisted of 104 animations showing two 3D-spheres
moving on a black background. The basic scenery comprised one
sphere crossing the setting horizontally in the background (sphere1)
and one static sphere in the foreground (sphere2). The following
stimulus parameters were systematically varied: 1) the time sphere1
spent in the center of the screen: 0 (without break), 100, 200, 400,
600, 800 and 1000 ms (“time delay”); 2) whether the moving sphere1
did approach sphere2 or not (“approach”); 3) whether sphere2
292 N.S. Santos et al. / NeuroImage 53 (2010) 291–302
moved toward the moving sphere1 (“responsiveness”); 4) the vertical
perspective view of the scene: 30° or 60° (“perspective”); 5) whether
the moving sphere1 crossed from left to right or vice versa
(“direction”). Approach and responsiveness were varied in a 2×2
factorial design (no approach+no responsiveness; no approach+
responsiveness; approach+no responsiveness; approach+respon-
siveness) and each of the factorial combinations was designed in six
time delay variations (from 100 to 1000 ms), two vertical view
perspectives (30° or 60°) and two movement directions (right–left,
left–right). Additionally, animations without approach (no approach
+no responsiveness; no approach+responsiveness) were also pre-
sented without break (time delay=0 ms), resulting in 26 stimuli.
Animations with approach always had a break (time delayN0 ms)
to ensure “plausibility of the behaviour” and thus ecological vali-
dity. Finally, each of these stimuli was repeatedly presented in
both perspectives and in both directions. This resulted in a parametric
variation of physical properties of the stimulus material. All anima-
tions were created using “3D Studio Max” software (version 7,
Autodesk, Montreal, Canada). The participants' task was to rate the
animacy of each animation according to a four-step scale (animacy
judgements: “physical”, “rather physical”, “rather personal” and
“personal”) by pressing the respective buttons on an MRI-compatible
response device (Lumitouch, Lightwave Medical Industries, CST
Coldswitch Technologies). In order to facilitate the understanding of
the rating scale, we have deﬁned the rating scale extremes as opposite
terms, i.e., “physical” vs. “personal”, instead of using a more abstract
labelling, i.e., “least animated” vs. “very animated”. Due to the
continuous systematic generation of stimuli, the changes in the
amount of animacy-related features of movement patterns and thus
in the subjective animacy perception are to be deﬁned as representing
the dimension of animacy, where increases and decreases can be
determined. Subjects were instructed to answer as soon as they felt
conﬁdent in their judgment, i.e., did not have to wait until the end of
the animation. Between the video sequences a small white ﬁxation
cross was presented in the center of the screen for 2–4 s, to allow the
estimation of event-related responses (Josephs and Henson, 1999).
The presentation of the stimuli was divided into four sessions of 52
animations each with a total measurement time of approximately
20 min. All animations were presented during the ﬁrst two sessions
and repeated during the last two sessions to increase measurement
reliability and statistical power. In order to prevent order effects, all
trials were randomly presented within each session and for each
participant. Instructions and six example trials were provided to the
participants prior to the scanning procedure.
fMRI data acquisition
A 3 T whole body system (Siemens TRIO), equipped with a
standard head coil and a custom-built head holder for movement
reduction was used to acquire high-resolution T1-weighted structural
images (TR=2500 ms, TE=3.93 ms, voxel size: 1×1×1 mm,
256 mm FOV, 256×256 matrix) and T2-weighted EPI images
(TR=2500 ms, TE=30 ms, 40 axial slices aligned parallel to the
AC–PC plane, ﬂip angle=90°, voxel size: 3.1×3.1×3 mm, 200 mm
FOV, 64×64 matrix, 147 volumes per session). Three additional
volumes were collected and discarded at the beginning of each
session to allow for magnetic saturation.
The fMRI protocol was an event-related design with a pseudor-
andomized jitter of 2000 to 4000 ms (in steps of 100 ms) between
trials. Pseudo-randomisation of inter-event intervals ensured random
sub-sampling of the neural response relative to the onset of the
different event-types. All stimuli were presented on a screen located
behind the participants' head and reﬂected to his ﬁeld of vision via a
mirrormounted on the head coil. Programming of the experiment and
presentation of the stimuli were done using the “Presentation”
software (Version 9.90, Neurobehavioral Systems).
Data analysis
Behavioural data
The effect of factors of interest approach, responsiveness and time
delay on subjects' ratings was tested by a three-way repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) using SPSS (SPSS Statistics
17.0). Only the levels of time delay higher than 0 (six levels between
100 and 1000 ms) were included in the analysis as the time delay
level of 0 was realized only for the sequences without approach (see
Stimuli and design).
Preprocessing of fMRI data
Image processing and analysis of fMRI data were performed using
the statistical parametric mapping software (SPM5) (Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging; www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All functional
images for each subject were corrected for slice acquisition delays and
spatially realigned to correct for head movement during the scanning
procedure. Each structural MRI was co-registered to the subject's
mean realigned functional image. Images were then normalized into a
standard stereotactic space using the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) template. Functional images were spatially smoothed with an
isotropic Gaussianﬁlter (8 mm fullwidth at halfmaximum) to account
for residual interindividual differences.
Statistical analyses of fMRI data
Two sets of analyses of the imaging data were performed. In all
analyses the data were analyzed using a General Linear Model as
implemented in SPM5. Furthermore, effects of interest weremodelled
using a boxcar reference vector convolved with the canonical
hemodynamic response function (hrf) and its ﬁrst-order time
derivative. The events of interest covered the last second of the
stimulus movies, thereby focusing on the time window where the
events became meaningful (corresponding to the spheres move-
ments). A 128 s temporal high-pass ﬁlter was applied to account for
low-frequency drifts. Spatial realignment parameters were included
as confounds to exclude movement-related variance from the image
time series. The single subject contrasts were fed into the second level
group analyses using a ﬂexible factorial ANOVA (factors: condition
and subject), employing a random-effects model (Penny et al., 2003).
At the group level, brain regions with increased neural activation are
reported throughout at a cluster-level threshold of pb0.05, FWE
corrected for multiple comparisons and a voxel-level threshold of
pb0.0005, uncorrected for multiple comparisons (Friston et al., 1996).
For the ﬁrst set of response-related analyses we used a more liberal
threshold at the voxel level (pb0.005 at the voxel level, uncorrected).
All anatomical regions and denominations are reported according to a
standard brain atlas (Duvernoy, 1999) and the Anatomy toolbox
implemented in SPM5 (Eickhoff et al., 2007; Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Reported coordinates refer to maximum values in a given cluster
according to the standardMNI-template. For the purpose of additional
anatomical precision, group contrasts were overlaid on a surface
based representation of the MNI canonical brain using the SPM
surfrend toolbox (written by I.Kahn; http://spmsurfrend.sourceforge.
net). The surfaces were then rendered using NeuroLens (written by
Dr. R. Hoge; http://neurolens.org).
Statistical analyses based on animacy experience (subjective ratings)
In the ﬁrst set of analyses we used subjects' individual ratings of
the movies in order to identify brain regions with increased neural
activation, as a function of an increased or decreased degree of
subjectively perceived animacy. The effect of subject's ratings was
modelled as a linear parametric modulation of the hemodynamic
response to the movies by the corresponding rating. For each single
movie event both (i) the onset was deﬁned within the regressor
representing the last second of the stimulus (onset=endpoint minus
1 s); and (ii) the effect of subjective animacy experience deﬁned by
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the corresponding rating to each movie (values referred to the
subjective ratings made on a 4-step rating scale). At the group level,
two t-contrasts were computed: (i) the positive effect of responses,
that is, brain regions with increased neural activation corresponding
to increases in animacy ratings; and (ii) the negative effect of
responses, that is, brain regions with increased neural activation
corresponding to decreases in animacy ratings. Additionally, in a
supplementary analysis, we employed a categorical design where
movies that were rated with 1 (physical), 2 (rather physical), 3
(rather personal) or 4 (personal) were modelled on separate
regressors. The four rating-related contrasts were included in the
group level analysis and an F-contrast was computed for the effect
across all four response conditions in order to obtain plots with
contrast estimates for each rating step at the local maxima from the
ﬁrst analysis.
Statistical analyses based on movement patterns (physical properties of
the stimulus material)
In the second set of analyseswe focused on the physical movement
patterns that showed signiﬁcant effects on animacy ratings (see
“Results of behavioural data”), namely approach and responsiveness
(as described in the “Stimuli and design” section). At the single subject
level of the combined analysis based on the 2×2 design of the factors
approach and responsiveness, we were able to identify brain regions
with increased neural activation as a function of increasing interactive
movements between the spheres, simulating social interaction. For the
linear parametric modulation of the hemodynamic response to the
movies we used the following codes corresponding to four types of
movement patterns: (i) no approach+no responsiveness (codedwith
1); (ii) no approach+responsiveness (codedwith 2); (iii) approach+
no responsiveness (coded with 3); (iv) approach+responsiveness
(coded with 4). At the group level, the following two t-contrasts were
computed: (i) the positive effect of movement patterns, that is, brain
regions with increased neural activation corresponding to an increase
in interactive movements; and (ii) the negative effect of movement
patterns, that is, brain regions with increased neural activation
corresponding to a decrease in interactive movements. Additionally,
in a supplementary analysis, we employed a categorical design where
movies with different movement pattern codes were modelled on
separate regressors. As in the ﬁrst set of analyses, the resulting F-
contrast was used to obtain plots with contrast estimates for the local
maxima from the analysis with parametric modulation of movement
patterns.
Results
Behavioural data
Descriptive statistics revealed that subjects rated 14.4% of the
animations as “physical”, 27.8% as “rather physical”, 34% as “rather
personal”, and 24% as “personal”. The ANOVA revealed that there were
signiﬁcant main effects of approach (F(1,14)=82.142, pb0.001,
r=0.924) and responsiveness (F(1,14)=10.919, pb0.05, r=0.661)
indicating more personal ratings for sequences with approach
(M=3.18, SE=0.105) than without approach (M=2.342, SE=
0.112) as well as more personal ratings for sequences with responsive-
ness (M=3.00, SE=0.135) than without responsiveness (M=2.52,
SE=0.107). Neither the main effect of time delay (F(5,70)=1.079,
p=0.380) nor any of the possible interactionswere signiﬁcant. Starting
from these results we decided to use the four factor combinations of
approach and responsiveness as a way to characterize the induction of
animacy by interactive movement patterns between the two spheres
(see Table 1 for mean animacy ratings for each category and additional
descriptive statistics), and as a base for the parametric analysis of the
fMRI data (see Statistical analyses of fMRI data). Pair-wise comparisons
conﬁrmed signiﬁcant differences in subjective animacy ratings between
all pairs of the selected stimulus categories (see Table 1) and thus
demonstrate a signiﬁcant discriminatory power and justify our stimulus
category coding. Furthermore, subjective ratings of the four movement
patterns showed a signiﬁcant linear trend (F(1)=6.327, pb0.001),
therefore supporting the ranking and the equidistance of the stimulus
categories.
Neural correlates of animacy experience
Our primary focus was the identiﬁcation of brain regions featuring
an increase of neural activity associated with a linear increase or
decrease in animacy experience, respectively (as a function of
subjective ratings). We found that an increase in animacy experience
was associated with higher activations in i) the bilateral insula (right
insula: T=5.49, pb0.001; left insula: T=5.34, pb0.001), extending
bilaterally to the superior temporal gyrus and sulcus, ii) the medial
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) (T=4.89, p=0.002), extending to the
pre- and subcallosal ACC, and iii) the left parahippocampal gyrus
(T=6.21, p=0.011) extending into the left fusiform gyrus (FFG) (see
Fig. 1, Table 2).
A decrease in animacy experience was associated with increased
activations in i) the right postcentral gyrus (T=4.94, p=0.007)
extending to the precentral gyrus and the inferior parietal lobe, ii) the
right inferior frontal gyrus (T=4.58, p=0.028), and iii) the right
precuneus (T=4.33, p=0.029) (see Fig. 1, Table 2).
Neural correlates of movement patterns
An increase in interactive movements based on approach and
responsiveness, showed stronger neural activity in i) the insula
bilaterally (right insula: T=6.77, pb0.001; left insula: T=5.82,
pb0.001), extending to the right amygdala, the bilateral STG, and the
right temporal pole, ii) the ACCbilaterally (maxima on the left: T=5.89,
pb0.001), iii) the bilateral FFG (right FFG: T=5,49, pb0.001; left FFG:
T=6.22, pb0.001), iv) thebilateral parahippocampal gyrus (maximaon
the left: T=5.48, pb0.001), v) the leftmiddle cingulate cortex (T=5.87,
p=0.001), vi) the right paracentral lobule (T=6.01, p=0.015),
and vii) the bilateral rolandic operculum (right operculum: T=6.98,
p=0.019; left operculum: T=5.29, p=0.031) (see Fig. 2, Table 3).
A decrease in interactive movements based on movements of
approach and responsiveness revealed increased neural activity in
i) the precuneus (T=6.03, pb0.001), ii) the right middle frontal gyrus
(T=4.66, pb0.001), extending to the inferior frontal gyrus, iii) the
bilateral inferior parietal lobe (right IPL: T=4.72, p=0.001; left IPL:
T=4.36, p=0.012), and iv) the left inferior frontal gyrus (T=5.21,
pb0.031) (see Fig. 2, Table 3).
Table 1
Descriptive and inferential statistics for the four stimulus categories based on movement
patterns. M=Mean, SD=Standard Deviation, CI=Conﬁdence Interval. * p-Values that
survived the Bonferroni-correction for multiple comparisons (pb0.008).
95% CI
Movement patterns M SD Lower bound Upper bound
1. no approach+no responsiveness 2.036 0.419 1.794 2.278
2. no approach+responsiveness 2.641 0.546 2.326 2.956
3. approach+no responsiveness 3.055 0.384 2.833 3.276
4. approach+responsiveness 3.437 0.439 3.183 3.691
Pair-wise comparisons T df p r
1 vs. 2 −3.985 13 0.002* 0.74
2 vs. 3 −3.172 13 0.007* 0.66
3 vs. 4 −2.817 13 0.015 0.62
1 vs. 3 −12.214 13 0.000* 0.96
2 vs. 4 −8.260 13 0.000* 0.92
1 vs. 4 −9.690 13 0.000* 0.94
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Discussion
The present study focused on activation patterns of the brain
related to the subjective experience of animacy in a parametric
design, and on the inﬂuence of speciﬁc movement parameters
contributing to the subjective experience. Results show that with
increasing animacy experience, key regions part of the Social Neural
Network (SNN) were recruited, while decreasing experience of
animacy was associated with activation of fronto-parietal regions
previously associatedwith the humanMirror Neuron System (hMNS).
We argue that the hMNS may constitute a neural module for the
“detection” and “interpretation” of actions, expressed in movement
variations in general. Conversely, when stimuli appear highly
animated, as in the case of movements invoking social intentions
(such as “approach”), the SNN is recruited, assumed to be responsible
for the adequate interpretation or the “evaluation” of relevant social
cues.
Increasing animacy experience
Regions of increased neural activity that correlate with increasing
experience of animacy, namely the insula, the mOFC and the ACC, the
STG/STS and the FFG, are key regions in social neuroscience.
The strongest increase in activity bilaterally was shown in the
insula, extending to the posterior STG/STS. The role of the insula, as
part of the SNN (Adolphs, 1999; Blakemore, 2008; Frith and Frith,
2006), has recently become more prominent due to its involvement
in decision-making processes (Huettel, 2006; Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005; Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008), as well as in the
perception of fear (Phillips et al., 1997) and disgust (Anderson et al.,
2003; Phillips et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 1997), and empathy for
others (Jabbi et al., 2007; Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2004).
Only very recently, models on the functional role of the insular
cortex have been proposed. One of these models links the insula to a
functional role in awareness (Craig, 2009), as a site where inputs
from interoceptive signals are integrated with signals of emotionally
salient stimuli coming from the TP and the amygdala. Subjective
awareness is processed in the insula by integrating motivational,
social and cognitive conditions represented in other parts of the
brain such as the mPFC. Another recent model on the function of the
insula implicates this region in affective learning that could guide
decision making in uncertain environments (Singer et al., 2009).
This model is supported by research in decision making that show a
strong link between insular activation, particularly the anterior
insula, and processing, representing and learning information about
risk and uncertainty (Huettel, 2006; Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff
et al., 2008). Increasing animacy experience revealed an increased
Fig. 1. Brain regions of increased activation for parametric modulation of animacy experience. Parametric modulation analysis of fMRI data identiﬁed the bilateral insula extending
into the STS, the mOFC, and left parahippocampal gyrus extending into the FFG, where BOLD signal changes increased linearly with increasing animacy experience (upper box). Plots
illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for movies with different ratings for four different local maxima (upper left plot: Parahipp, x=−14, y=−36, z=−13; lower
left plot: right Ins, x=38, y=−30, z=23; upper right plot: mOFC, x=12, y=52, z=−1; lower right plot: left Ins, x=−32, y=−22, z=19). The same analysis revealed regions in
right inferior frontal (IFG) and parietal lobules (IPL) as well as in the precuneus where BOLD signal changes increased linearly with decreasing animacy experience (lower box). Plots
illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for movies with different ratings for three different local maxima (left plot: IPL, x=54, y=−40, z=53;middle plot: IFG, x=44,
y=14, z=31; right plot: PCun, x=16, y=−70, z=43). The SPM{t} maps of these contrasts were overlaid on lateral and medial views of a surface based representation of the MNI
canonical brain. The bar represents the color coding of the t-values for overlaid SPM{t} maps; mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex; Hipp=parahippocampal gyrus; Ins=Insula;
IPL=inferior parietal lobule; PCun=Precuneus; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus.
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activity in posterior insular cortex, replicating previous ﬁndings
in animacy research (Gobbini et al., 2007; Wheatley et al., 2007),
while increasing complexity of interactive movements extended
this activation to the medial and anterior insula. Based on the
above mentioned functional models on the insula, we suggest that
meaningful social cues, such as movements of approach and
responsiveness, represent salient information that – through the
set of movies – helped the subjects to base their decisions on what
they felt as more animated or less so. Because they had to use a scale
to make their judgements (instead of using a binary system) the
more anterior sites of the insula come into play associated with an
affective learning component, by integrating stimuli-related emo-
tionally relevant information signalled from the TP and the
amygdala (areas that were activate during increasing interactive
movements, but not during increasing animacy experience). The
movement cues in our movies have an ambiguous nature in the
sense that subtle changes in movement patterns could lead to
animacy experiences that differed from subject to subject (subjec-
tive animacy experience). Due to the ambiguous cues used in our
movies, we suggest that affective learning in the insula helped
guiding the animacy judgements, which – together with the
integration of emotional, social and cognitive information – led to
an animacy-related subjective experience processed in more
posterior areas of the insula. Our hypothesis is in line with the
recent model on the insula proposed by Singer et al. (2009)
emphasizing its role in affective learning, as well as in the
integration of social information with information coming from
external uncertain/ambiguous cues.
On the basis of the literature it is plausible to speculate that the
integration of information in the insula is further processed by
strongly connected cortical areas responsible for the evaluation of the
potentially socially enriched material, including the mOFC and the
ACC in the vmPFC, which were among the strongest activated regions
associated with increasing animacy experience. This region has been
previously linked to mentalizing capacities or person perception
(Amodio and Frith, 2006), and the observation of communicative
intentions (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Becchio et al., 2006; Grezes et al.,
2004; Walter et al., 2004). Thus, studies point to a functional
dissociation within frontal dorsal/medial areas. Activity in the ventral
mPFC is involved in social and emotional processes (Bush et al., 2000;
Whalen et al., 1998), whereas the dorsal mPFC is involved in more
cognitive processes such as resolving cognitive conﬂicts (present in
tasks such as the Stroop task) (Botvinick et al., 2004; Carter et al.,
1998). Speciﬁcally, the ventral mPFC seems to play a role in social and
emotional evaluation (Somerville et al., 2006). In conformity, our
results point to a role of the ventral mPFC in the evaluation of
animated movements and processing social cues. Walter et al. (2004)
in particular, proposed that the ventral mPFC is mainly involved in
mentalizing processes that are embedded in a context of social
interaction, while private intentions are processed in a more dorsal
region (Walter et al., 2004). Our present ﬁndings are in accordance
with this hypothesis. The animations always showed two spheres in
which increasing animacy experience and interactive movements
(approach and responsiveness) resulted in increased ventral mPFC
activation. Moreover, the same region has previously been shown to
be activated by the perception of socially relevant facial expressions
and by being personally addressed in a (virtual) social interaction
(Schilbach et al., 2006), and during the experience of an “online”
interaction with a virtual other in a gaze-contingency paradigm
(Schilbach et al., 2009). Socially relevant facial expressions might feed
the same evaluation process that is also involved during the judgment
of animated scenes as presented in the current experiment,
irrespective of whether the stimuli are human-looking or context-
embedded (Wheatley et al., 2007). Closely related to our ﬁndings are
the results from a study using computer-animated characters to
investigate biological motion perception (Chaminade et al., 2007) that
found the vmPFC to be positively correlated with the tendency to
perceive motion as natural. Our study hence provides further
evidence that the vmPFC sustains the subjective perception of the
stimuli rather than their physical features such as anthropomorphic
properties.
Importantly, our instructions were not meant to elicit mentalizing
attributions, as we wanted to keep the subjects as free as possible
when generating their individual judgments related to their own
interpretation of the movements. Therefore, our instructions did not
provide any indication as to the animacy degree content in our
stimuli. Previous studies using geometric shapes did not ﬁnd any
differences in the amount of mental state inferences when comparing
explicit and non-cued instructions (Castelli et al., 2000). In the same
line, despite the lack of explicit instructions regarding mental state
ascription (“What was happening in this animation?”) Castelli et al.
(2002) still could demonstrate spontaneous mentalizing contents in
neurotypical participants' responses, as well as activations in the ToM
network. Furthermore, the events in our animations are very simple,
themost common and “typical” verbal description of the participating
subjects obtained after the experiment that can be related to
mentalizing (associated with the highest rated movies) was: “the
sphere seemed to know the other sphere” (that is why it stopped)
“and approached to talk”. In conclusion, we argue that animations
including socially meaningful movement patterns automatically elicit
spontaneous mentalizing processes that lead to the attribution of
personality or animacy. Consequently, the supposed spontaneous
mentalizing in the context of animacy perception could explain the
involvement of the vmPFC as a part of the ToM network.
We also found activation of the fusiformgyrus (FFG),whichhas been
introduced as the “face recognition” area (Kanwisher et al., 1997). This
view, however, has recently been challenged by the “expertise
hypothesis” proposing that the FFG is recruited during categorizing
tasks in which participants have reached a signiﬁcant expertise,
whether these are faces or object categories (Bukach et al., 2006;
Table 2
Neural correlates of animacy experience. Results of the random-effects analysis with
linear parametric modulation of the BOLD-response to stimulus movies by subjects'
ratings. Included are: (i) the contrast identifying regions with increased neural
activation corresponding to increasing animacy experience; and (ii) the contrast
identifying neural regions with increased neural activation corresponding to decreasing
animacy experience. For each presented cluster, coordinates at the maximum voxel are
reported in the same row as the cluster size. Within extended clusters, coordinates for
additional local maxima are indicated in rows below the respective cluster size
declaration. Distinct clusters are separated with white lines. x, y and z refer to the MNI
stereotactic coordinates. R=right hemisphere; L=left hemisphere; STG=superior
temporal gyrus; STS=superior temporal sulcus; mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex;
ACC=anterior cingulate cortex; FFG=fusiform gyrus.
Region Cluster size Cluster pc Side x y z T
Increasing animacy experience
Insula 1160 0.000 R 38 −30 23 5.49
STG R 46 −20 3 5.02
Postcentral gyrus R 50 −8 35 4.17
Insula 885 0.000 L −32 −22 19 5.34
STG L −44 −16 1 5.08
STS L −60 −20 1 4.27
mOFC 518 0.002 R 12 52 −1 4.89
ACC R 2 40 −3 4.29
Parahippocampal gyrus 409 0.011 L −14 −36 −13 6.21
Lingual gyrus L −14 −42 −3 4.37
FFG L −28 −50 −11 4.08
Decreasing animacy experience
Postcentral gyrus 439 0.007 R 40 −32 55 4.94
Precentral gyrus R 40 −26 61 4.03
Inferior parietal lobule R 54 −40 53 3.08
Inferior frontal gyrus 339 0.028 R 44 14 31 4.58
R 58 14 31 3.56
Precuneus 337 0.029 R 16 −70 43 4.33
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Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier et al., 1999; Golby et al., 2001). Sup-
porting the expertise hypothesis, animacy studies addressing mentaliz-
ing processes frequently reported FFG activations in the absence of
facial features in the stimuli (Castelli et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Martin and Weisberg, 2003; Schultz et al., 2005;
Tavares et al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 2007). We suggest that the FFG
activation evoked by increased animacy experience and movements of
approach might be related to the high expertise of humans for socially
appearing animated movements, since humans are highly specialized
in and attuned to social relevant signs (Tomasello et al., 2005).
Increased STS/STG bilateral activation associated with increased
animacy experience and with increase in interactive movements, is
congruent with previous reports implicating the STS/STG in the
perception of biological motion (Beauchamp et al., 2002, 2003;
Bonda et al., 1996; Grezes and Decety, 2002; Grezes et al., 2001;
Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman and Blake, 2001; Howard et al.,
1996; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Vaina et al., 2001), in processing the
kinematics of geometrical ﬁgures (Blakemore et al., 2003; Schultz
et al., 2005, 2004), and in processing realistic scenes (Mar et al.,
2007). More speciﬁcally, it has been proposed that the STS may be
important for the processing of intentional action (Blakemore et al.,
2003; Saxe et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2004). The lateralization of
such responses, however, is still a matter of conjecture. Ciaramidaro
et al. (2007) proposed that the left STS is mainly related to the
processing of communicative intention, while the right STS may play
a role in understanding others intentions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007).
Recently, de Lange et al. (2008) also found the right STS to
speciﬁcally activate when participants in their study selectively
attended to the intentionality of an action (de Lange et al., 2008).
Saxe et al. (2004) showed their participants videos of an actor
walking and stopping for a certain period of time behind a bookcase
(Saxe et al., 2004). They found activation in the right STS related to
longer occlusions, suggesting that this region is involved in the
representation of observed intentional actions. Contradicting previ-
ous behavioural results (Santos et al., 2008), we were surprised to
verify that in the present study using the same paradigm, time delay
did not constitute a signiﬁcant cue for animacy experience, neither at
the behavioural level (please see section Results for the behavioural
data), nor at the neural level (even when using a lower threshold).
One possible explanation for the difference between the results in
the present study and the results observed in the Saxe et al. (2004)
paradigm lies on the fundamental difference between the types of
characters involved. Wherefore, watching a human hide behind a
box may lead to stronger effects related to mental attributions (such
as intentional inferences) than watching a sphere stopping for varied
amounts of time.
Fig. 2. Brain regions of increased activation for parametric modulation of interactive movements between the spheres (approach and responsiveness). Parametric modulation
analysis of fMRI data identiﬁed regions in bilateral insula extending into the STG, right amygdala and temporal pole, mOFC and bilateral parahippocampal gyrus, FFG and middle
cingulate gyrus where BOLD signal changes increased linearly with increasing interactive movements (upper box). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for
movies with different movement patterns (1=no interactive movement between the spheres to 4=both movements of approach and responsiveness) for four different local
maxima (upper left plot: FFG, x=−28, y=−50, z=−11; lower left plot: right Ins, x=36, y=−12, z=5; upper right plot: mOFC, x=10, y=54, z=−5; lower right plot: right
Amyg, x=28, y=−2, z=−19). The same analysis revealed regions in bilateral inferior frontal and parietal lobules as well as in the precuneus where BOLD signal changes increased
linearly with decreasing interactive movements (lower box). Plots illustrate corresponding contrast estimates obtained for movies with different movement patterns (see above) for
three different local maxima (left plot: IPL, x=54, y=−44, z=51; middle plot: IFG, x=58, y=10, z=23; right plot: PCun, x=6, y=−68, z=45). The SPM{t} maps of these
contrasts were overlaid on lateral and medial views of a surface based representation of the MNI canonical brain; mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex; Amyg=Amygdala;
FFG=fusiform gyrus; Ins=Insula; IPL=inferior parietal lobule; PCun=Precuneus; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus. Statistical threshold: pb0.0005 at the voxel level, uncorrected and
pb0.05 at the cluster-level, corrected.
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Increase in interactive movements (approach and responsiveness)
Corroborating the subjective experience of increased animacy a
very similar pattern was found associated with increasing complexity
of social cues, expressed as an increase in interactive movements
between the spheres, namely in a wide range of brain areas implicated
as part of the SNN, including the insula, activation extending to the
STG, the amygdala, the parahippocampal gyrus and the temporal pole
(TP), the mOFC, the FFG, and others.
We have already discussed before the speciﬁc role of the insula.
With increasing complexity of interactive movements between the
spheres (movements of approach and responsiveness) the increased
activation in the posterior insula extended forward to the medial and
anterior insula, the amygdala and the TP.
The TP, as part of the SNN (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Blakemore,
2008; Frith, 2007; Pinkham et al., 2003) was recently discussed to
process complex social stimuli based on narrative or scripts (Castelli
et al., 2000; Olson et al., 2007), abstract conceptual knowledge of
social behaviours (Zahn et al., 2007), and is found in “classical” ToM
studies (Fletcher et al., 1995; Vogeley et al., 2001). Here we show that
the TP is also responsive to comparably simple animated movement
that introduces social narrative into the display. The parahippocampal
gyrus, functionally close related to the TP, and the hippocampus were
also found to be activate. Previous studies point to a role of the
parahippocampal regions in contextual (Rauchs et al., 2008) and
autobiographical memory (Fink et al., 1996; Maguire, 2001; Maguire
et al., 2000). Maguire et al. (2000) observed increased connectivity
between the parahippocampal gyrus and the temporal pole associated
with retrieval of autobiographical events. Activations in these areas
may hence reﬂect the access to social semantic information while
decoding the displayed movements.
With strong connections to the insula (Hoistad and Barbas, 2008),
the TP and the OFC (Adolphs, 2003; Davidson and Irwin, 1999), the
amygdala, as part of the SNN (Adolphs, 1999, 2001, 2003; Blakemore,
2008; Brothers, 1990; Frith, 2007; Pinkham et al., 2008; Skuse and
Gallagher, 2009), have been associated to the evaluation of emotional
signiﬁcance in social contexts (Adolphs, 2003). Its role in associating
valence to stimuli (Kim et al., 2003; Pessoa et al., 2005; Straube et al.,
2008) and its activation by stimulus intensity, but not value
(Anderson and Sobel, 2003; Small et al., 2003), has led to a recent
hypothesis that the amygdala actually codes an interaction between
intensity and valence of the stimuli, reﬂecting the overall emotional
value of a stimulus (Dolan, 2007). In accordance, it also modulates
emotional behaviour during biologically-relevant situations (Herry et
al., 2007). Moreover, it has been suggested that the amygdala is
involved in vigilance for salient stimuli that are unpredictable or
ambiguous (Adolphs, 2009; Whalen, 2007). The involvement of the
amygdala for increases in interactive movements might have been
necessary to evaluate the salience in movement changes, as part of
socially meaningful contexts. Thus, it is quite plausible, considering
the activation of the amygdala for increases in interactive movements
but not for increases in animacy experience that the amygdala played
an important role in the evaluation of social physical cues present in
the stimuli by coding for its overall emotional/social value.
The large activation of the mOFC (as part of the vmPFC), and the
overlap with the effects of increases in animacy experience reiterates
the important contribution of interactive elements in the perception
of animacy and the role of the vmPFC in perceiving them.
Decreasing animacy experience
A decrease in animacy experience activated the inferior parietal
lobe (IPL) bilaterally and the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which
have previously been described as part of the hMNS (Hamilton and
Grafton, 2007; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), the postcentral gyrus
and the precuneus.
The precuneus has been previously implicated in visuo-spatial
imagery, in shifting attention between targets, and in encoding aswell
as retrieval of spatial locations (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006; Frings et al., 2006; Misaki et al., 2002; Rao et al.,
2003; Wheatley et al., 2007). Thus, the parietal cortex together with
the precuneus, cooperates in directing attention in space during
mentally tracking targets (Culham et al., 1998). Increases in
precuneus activation have also been reported during processing of
animated stimuli (Ochsner et al., 2004; Wheatley et al., 2007), real
stimuli when compared to animated (Mar et al., 2007) and
perspective taking (Chaminade and Decety, 2002; Farrer and Frith,
2002; Ruby and Decety, 2001; Vogeley et al., 2004), suggesting that
this region serves the function of a spatial workspace within the ToM
network. Its increased activity during decreased animacy experience,
suggests that the involvement of the precuneus links to the processing
of dynamic scenes, more related to spatial dynamics than to social
animacy inference. The relevance of such a visuo-spatial workspace in
social cognition is evident, since dynamic scenes have to be evaluated
for their spatial and temporal contingency in order to allow
recognition of social cues.
Table 3
Neural correlates of movement patterns. Results of the random-effects analyses with
linear parametric modulation of the BOLD-response to stimulus movies by interactive
movement patterns between the spheres. Included are: (i) the contrast identifying
regions with increased neural activation corresponding to increases in interactive
movements; (ii) the contrast identifying neural regions with increased neural
activation corresponding to decreases in interactive movements. For each presented
cluster, coordinates at the maximum voxel are reported in the same row as the cluster
size. Within extended clusters, coordinates for additional local maxima are indicated in
rows below the respective cluster size declaration. Distinct clusters are separated with
white lines. x, y and z refer to the MNI stereotactic coordinates. R=right hemisphere,
L=left hemisphere. STG=superior temporal gyrus; STS=superior temporal sulcus;
ACC=anterior cingulate cortex; mOFC=medial orbitofrontal cortex; FFG=fusiform
gyrus.
Region Cluster size Cluster pc Side x y z T
Increasing interactive movement approach+responsiveness
Insula 1303 0.000 R 36 −12 5 6.77
Amygdala R 28 −2 −19 6.00
STG R 54 −22 9 4.91
Rolandic operculum R 60 −4 17 4.88
Temporal pole R 40 4 −23 4.16
Parahippocampal gyrus R 34 −10 −25 3.95
Insula 843 0.000 L −36 −16 17 5.82
STG L −44 −18 5 5.39
STS L −54 −18 −5 4.38
ACC 640 0.000 L −2 46 −7 5.89
mOFC R 10 54 −5 4.83
Rectal gyrus L −4 42 −15 5.13
R 6 30 −19 4.86
FFG 331 0.000 L −28 −50 −11 6.22
Lingual gyrus L −26 −56 −7 5.30
Parahippocampal gyrus L −22 −30 −15 3.97
Parahippocampal gyrus 318 0.000 L −20 −14 −19 5.48
FFG L −34 −28 −15 4.05
FFG 290 0.000 R 22 −46 −11 5.49
Lingual gyrus R 16 −58 −11 5.42
Parahippocampal gyrus R 26 −44 −3 4.16
Middle cingulate cortex 212 0.001 L −12 −46 37 5.87
Paracentral lobule 121 0.015 R 14 −38 49 6.01
Rolandic operculum 114 0.019 R 46 −8 19 6.98
Middle cingulate cortex 113 0.020 L −6 −14 43 5.17
Rolandic operculum 101 0.031 L −58 −2 9 5.29
Decreasing interactive movement approach+responsiveness
Precuneus 524 0.000 R 6 −68 45 6.03
Middle frontal gyrus 297 0.000 R 46 32 23 4.66
Inferior frontal gyrus R 58 10 23 4.65
Inferior parietal lobule 207 0.001 R 54 −44 51 4.72
Inferior parietal lobule 128 0.012 L −36 −38 45 4.36
Angular gyrus L −30 −52 37 3.97
Inferior frontal gyrus 101 0.031 L −42 26 27 5.21
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Activity in the precuneus has also been shown in self-processing
experiments. Vogeley et al. (2001) found precuneus activations for
ﬁrst person perspective during mental attributions to oneself.
Similarly, precuneus activations were found in studies involving
self-reﬂection (Johnson et al., 2002; Lou et al., 2004). Den Ouden et al.
(2005) found convergent precuneus activation both for intentional
causality and prospective memory, leading to the suggestion of the
precuneus speciﬁc involvement in processing intentions related to the
self (den Ouden et al., 2005). Together with the recent implication of
the precuneus as part of the brain default mode (Gusnard and Raichle,
2001) – corresponding to a metabolic resting state – a decrease in
animacy experience might reﬂect a state of relaxation allowing a
reorientation to the subject's own thoughts, when demands to focus
on social signals embedded in the animated stimuli decrease.
The hMNS concept is an extension of the earlier description of
mirror neurons activated by execution and observation of actions in
monkeys (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). The putative
localization for the hMNS includes the left and right IPL and the right
IFG (Hamilton and Grafton, 2007; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
Research has shown these brain areas to be implicated in action
perception, whether the actions are performed (Grafton et al., 1992),
imagined (Grafton et al., 1996; Iacoboni et al., 1999), observed
(Buccino et al., 2001, 2004), or imitated (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006;
Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 1999). The “motor resonance
function” of the hMNS has been related to empathy (Iacoboni and
Dapretto, 2006). Furthermore, the hMNS seems to play a role in
differentiating intentional actions that are part of everyday life (for
example, grasping to drink) (Iacoboni et al., 2005). Particularly, the
lateral parietal lobe responds to changes in movement direction
(Donner et al., 2007; Martinez-Trujillo et al., 2007; Shulman et al.,
2001) and is associated with spatial attention (Corbetta and Shulman,
2002) while the inferior frontal gyrus is involved in task switching
(Brass et al., 2007), which suggests that these regions contribute to
action understanding.
In the present study only the SNN but not the hMNS was
modulated by increasing animacy experience. In accordance, Wheat-
ley et al. (2007) investigated brain activity evoked by interpreting and
imagining moving shapes as animate or inanimate. They found the
hMNS to be active during both motion observation and imagery but
not modulated by animacy. Similarly, perceiving motion as natural/
biological positively correlated with the SNN, but negatively corre-
lated with the hMNS (Chaminade et al., 2007). Thus, recent studies
found the hMNS to respond to both human and robotic actions
(Gazzola et al., 2007), as well as to movements not belonging to the
humanmotor repertoire (Engel et al., 2008). As increased activation of
the hMNS was also found during the decrease in interactive move-
ments in the movies, it appears that the hMNS might be involved – as
a more general and early stage of processing – in the understanding of
a wide range of actions rather than sustaining the perception and
interpretation of social movement cues which is the functional role of
the SNN. In particular, we would like to argue that the hMNS is not
speciﬁcally involved in animacy perception or detection of social cues,
or, at least, it is involved to a lower degree once socially signiﬁcant
signals become relevant. Along the same line, we hypothesize that
paradigms that concern making decisions as to observed intentions
and social inferences might require brain areas that integrate a wide
range of social information and decision-making processing. There-
fore, once decisions about social content have to be made, and the
degree of social computation increases, the SNN is recruited to take
over. The hMNS function in social perception and in action perception
appears to be necessary to process intentionality and imitation, but
not necessarily social and not necessarily animated or biological, in
the sense of relevant action “detection” whereas the action “evalu-
ation” is a key property of the SNN.
On a more speculative note, we would like to propose that while
increasing animacy experience recruits sites involved with higher
cognition that are required for computation and interpretation of
social movements (including brain regions involved in access to
semantic social memories) – correspondent to a more cognitive-
controlled system of processing – a decrease in animacy experience
would rather involve more low-level processing of features, an early
evolutionary system involving sites of automatic movement percep-
tion processing.While decreasing animacy experiencewould rely on a
neural system evolutionarily shared with other animals – the MNS –
the increasing animacy experience would rely on a neural system
strongly dependent on anterior–frontal structures such as the
prefrontal cortex, which would constitute our “social cognition” site
of evolutionary complexity gain — the SNN. As such, humans are
capable of disentangling and interpreting very subtle social cues in
other movements, to make decisions concerning social content, and
then also able to trigger a quite advanced system of interpretation
capacity such as mentalizing.
Conclusions
The present research used a parametric approach to explore brain
activations during increases and decreases in animacy experience and
to understand how certain movement parameters contribute to this
experience. Firstly, our study corroborates that also simple geometric
ﬁgures can convey the impression of social encounters if they express
a certain pattern of movements that allow ascribing animacy to these
ﬁgures. Secondly, a subjective increase in animacy experience relates
to increased activation in key brain areas of the SNN, dedicated to the
subjective experience of being in the presence of entities that are
perceived as social agents and necessary for the computation of social
cues. We also showed that interactive movements, such as move-
ments of approach, constitute a prime animacy property for social
content perception. Thirdly, decreasing animacy experience, and
decreases in interactive movements correlated with increased
activations of the hMNS, suggesting that the hMNS is involved in
pre-inferential processes that appear as necessary but most likely not
as a sufﬁcient precondition for animacy perception or for decision-
making processes concerning social inferences. Finally, the implica-
tions of the present study foster future neuroimaging research to
apply parametric methods to access differential components in the
study of animacy perception and in clinical studies related to
neuropsychiatric disorders such as autism and schizophrenia that
typically show difﬁculties of social nature.
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Abstract  
In individuals with high-functioning autism (HFA), the interpretation of social stimuli is 
assumed to rely more on feature-based cognitive strategies than on intuitive heuristics. To 
examine this, we computed neural correlates of increasing animacy in dynamic geometric 
shapes based on physical features and on subjective perceptions. 
13 HFA adults and 13 matched controls rated the “person-likeness” of stimuli with 
increasingly interactive movement patterns during fMRI. Parametric modulations of neural 
responses to stimuli were analysed by using i) subjective, i.e. rating-related, and ii) objective, 
i.e. movement-related measures of animacy. 
In controls relative to HFA, increasing subjective animacy correlated more strongly with 
activity in amygdala and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) associated with enhanced 
salience and mentalizing. In contrast, in both groups objective animacy was correlated with 
activity in superior temporal gyrus and ventral mPFC related to processing and evaluating 
meaningful movements. Furthermore, the more ratings correlated with stimulus properties, the 
stronger was the involvement of temporo-parietal regions in controls, relative to HFA. 
These results confirm specific differences in cognitive strategies between HFA and controls 
by suggesting that in HFA feature-based classification of social stimuli is relatively intact, 
while more complex processes related to subjectively experienced salience and mind 
attribution are absent.
 3 
Introduction 
Being able to spontaneously and effortlessly apprehend other minds is a skill we take for 
granted, which makes it difficult to imagine that it may not be readily available. Autism 
spectrum disorders, however, are characterized by such impairment in mind perception and 
understanding. In particular, adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) demonstrate a 
remarkable discrepancy between intact non-social cognitive capacities and impaired 
processing of social information (Klin and Jones, 2006). Thus, by applying compensatory 
cognitive strategies that rely more on feature-based processing, individuals with HFA may 
nonetheless be able to correctly classify and interpret social stimuli observed in experimental 
settings (Klin et al., 2003; Schilbach et al., 2011). However, due to reduced salience and 
intrinsic significance of social cues and the stronger focus on physical properties of stimuli in 
HFA (Klin et al., 2003), this performance may be accompanied by differential emotional 
and/or cognitive responses and hence altered subjective experience (Kuzmanovic et al., 2011). 
Within the ability to spontaneously grasp social meanings, animacy (i.e., the interpretation of 
entities as mindful agents) represents a constitutive component. This phenomenon of mind 
attribution is not restricted to living beings but may also occur when perceiving dynamically 
moving geometric figures (Heider and Simmel, 1944). Using such figures to evoke animacy 
impressions, neuroimaging studies have revealed the recruitment of brain regions associated 
with different aspects of social cognition (Castelli et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Santos et 
al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2003; Tavares et al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 2007). Moreover, animacy 
perception tasks have proven to be sensitive to differences in the frequency of ‘mentalistic’ 
interpretations between HFA and controls, despite comparable performances on “classical”, 
explicit mentalizing tasks (Abell et al., 2000; Klin, 2000), as well as to reduced neural 
responses to animated stimuli in HFA in relevant social neural regions (Castelli et al., 2002; 
Spengler et al., 2010). 
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In the present study we used an established functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
paradigm drawing upon animacy perception in moving geometric figures (Santos et al., 2010). 
In contrast to previous research, stimuli in this paradigm systematically varied as to 
parametrically increase the impression of animacy (see Figure 1). This was achieved by 
modulating interactive movements between two spheres, which have been demonstrated to be 
crucial for the perception of animacy (Santos et al., 2010). In addition to this objective 
measure of animacy, all stimuli were rated on a trial-by-trial basis with respect to the 
subjectively perceived “person-likeness”. Consequently, this procedure provided both 
exogenous and endogenous measures for the same task. Effects of objective (stimulus-related) 
and subjective (rating-related) animacy were compared between HFA and controls. We 
hypothesized that basic perceptual, stimulus-driven processes used for feature-based 
classification of social cues could be largely intact in HFA (Klin and Jones, 2006), while 
profound differences should exist with regard to subjectively experienced salience and mind 
attribution, that have been previously associated with the amygdala (Pessoa, 2008; Robinson 
et al., 2010) an the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) (Amodio and Frith, 2006). In 
addition, the correlation between objective stimuli properties and their subjective ratings in 
each participant  – referred to as the subjective-objective fit (SOF) – allowed to investigate 
whether inter-individual differences regarding the propensity to recognize animacy were 
related to the same neural regions in HFA and controls. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Thirteen HFA participants were compared to 13 controls matched for gender, age, years of 
education and IQ (see Table 1). HFA participants were diagnosed and recruited in the Autism 
Outpatient Clinic at the Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Hospital 
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Cologne, Germany. Diagnoses were made independently by two trained physicians 
corresponding to ICD-10 criteria and supplemented by an extensive neuropsychological 
assessment. Included were patients with the diagnoses childhood autism (F84.0) and Asperger 
syndrome (F84.5) with an at least average IQ and thus with a high level of intellectual 
functioning. Except for three participants who were taking antidepressants (1x Zoloft 
50mg/day, 2x Citalopram 20mg/day) and reported episodes of depression, the HFA sample 
was free of psychotropic medication. As depression is a common co-morbidity in HFA 
(Lehnhardt et al., 2011; Stewart et al., 2006), they were not excluded although this resulted in 
a significant difference in the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) score (Beck and Steer, 1987) 
between HFA and controls (see Table 1). To control for depression symptoms, BDI was 
included as a covariate in all data analyses (see Data Analyses). Furthermore, in accordance 
with the clinical diagnoses, there were significant differences in the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ) (Wheelwright et al., 2006) between HFA and controls (see Table 1). 
Control participants were recruited online by addressing students and employees of the 
University of Cologne and the Research Center Juelich. They had no history of neurological 
or psychiatric disorders, and did not take any psychotropic medication. For matching 
purposes, intelligence in both groups was assessed by a German multiple choice vocabulary 
test (“Wortschatztest”, WST) (Lehrl et al., 1995; Schmidt and Metzler, 1992). After complete 
description of the study to the participants, written informed consent was obtained. The study 
was conducted with the approval of the local ethics committee. 
 
Experimental procedure 
Stimuli consisted of short video clips in which the basic scenery included two spheres (see 
Figure 1): one crossing the scene horizontally in the background (sphere 1), and the other 
placed in the front (sphere 2). Previous research has demonstrated that the perception of 
animacy can be induced by movements indicating “approach” and “responsiveness” (Santos 
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et al., 2010). Thus, the movement of sphere 1 was either steady or contained an interruption 
followed by a movement towards the other sphere thereby creating the impression of an 
approach. Sphere 2 either remained static or moved towards sphere 1 thereby indicating 
responsiveness. These movement characteristics were combined to four possible stimulus 
categories with an increasing amount of objective animacy (see Figure 1). Other stimulus 
characteristics such as the laterality or the vertical perspective of the scene were balanced 
across the four stimulus categories, as they have been shown to not significantly modulate the 
subjective experience of animacy (Santos et al., 2010). Furthermore, the time delay of the 
approach varied between 0 and 1s, but did not have any behavioral effect (Santos et al., 2010). 
Because of the use of geometric figures embedded in a maximally simplified setting, that do 
not represent social cues such as faces or complex interactive scenarios, the use of eye 
tracking was not indispensable to control for gaze behavior between the groups (Zwickel et 
al., 2010). The total stimulus duration varied between 2 and 5.7s, depending on movement 
events included. In total, 104 stimuli were presented in a randomized order with an intertrial 
jitter of 2-4s in two sessions, each lasting 6.25min, using Presentation software (Version 12.2, 
Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc). Participants were asked to evaluate each stimulus with regard 
to how “person-like” they experienced the movement of the spheres on a four-point rating 
scale ranging from 1 = physical to 4 = person-like. They were instructed to respond at the end 
of the stimulus presentation via a LUMItouch keypad (Photon Control Inc). A Magnetom Trio 
3T whole body scanner (Siemens AG, Medical Solutions) was used to acquire fMRI data with 
a T2*-weighted gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, 40 
axial slices aligned parallel to the AC-PC plane, flip angle = 90°, voxel size: 3.1x3.1x3 mm, 
200 mm FOV, 64x64 matrix, 147 volumes per session). Three additional volumes were 
collected and discarded at the beginning of each session to allow for magnetic saturation. 
 
Behavioral data analyses 
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All analyses were done using SPSS (PASW Statistics 18) and included BDI as a covariate to 
control for differences in reported depression symptoms between groups. The effect of 
stimulus categories on ratings as well as group differences were tested by a mixed ANOVA 
with group (HFA vs. control) as a between-subject factor and stimulus category (codes 1 to 4 
for stimulus categories, see Figure 1) as a within-subject factor. Additionally, Pearson 
correlation coefficients (r) were computed between ratings of each participant and 
correspondent stimulus categories resulting in the subjective-objective fit (SOF). Group 
differences in SOF were tested by a univariate ANOVA. Finally, in order to document 
whether the groups differed in the frequency with which they chose the four possible response 
options, a second mixed ANOVA was conducted with group as a between-subject factor and 
response option (ratings on a four-point-scale and missing responses) as a within-subject 
factor. 
 
fMRI data analyses 
FMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using MATLAB 7.1 (The MathWorks, Inc) and 
SPM8 (The Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging). The EPI images were corrected for 
head movements using realignment and unwarping, normalized to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) reference space using the unified segmentation function and spatially 
smoothed with an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.  
In all single subject analyses, conditions were modeled using a boxcar reference vector 
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and its time derivative. Onsets 
for events of interests were set at 1s before the end of each video clip with a 1s duration. 
Thus, the analyses focused only on the time window of the last second of the stimuli where 
the interactive movements were completed and could be evaluated by participants. In so 
doing, the duration of events of interest as well as the complexity of the enclosed movement 
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were kept constant as the last second was exactly the same across all stimuli (sphere 1 exits 
the scene, see Figure 1). Low-frequency signal drifts were filtered using a cutoff of 128s.  
Single subject contrasts were fed into group analyses employing a random-effects model. All 
models included participants’ BDI scores as a covariate in order to control for depression 
symptoms. On the group level, effects are reported as significant at p<.05, corrected for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level (pFWE-corr) with p<.001 at the voxel level. Functional 
activations were anatomically localized by using the brain atlas by Duvernoy (Duvernoy, 
1999) and the SPM anatomy toolbox, version 1.7 (Eickhoff et al., 2007). Group activation 
maps were superimposed on the canonical MNI single-subject T1-weighted brain of SPM8. 
For the comparison of neural correlates of animacy perception between HFA and controls 
three types of analyses were performed. The first set of analyses focused on brain regions 
where the activity correlated with increasing subjective animacy. Using ratings of each 
participant for parametric modulation of his or her general neural response to the stimuli, we 
investigated where in the brain the neural signal correlated with the subjective experience of 
animacy, irrespective of stimulus properties. Trials with missing responses were modeled on a 
separate regressor. Additionally, in order to investigate whether subjective animacy accounted 
for unique variance, an upgraded model was specified including first objective and second 
subjective animacy as parametric regressors.  
In the second set of analyses, the variation of animacy was operationalized objectively in 
accordance with systematic variations of stimulus properties. Here, codes for the four 
stimulus categories (see Figure 1) representing objective animacy were used for the 
parametric modulation of the general neural response to the stimuli.  
Third, the groups were compared with respect to general processing of the stimulus material – 
i.e. disregarding objective or subjective animacy levels, with the SOF of each participant as a 
covariate. Here, we tested whether the general processing of the stimuli differed for 
participants with varying propensity to recognize animacy-relevant movement patterns.  
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Results 
 
Behavioral results 
The ANOVA focusing on the effects of stimulus category on ratings did not reveal a 
significant main effect of group (F(1,23)=.41, p=.526), nor a significant interaction between 
group and stimulus category (F(2.2,49.5)=1.69, p=.193; see Figure 2). Thus, controls and 
HFA participants did not differ in their rating of stimuli. There was a significant main effect 
of stimulus category on ratings (F(2.2,49.5)=28.49, p=.000) indicating that across groups, 
stimuli were rated as more person-like when they included increasingly more animacy 
inducing movement patterns. This finding supports paradigm validity since it demonstrates 
that the stimuli indeed induced a parametric increase in animacy perception.  
The ANOVA comparing the groups with regard to SOF did not reveal a significant difference 
(F(1,23)=3.12, p=.091). On average, both groups showed a positive correlation between the 
subjective and the objective animacy (HFA: mean r=.56, s=.24; controls: mean r=.67, s=.17), 
providing further evidence that the stimuli affected the animacy ratings in the predicted 
manner across both groups. 
Finally, the ANOVA focusing on response frequencies did not reveal any group differences 
either. There was neither a significant main effect of group (F(1,24)=1.00, p=.327) nor a 
significant interaction between group and response option (F(2.1,51.2)=.57, p=.582). Thus, by 
showing that response frequencies of HFA and control participants were comparable, these 
groups could be compared with regard to the parametric modulation of the BOLD-response 
by individual ratings. 
 
fMRI results 
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The increase of neural activation with increasing subjective animacy experience was stronger 
in the control group compared to the HFA group in the dmPFC and the amygdala mainly 
located in the basolateral complex (Amunts et al., 2005) (see Table 2A for complete results 
and Figure 3A). There were no significant results for the reverse contrast (HFA > controls) or 
for the conjunction testing for common effects across both groups. Simple main effects of 
increasing subjective animacy revealed significant results for the control group (listed in 
Table 2A), but not for the HFA group. Furthermore, by including both objective and 
subjective animacy as parametric regressors in a supplementary analysis we tested whether 
subjective animacy accounted for different variance to that accounted for by varying stimulus 
properties. By using the effect of group difference in increasing subjective animacy reported 
in Table 2A as an inclusive mask, this upgraded model could replicate the prior results for 
controls > HFA, although at a more liberal statistical threshold (p<.005, uncorrected): right 
posterior insula (x=36, y=-18, z=-2, T=3.78, cluster size=150) extending into the right STG 
(x=52, y=-10, z=0, T=3.66), left STG (x=-52, y=-12, z=4, T=3.60, cluster size=110), left 
anterior insula (x=-32, y=4, z=-10, T=4.04, cluster size=109) extending into the temporal pole 
(x=-34, y=6, z=-22, T=3.05), left hippocampus (x=-34, y=-14, z=-18, T=3.70, cluster 
size=82), and the right hippocampus (x=22, y=-8, z=-32, T=3.56, cluster size=48) extending 
into the amygdala (x=24, y=-6, z=-18, T=2.69). Thus, there was unique variance accounted 
for by the subjective animacy despite the positive correlation between subjective and 
objective animacy in both groups. 
There were no significant differences between the HFA and the control group in the 
parametric modulation of the neural response to stimuli by increasing objective animacy 
(controls > HFA, HFA > controls). Instead, the conjunction revealed a common neural 
network across both groups correlating with increasing objective animacy including the 
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) and the bilateral rolandic operculum extending into the superior 
temporal gyrus (STG, see Table 3). The simple main effects of increasing objective animacy 
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were calculated for the control and the HFA group, respectively, and are listed in Table 3. 
These results show that the control group demonstrated neural modulation by increasing 
objective animacy in a more extended network than the HFA group.  
Finally, including the subjective-objective fit (SOF) of every participant as a covariate of the 
general neural response to stimuli revealed significant differences between the groups. 
Control participants with a greater SOF demonstrated a greater involvement of the left 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), superior frontal gyrus, and the right angular gyrus 
corresponding to the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) as compared to HFA participants (see 
Table 2A and Figure 3B). There were no significant results for the reverse contrast (HFA > 
controls) or when computing the conjunction across the groups. As evident from the scatter 
charts provided in Figure 3B, there was one outlier within the HFA group with a very low 
SOF value (r=-0.03). However, we could replicate the results also under exclusion of the 
correspondent participant (STS: x=-56, y=-24, z=-6, T=7.77, cluster size=157; superior frontal 
gyrus: x=-16, y=32, z=48, T=5.35, cluster size=200; and angular gyrus: x=42, y=-60, z=32, 
T=5.00, cluster size=218). There were no significant simple main effects for the inter-
individual correlation between the SOF and the general stimulus processing for either of the 
two groups. 
 
Discussion 
Depending on whether the neural responses to stimuli were correlated with subjective or 
objective animacy (within-subject level), or with the subjective-objective fit (SOF; between-
subject level), comparisons between the HFA and the control group revealed divergent 
results. Significant group differences occurred in neural correlates of subjectively experienced 
animacy, although stimulus-driven neural responses and behavioral stimulus ratings were 
comparable. Thus, these findings suggest that classification of social cues based on stimulus 
properties was similar in both groups, while more complex responses beyond the perceptual 
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analysis differed. Additionally, group differences occurred also with respect to neural 
correlates of inter-individual differences in SOF indicating the propensity to recognize 
animacy-relevant movement patterns. 
Given that the task was designed to prompt social cognition, our general result pattern may be 
interpreted in two ways. First, the absence of a differential recruitment of brain areas 
associated with social cognition for subjective animacy in HFA may have occurred because 
the applied stimuli were unable to evoke social processing in a similar way as they did in 
neurotypical individuals. Supporting this explanation, individuals with HFA have been shown 
not to attend to socially relevant details of complex scenes indicating a reduced salience of 
social cues (Klin et al., 2003). Importantly, the lack of group differences in accuracy and 
missing responses in our study nevertheless demonstrated that in this simplified setting HFA 
participants were able to recognize animacy cues and were equally motivated to perform the 
task. 
Second, due to the assumed impairment of social cognition in autism, individuals with HFA 
may have developed compensatory strategies based on a more tight analyses of physical 
stimulus properties as their integrative physical reasoning is not impaired (Klin and Jones, 
2006). This possibility accounts for the observed modulatory effect of objective, i.e. stimulus-
related, but not of subjective animacy on general stimulus processing in the HFA group. 
Within such a ‘strategic’ analysis of stimuli based on physical properties, only differences in 
physical properties themselves, but not in different outcomes of their appraisal need to be 
related to differences in neural activity. Notably, the two interpretations are not mutually 
exclusive, but may interact in the sense that a decreased predisposition for the salience of 
social cues has an impact on the development of social cognitive skills and possible 
compensatory strategies (Klin et al., 2003; Senju, 2011). 
Beyond this general interpretation, the specific brain regions differentially involved during 
animacy processing should be considered with regard to their functional roles. One of the 
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brain regions that more strongly correlated with increasing subjective animacy in controls as 
compared to HFA was the amygdala bilaterally. Serving as a highly interconnected node 
within multiple neural networks, the amygdala plays a central role in detecting salient sensory 
input (Pessoa, 2008; Robinson et al., 2010) and more specifically in recognizing and 
experiencing moving geometrical shapes as being animated (Castelli et al., 2002; Martin and 
Weisberg, 2003; Santos et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2003; Tavares et al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 
2007). Particularly the basolateral complex of the mammalian amygdala represents the 
primary input site where the majority of subcortical and cortical afferents such as visual 
information converge (Ball et al., 2007; Etkin et al., 2004). The close relationship between its 
activity and the animacy content of visual stimuli in controls confirm that in humans, too, the 
basolateral complex is a strong candidate for a subregion of the amygdala which is responsive 
to increased salience of sensory input.  
The greater recruitment of the bilateral amygdala with increasing subjective animacy in 
controls as compared to HFA provides direct empirical support for the amygdala theory of 
autism, which proposes a specific dysfunction of this region (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Most 
of the evidence for this theory is indirect and relates to anatomical variations of the amygdala 
or to decreased amygdala involvement in autism when processing social nonverbal cues 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2000). However, none of these studies 
demonstrated a relationship between trial-to-trial task performance and amygdala activation. 
Thus, our findings provide first-time evidence that the evaluation of social stimuli in HFA 
does not rely on the differential involvement of the amygdala to the same extent as in 
controls, possibly because the presented stimuli conveyed relatively less social meaning 
resulting in a decreased subjectively experienced salience.  
Furthermore, the increase of activity in the dmPFC with increasing subjective animacy 
experience was significantly stronger in controls than in HFA participants. As it plays a 
central role in classical mentalizing tasks (Amodio and Frith, 2006) and has been specifically 
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involved in perceiving animacy of moving geometric figures (Castelli et al., 2002; Schultz et 
al., 2003; Tavares et al., 2008; Wheatley et al., 2007), the involvement of this region might be 
associated with mind attribution elicited by increasingly interactive movement patterns. 
Difficulties in mentalizing are constitutive for autism spectrum disorders and reduced dmPFC 
activity has been demonstrated in previous imaging studies focusing on animacy perception 
(Castelli et al., 2002) and ‘mentalistic’ story comprehension (Happe et al., 1996). 
Furthermore, the lack of modulation of dmPFC activation by increasing animacy ratings in 
HFA is in accordance with less frequent interpretations of interactively moving geometric 
figures in terms of mental states (Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Klin, 2000). Thus, 
the absence of a differential involvement of the dmPFC provides further evidence for a 
different cognitive style in HFA that may be reactive to different stimulus properties, but does 
not imply mind attributions evoked by increasingly animated stimuli in neurotypical 
individuals.  
In contrast, when focusing on objective animacy, i.e. on increasingly interactive movement 
patterns of the stimuli, there were no significant differences between the HFA and the control 
group. In both groups neural activity in the vmPFC and the bilateral rolandic operculum 
extending into the STG increased with increasing objective animacy. The STG has been 
demonstrated to be specifically associated with identification of objective movement 
characteristics, such as the amount of interactivity between two moving geometrical figures 
(Schultz et al., 2005). In general, this region seems to respond to animacy-inducing movement 
of objects (Santos et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2003; Wheatley et al., 2007). Thus, its common 
involvement in both the HFA and the control group might represent a feature-based 
processing which depends on exogenous characteristics of stimuli, but is not directly related 
to endogenous responses, which depend on subjective appraisal beyond basic perception. 
Furthermore, these encoded features have to be integrated into an evaluative judgment that 
reflects internal values based on experiential learning, a process that has been specifically 
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associated with the vmPFC (Phan et al., 2004; Zysset et al., 2003). Thereby, vmPFC might 
operate in a top-down manner to modulate the unfolding stimulus representation in the STG 
(Bar et al., 2006). Following this line of interpretation, the feature-based and top-down guided 
analysis of stimulus properties does not seem to be impaired in HFA which explains the 
comparable behavioral performance between the two groups. 
Finally, we found interesting differences between groups when considering the covariance of 
the SOF, i.e. the fit between subjective and objective animacy, and the activity in the left STS, 
left superior frontal gyrus and right TPJ. In these brain regions, the activity was more strongly 
correlated with SOF in controls than in HFA participants, which indicates that they were 
engaged to a greater extent in neurotypical individuals with better propensities to recognize 
animacy-relevant movement patterns. The left STS and the right TPJ have previously been 
shown to be implicated in processing of biological motion (Blake and Shiffrar, 2007) and 
social inference (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009), respectively. The finding that the 
performance in animacy perception was not related to these regions in HFA is consistent with 
prior studies demonstrating less pronounced recruitment of the STS and TPJ in HFA as 
compared to controls during animacy perception (Castelli et al., 2002; Lombardo et al., 2011; 
Spengler et al., 2010) and further supports the assumption of differential neural mechanisms 
underlying social cognition in HFA. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Four frames extracted out of a stimulus video clip containing “approach” and 
“responsiveness” with arrows indicating the pathways of movements. Across all stimuli, the 
beginning and the end were exactly the same showing a red sphere in the front and a green 
sphere entering the scene in the background, passing by and exiting the scene. The middle 
part of video clips was systematically varied across the four stimulus categories. In the least 
animated category, there was no additional action, i.e., the green sphere passed by without a 
stop or change in the direction and the green sphere showed no reaction (category 1, no 
approach-no responsiveness). In the most animated category, the green sphere stopped in 
front of the red one (frame 2) and approached it while the red sphere responded by moving 
towards the green sphere (frame 3; category 4, approach-responsiveness). Category 2 stimuli 
contained only responsiveness and category 3 stimuli only approach. 
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Figure 2 Mean animacy ratings of the four stimulus categories for the control and the HFA 
group. Comparable across groups, stimuli that included animacy-inducing movement patterns 
(approach and responsiveness) were perceived as more personal on a four-point rating scale 
(1=physical, 4 =personal). 
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Figure 3 Group comparisons in within-subject (A) and between-subject (B) correlations 
between the BOLD signal and animacy-related measures. A) The effect of increasing 
subjective animacy (as indexed by participants’ event-related ratings) that was significantly 
greater in the control than in the HFA group. Activation maps show group differences in the 
parametric modulation of the general neural response to stimuli by subjective animacy and the 
plots show the corresponding contrast estimates for the four levels of subjective animacy, in 
the following activation peaks: dmPFC: x=-2, y=58, z=24; R Amy: x=24, y=-6, z=-18. The 
contrast estimates were derived from a supplementary 4 x 2 categorical model including 
regressors for each response option, separately for the two groups. B) Brain regions 
correlating with the subjective-objective fit (SOF, the fit between the ratings of a participant 
and the movement patterns of stimuli) to a significantly greater extent in the control than in 
the HFA group. Activation maps show group differences in the covariance of the general 
neural response to the stimuli, irrespective of animacy, and the SOF of each participant. For 
illustrative purposes, scatter charts showing the relation between the SOF and the contrast 
estimates of the significantly correlated neural regions are depicted: L STS: x=-56, y=-24, z=-
6; R TPJ: x=42, y=-60, z=32. Activation maps were superimposed on the canonical MNI 
single-subject T1-weighted brain of SPM8. L, left; R, right; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex; Amy, Amygdala; STS, superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction.
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Demographic and neuropsychological data. 
     HFA group Control group  
 M s M s Statistics 
Gender (m:f) 8:5  8:5    
Age (years) 29.08 4.33 29.77 4.02 t(24) = .42 p = .677 
Education (years) 16.96 3.99 19.50 3.10 t(24) = 1.81 p = .083 
IQ 109.54 9.19 108.00 7.45 t(24) = -.47 p = .643 
BDIa  9.92 8.14 3.46 3.89 t(17.2) = -2.58 p = .016* 
AQa 40.38 5.35 14.54 5.64 t(24) = -11.99 p = .000* 
HFA, high-functioning autism; M, mean; s, standard deviation; m, male; f, female; BDI, Beck 
Depression Inventory; AQ, Autism Spectrum Quotient. *p<.05. 
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Table 2 Significant effects of within-subject (A) and between-subject (B) correlations 
between the BOLD signal and animacy related measures that revealed significant group 
differences: A) BOLD signals correlating with increasing subjective animacy; B) Covariation 
of the general neural processing of stimuli with the subjective-objective fit (SOF). 
 Cluster-level Side x y z T 
 Size pFWE-corr      
A) INCREASING SUBJECTIVE ANIMACY        
Controls > HFA        
Insula (posterior) 628 .000 R 46 -12 2 5.24 
Superior temporal gyrus   R 52 0 -12 4.70 
Temporal pole   R 58 10 -8 3.40 
Insula (posterior) 587 .000 L -44 -10 -8 4.92 
Rolandic operculum   L -48 -8 6 4.92 
Hippocampus   L -28 -10 -16 4.21 
Superior temporal gyrus   L -56 -6 -4 3.94 
Amygdala   L -24 -6 -16 3.54 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 275 .004 L/R -2 58 24 4.79 
Hippocampus 272 .004 R 26 -8 -22 4.74 
Amygdala   R 24 -6 -18 4.60 
Insula (anterior) 269 .004 L -36 8 -12 5.45 
Temporal pole   L -18 4 -22 4.03 
        
Controls        
Rolandic operculum 4761 .000 L -48 -8 -6 7.38 
Fusiform gyrus   L -28 -28 -22 6.04 
Middle temporal gyrus   L -62 -24 -6 5.87 
Insula (posterior)   L -36 6 -14 5.74 
Temporal pole   L -18 4 -22 5.57 
Hippocampus   L -28 -12 -16 5.48 
Superior temporal gyrus   L -54 -4 -4 5.37 
Amygdala   L -24 -6 -16 5.21 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 4055 .000 R/L -2 58 24 6.28 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex   R/L 8 44 -18 6.08 
Hippocampus 3033 .000 R 30 -12 -20 7.16 
Superior temporal gyrus   R 58 -2 4 6.57 
Insula (posterior)   R 48 -10 4 6.20 
Amygdala   R 24 -6 -18 5.87 
Temporal pole   R 58 8 -8 5.21 
Insula (middle)   R 44 8 -4 4.10 
Posterior cingulate gyrus 2319 .000 R/L -4 -48 34 6.48 
Middle cingulate gyrus   R/L -2 -14 40 5.43 
Paracentral lobule 397 .000 R/L -2 -32 70 4.85 
Angular gyrus 350 .001 L -48 -74 30 4.82 
        
B) COVARIANCE WITH THE SOF        
Controls > HFA        
Superior temporal sulcus 255 .003 L -56 -24 -6 6.72 
Middle temporal gyrus   L -56 -24 -12 6.21 
Superior frontal gyrus 230 .005 L -16 30 50 5.40 
Angular Gyrus 186 .015 R 42 -60 32 5.22 
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Table 3 Significant effects of increasing objective animacy. 
 Cluster-level Side x y z T 
 Size pFWE-corr      
Conjunction: controls, HFA        
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 427 .000 L -4 50 -16 4.69 
   R 6 52 -12 3.80 
Rolandic operculum 333 .001 L -54 -6 10 5.84 
Superior temporal gyrus   L -56 -6 6 5.68 
Rolandic operculum 309 .002 R 56 -4 12 4.86 
Superior temporal gyrus   R 56 -18 2 3.68 
        
Controls        
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 6261 .000 R/L 6 42 -16 8.73 
Dorsomedial prefrontal gyrus   R/L 4 60 14 6.39 
Fusiform gyrus 5187 .000 L -26 -38 -16 7.12 
Middle cingulate gyrus   R/L -6 -32 42 6.84 
Posterior cingulate gyrus   R/L 6 -48 26 6.41 
Anterior calcarine sulcus   L -16 -56 6 5.05 
Rolandic operculum 3815 .000 L -50 -6 4 7.70 
Insula (anterior)   L -34 8 -18 6.19 
Insula (posterior)   L -42 -6 -2 6.12 
Superior temporal gyrus   L -44 -16 -6 6.00 
Middle temporal gyrus   L -62 -20 -8 5.25 
Hippocampus   L -24 -10 -14 5.22 
Amygdala   L -24 -2 -24 4.88 
Hippocampus 3564 .000 R 30 -12 -20 7.21 
Superior temporal gyrus   R 58 -16 2 6.92 
Temporal pole   R 48 4 -10 5.47 
Middle temporal gyrus   R 64 -6 -22 5.22 
Amygdala   R 28 -6 -18 4.97 
Fusiform gyrus 402 .000 R 26 -64 -16 4.68 
Angular gyrus 250 .006 L -48 -74 32 4.16 
Superior temporal gyrus 240 .008 L -44 -30 12 4.77 
Superior frontal gyrus 222 .011 L -24 38 40 5.74 
Parahippocampal gyrus 222 .011 R 22 -32 -14 5.09 
Cerebellum   R 22 -44 -24 4.23 
Anterior calcarine sulcus 203 .017 R 24 -54 6 4.57 
        
HFA        
Superior temporal gyrus 1363 .000 R 46 -26 14 5.16 
Insula (posterior)   R 40 -18 14 5.12 
Rolandic operculum   R 58 0 12 4.97 
Rolandic operculum 753 .000 L -58 -4 9 6.42 
Insula (posterior)   L -34 -14 22 4.97 
Superior temporal gyrus   L -50 -22 12 3.40 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 496 .000 L -14 48 -4 5.62 
   R 6 52 -12 3.80 
Superior occipital gyrus 374 .001 R 16 -92 32 4.61 
Middle occipital gyrus 225 .011 L -20 -82 16 4.40 
Superior occipital gyrus   L -16 -92 2 4.28 
Putamen 169 .037 L -28 -14 0 4.39 
   
